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INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NEW YORK BOSTON - CHICAGO 
ATLANTA SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO 



INTRODUCTION TO 
PHILOSOPHY 



By 

WILLIAM JERUSALEM, Ph.D, 

Lecturer in Philosophy and Pedagogy 
at the University of Vienna 



Authorized Translation 

{From the fourth edition) 
By 

CHARLES F. SANDERS, A. M. 

Professor of Philosophy, Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg, Pa. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1910 

All rights reserved 



« 



Copyright, 19 io 
By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 



Set up and electrotyped. Published December, 1910. 



NorfaoDlr ^regg: 
Berwick & Smith Co., Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 



©C!.A278u3> 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

The translator desires me to write a brief preface for 
the English edition of my Introduction. First of all, I 
wish to express my gratitude that the little book has been 
considered worthy of being presented to the English 
speaking world in their own tongue. I should like to 
add, furthermore, that I am greatly indebted to English 
and American thinkers for inspiration and suggestion 
which I regard of the highest value. Herbert Spencer 
taught me to think genetically and from William James, 
whose recent untimely death fills us all with profound 
sorrow, I got the idea of making psychological analysis 
the basis of my philosophical investigations. And in the 
new pragmatic method, which likewise originated in 
America, I have found a theory to which I had been led 
independently by my own investigations even before 
hearing of its American exponents. 

My book aims to accomplish a twofold purpose. It 
seeks to help all who find an interest in philosophy to an 
acquaintance with the language and the problems of 
philosophy, and thus to stimulate independent reflection. 
My constant motto in the presentation of the problems 
and the various solutions which have been proposed has 
been objectivity, perspicuity and brevity. The propae- 



vi AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

deutic adaptability of the book has been acknowledged 
by the German public as shown by the fact that four 
editions were required within ten years (1899-1909). I 
can only wish that English readers will judge as favor- 
ably of my method of exposition. 

The second aim of the book is to examine the prob- 
lems themselves and make some contribution towards 
their solution. Even in the first edition I defined my own 
attitude to all the various problems, and these divisions 
of the book have constantly been increasing in comprehen- 
siveness in the successive editions. The fourth edition, 
therefore, from which the translation is made, like- 
wise contains my philosophical system in mice. Although 
my own theory must certainly have influenced the pre- 
sentation of the problems and thus permeated the entire 
volume, my distinctive views have nevertheless been 
brought together and stated coherently in Sections 2'jy 
33, 2>7, 42, and the Concluding Reflections. 

My philosophy is characterized by the empirical view- 
point, the genetic method and the biological and social 
method of interpreting the human, mind. Adherence to 
these principles has brought me rather close to pragma- 
tism in epistemology. I have, nevertheless, attempted a 
further development of the pragmatic concept of truth. 
This method of interpretation has attested its value as a 
heuristic principle in Aesthetics and Ethics and led to the 
discovery of new results. 

The empiricist assumes an entirely different attitude 
to the problems of metaphysics from that of the critical 
apriorist. I undertook to show in my address at the 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE vii 

Heidelberg Congress of Philosophy (Kongressbericht, 
p. 806, ff.) that apriorism contains a latent metaphysics 
of which its exponents are frequently unaware, and which 
only becomes apparent when its presuppositions are 
consistently thought through to their logical conclu- 
sions. The evolutional thinker, on the other hand, al- 
ways understands perfectly that it is utterly impossible 
for experience to attain to ultimate facts. But, due 
to the ineradicable, metaphysical impulse the empiri- 
cist is obliged, with full consciousness of what he is 
about, to transcend experience. If this is done in 
harmony with the methods attested by scientific investi- 
gation, the result not only answers a deeply felt need, 
but it is at the same time fully justified scientifically. I 
shall never surrender the hope that this method will some 
day make it possible to harmonize philosophy with pure 
religion, and bring the synthesis of faith and knowledge 
to its perfect consummation. 

One thing, however, is certain. Philosophy dare no 
longer devote itself to speculations that move in the airy 
realm of the transcendental and sentimental. It must 
come down to the level of reality with all its real, fre- 
quently brutal and glaring contradictions. It must 
teach us to understand life itself ; it must strive to enrich 
this life, to increase its scope and depth, and at the same 
time define its ideal and destiny. 

WiLHELM Jerusalem 
Vienna, September 10, 1910 



viii AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

Note: After the foregoing comprehensive Preface 
there remains nothing for the translator to say except 
that he was led to the undertaking by the exceptional 
excellence of the author's method in presentation and 
exposition which has resulted in the production of such 
an excellent guide to the student of philosophy. It has 
been the aim of the translator to make the author speak 
English. We have in a few instances made a few addi- 
tions to the Bibliography. C. F. S. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



FIRST DIVISION 
The Significance and Position of Philosophy 



The Concept and the Problem of Philosophy 
The Psychological Origin of Philosophy , 
The Historical Origin of Philosophy 
Philosophy and Religion 
Philosophy and Science 
Division of Philosophy . 
The History of Philosophy 



I 
3 
5 
7 
II 
17 

20 



SECOND DIVISION 

The Propaedeutic (Preparatory) Disciplines 
The Subject Matter and the Problem of Psychology 
The Methods and the Schools of Psychology 
Psychology and Physiology .... 
Psychology and Philosophy .... 
The Subject Matter and the Problem of Logic 
The Development and the Schools of Logic 
Grammar, Logic and Psychology 
Logic and Philosophy 



25 

29 

37 
39 
41 
46 

51 

54 



THIRD DIVISION 

Criticism of Knowledge and Epistemology 

16. Dogmatism, Skepticism, Criticism .... 58 

17. The Problems of Knowledge 62 

18. The Development and the Schools of the Criticism of 

Knowledge 65 



X TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

19. Critical Idealism 71 

20. Examination of Critical Idealism .... 75 

21. Critical Realism 83 

22. The Development and the Schools of Epistemology . 86 

23. Sensualism 89 

24. Intellectualism 91 

25. Mysticism 95 

26. Pragmatism 98 

2y. Genetic and Biologic Epistemology .... 102 

FOURTH DIVISION 
Metaphysics or Ontology 

28. The Ontological Problem 135 

29. Materialism 139 

30. Spiritualism . . . . . . . . . 149 

31. The Monism of Substance 154 

22. The Monism of Becoming 163 

ZZ' Dualism 176 

34. The Cosmologico-theological Problem, God and the 

World ... 18s 

FIFTH DIVISION 
Methods and Aims of Aesthetics 

35. The Concept and the Problem of Aesthetics . . 196 

36. The Development and the Schools of Aesthetics . 200 

37. Genetic and Biologic Aesthetics 210 

SIXTH DIVISION 
Ethics and Sociology 

38. The Subject Matter and the Problem of Ethics . . 241 

39. The Development of Ethics 243 

40. The Problem of the Freedom of the Will . . . 254 

41. The Problems and the Schools of Ethics . . . 258 

42. Genetic and Biologic Ethics 260 

43. Sociology and the Philosophy of History . . . 2^6 

44. Pedagogy 285 

Concluding Reflections 291 

Topical Index 309 

Index of Authors 3i6 



AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PHILOSOPHY 

FIRST DIVISION 

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND POSITION 
OF PHILOSOPHY 

I. Concept and Problem of Philosophy 

Philosophy is the intellectual effort, which is under- 
taken with a viezv to combining the common experiences 
of life and the results of scientific investigation into a 
harmonious and consistent world-theory ; a world-theory 
moreover, which is adapted to satisfy the requirements 
of the imder standing and the demands of the heart. 
The common purpose of all philosophical reflection from 
its very beginning has been to realize a consistent theory 
of the world and of human life. Amidst all the diversity 
of opinion, as respects content and method, this has 
been the common aim of all philosophical systems. In 
this sense, therefore, all philosophy is theory of the 
world and of life. There was a time indeed when men 
believed that such a theory could be constructed from the 
pure forms of thought, without much concern about the 
results of detailed investigation. Philosophy was then 



2 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

regarded as the queen of the sciences, who might deter- 
mine by royal decree which resuUs of scientific and 
historical investigation should have authority and be ac- 
cepted as final. But that time is forever past. Any 
philosophy which will assume an attitude of indifference 
to the results of scientific investigation, or presume to 
dictate methods or to contradict results, can no longer 
expect to receive any recognition. Philosophy is obliged 
to keep in close touch with science and to take full ac- 
count of the results of scientific investigations. Resting 
upon this secure foundation, the philosophic impulse for 
unity may undertake to construct the fragments, beyond 
which scientific investigation can never attain, into con- 
sistent, articulated system. In doing so however, philoso- 
phy must employ the methods and instruments of thought 
which have been scientifically approved. 

The solution of this problem, however, is by no means 
a concern of theoretical thought alone. Our emotions, 
and especially our volitions, likewise make important 
contributions to our philosophy of the universe and of 
life. Herbert Spencer, one of the most matter-of-fact 
philosophers, has prefaced his Autobiography with the 
remark: "The feeling-moment plays an important part 
in the origin of any system of thought, perhaps even as 
great a part as the intellectual moment." 

A philosophical system is not to be regarded as a 
retreat whither a man may flee in order to escape 
the tedious routine of investigation. A man's philos- 
ophy, says Fichte, depends upon the kind of man he is. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY 3 

Philosophy is no longer the occupation of contempla- 
tive solitude ; it is no longer permitted to withdraw from 
the world of affairs. We must acquire our philosophy 
of the universe by careful scientific study, and apply it 
to our common experiences so as to elevate them to 
higher planes and to furnish correspondingly nobler 
impulses for our aspirations and our pursuits. Phil- 
osophy should teach us to regard the world and life from 
nobler viewpoints, but not simply to permit us to gaze 
complaisantly upon the world's activities and struggles 
as from some high watch-tower. 

Its chief duty rather consists in showing us from the 
higher standpoint the more distant goals towards which 
humanity is striving, and in inspiring us with energy 
and confidence, so that we may cooperate effectually in 
attaining them. 

2. The Psychological Origin of Philosophy 

The demand for a uniform world-theory is deeply 
rooted in the nature of man. Its most primitive form 
is the feeling of wonder. Plato and Aristotle indeed 
regard this sense of wonder as the beginning of phil- 
osophy. The feeling arises whenever we meet with a 
new experience, an experience which does not readily 
harmonize with our world-theory. Fear is frequently 
combined with this sense of wonder, for whatever is 
strange very readily takes on the appearance of being 
dangerous. But besides this practical wonder, if we 
may call it such, we can observe, even in the case of 



4 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

small children, a similar experience which bears no rela- 
tion whatever to fear, which we might call theoretical 
wonder. Thinking, therefore, which begins in practical 
reflection directed towards the preservation of life, 
eventually develops into a function which acts inde- 
pendently and without the incentive of practical necessity. 
In little children wonder or curiosity is first observed in 
the well-known quizzical expression of the countenance 
and later in naive questions ; in adults, and among whole 
races this function develops into scientific investigation 
and philosophic speculation.v^ Theoretical wonder ac- 
companies us all through life. Our curiosity or wonder 
is excited first of all by the novel and the strange. But 
there comes a time when the world-theory,/ which we 
appropriated almost unconsciously, at the hand of tradi- 
tion and under the influence of social and religious 
authority, no longer fully satisfies our riper thought. 
yWe then begin to wonder about things that were until 
then regarded as well known and commonplace, because 
they appear to us in a new light. It is just this wonder 
at the commonplace, the well known and the traditional, 
that marks the real beginning of philosophy. 

There is still another primitive fact of our psychic life 
which favors this tendency to philosophic wonder. I 
refer to the sense of the unity of our consciousness. 
Just as each one of us knows himself as an individual, 
a self-enclosed personality, — which, notwithstanding the 
most manifold relations to nature and to human kind, 
and the great changes which take place within the ego 



HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY 5 

during the natural course of development from the cradle 
to the grave, never ceases to feel itself as unitary and 
self-identical, — so do we also seek to explain the world 
about us according to a single uniform principle, and 
to conceive it as a unitary whole. The purpose and aim 
of all philosophizing as above described rests upon this 
psychical principle. 

The difficulty of finding unity in this variety increases 
in direct proportion as our idea of the world is enriched 
by scientific investigation. But this only furnishes new 
philosophic inspiration and the demand for unity becomes 
all the more intense. Hence we may safely assert that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the special sciences vigor- 
ously repudiate philosophic speculation and heap con- 
tempt upon it, the desire for philosophic knowledge will 
never cease. Although no philosophic system perma- 
nently satisfies, philosophy itself, according to the familiar 
saying of Schiller, will nevertheless endure forever. 

3. The Historical Origin of Philosophy 

The various civilized nations have elaborated systems 
of philosophy in entire independence of each other. The 
development of scientific philology during the nineteenth 
century has acquainted us with comprehensive philo- 
sophical speculations among the Chinese, Egyptians, 
Persians, and especially the Hindus, which are frequently 
profound. However, with the exception of a Very few 
thinkers of the nineteenth century, it is Greek phil- 
osophy alone, which has significance for the development 



6 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

of Western thought. Greek thought continued its activ- 
ity throughout the entire period of the middle ages, 
contributed much to the enrichment and inspiration of 
modern philosophy, and its historical efficiency is not by 
any means spent even yet. The Greeks first raised the 
questions with which we are still engaged; they dis- 
covered the instruments of thought which we still con- 
tinue to use. The study of Greek philosophy, therefore, 
still remains indispensable to a thorough understanding 
of the problems. But even apart from this, it will be 
found exceptionally instructive for beginners. 

The active business enterprise and commerce for 
which the opulent Ionian colonies (on the west coast of 
Asia Minor) were noted served to stimulate mental 
activity in many ways, whilst increasing wealth provided 
adequate leisure for reflection. Such an environment 
furnished peculiarly favorable psychological conditions 
for the unfolding of the philosophic impulse. There 
the long line of thinkers who have striven to solve the 
riddle of the universe dates its beginning from Thales 
about 600 B.C. 

The names, philosophy and philosopher, however, have 
been in use only since the end of the fifth century B.C. 
The Greek word philosophia is evidently derived from 
the verb philosophein, which signifies to strive after 
knowledge, and indeed, from the pure desire to know, 
without having any practical purpose in view whatever. 
This origin of the name at the same time symbolically 
suggests this significant truth, namely, that the most 



PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 7 

important thing in philosophy is philosophizing. It is 
not, therefore, the result of the reflection, appropriated 
without effort, but the individual acquisitive exercise 
that is the matter of supreme importance. 

The attempt to construct a theory of the universe, 
especially when seeking to account for ultimate prin- 
ciples, brings philosophy in contact with traditional 
religious ideas. As a matter of fact it is partly an out- 
growth from religion. It seems well, therefore, that we 
should explain the relation between religion and phil- 
osophy at this point. 

4. Philosophy and Religion 

Philosophy and religion are in many respects very 
intimately related. The effort to supplement experience 
so as to form a total world-view is common to both; 
common, furthermore, especially at their beginnings, is 
their naive trust in the power of thought, and of mental 
construction, and their firm confidence in the products 
of the intellect and the imagination. Plato believes in 
the efficiency and reality of ideas no less firmly than the 
pious worshiper believes in the Hfe after death. 

Besides these common characteristics, however, we 
meet with wide differences, which lead to sharp an- 
titheses, even at the very beginning of the historical 
development. The religious theory of the universe and 
of life arises chiefly from the fact, that our common- 
place experiences are interpreted by the anthropomor- 
phizing imagination and developed according to the needs 



8 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

and the wishes of the heart. BeHef in invisible spiritual 
powers, which interpose in the life of men, is afterwards 
confirmed by the fact that the members of the same 
family or tribe unite in this belief. The individual sup- 
ports and strengthens his conviction by fellowship with 
others who share his belief. Religious ideas and dogmas 
constitute the common spiritual possession of vast num- 
bers of people, and this common spiritual possession 
furnishes the unifying bond which holds co-religionists 
together. Religion, especially at its beginning, rests 
upon the social value of its dogmas. These universally 
accepted ideas are then transmitted with the authority 
of tradition from generation to generation. At a later 
stage they are likewise still further reenforced by the 
authority of the state. Religion is, therefore, by the 
very nature of its origin, social and authoritative. 

Philosophy, on the other hand, owes its origin to the 
fact that the cognitive impulse has become independent. 
Only such things as can be justified at the bar of reason 
can hope for recognition and acceptance here. The philos- 
opher is preeminently a solitary thinker. He is obliged 
to criticize the traditional theories and to construct his 
own world-view by the power of his own thought and 
investigation. He must follow his own course and 
sometimes even oppose the traditional theories as well as 
those of his contemporaries with much severity. In antith- 
esis therefore to religion, which is social and author- 
itative, philosophy is individual and critical. This con- 
trast is especially marked at their respective beginnings. 



PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 9 

Because of this antithesis we can readily understand 
why at the earHest appearance of philosophy there should 
be evidence of opposition to reHgious traditions. This 
opposition occasionally stands out very sharply in the 
philosophy of the Greeks. Xenophanes reproaches the 
Homeric gods on account of their likeness to men, and 
their human infirmities; Protagoras doubts whether 
there be any gods at all; Epicurus grants the existence 
of deities as ideal forms, but denies them any influence 
upon the world's affairs. 

On the other hand, we find that attempts to unite 
religion and philosophy began quite early. Plato and 
Aristotle arrive at the idea of a single deity by specula- 
tive processes. They differ greatly, however, in their 
explanations of the relation of deity to the world. The 
Stoics attempt to incorporate the traditional sayings of 
their heroes and gods into their philosophical system by 
allegorical adaptation. Philo, the Alexandrian Jew (born 
about 20 B.C.) endeavors, by allegorical interpretation, to 
discover a purely philosophical Cosmology in the Old 
Testament story of creation. Christianity makes 
abundant use of philosophic thought-forms, first of all 
for the statement and defense of its message of salvation, 
and afterwards likewise in formulating its doctrines. 
But it regards faith as decidedly superior to knowledge. 
During the middle ages scholastic philosophy made a 
strenuous effort to establish the dogmas of the Christian 
religion philosophically. It soon became evident, how- 
ever, that not every dogma is capable of strictly rational 



10 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

proof. An effort was then made to distinguish between 
natural and revealed theology (theologia naturalis and 
theologia revelata). What pertains to the latter cannot 
be proved, but must be accepted on the authority of 
revelation. Hence the antithesis, which had been appar- 
ently reconciled, appeared again within scholasticism 
itself. 

Modern philosophy has been greatly enriched through 
the progress made by natural science during the seven- 
teenth and eighteenth centuries. Mathematics likewise 
exerted an exceptionally strong influence. We learn, 
on the one hand, to prize observation and experiment as 
the surest sources of empirical knowledge; whilst on 
the other hand, we find that mathematics furnishes a 
system of truths which is unquestionably more valid and 
apparently entirely independent of experience, and which 
seems to be created by the reason itself. This increase 
in cognitive power inspired such self-confidence that 
philosophy felt obliged to assume an independent position 
on religious problems. These problems still remain the 
subject of profound reflection. 

The Materialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen- 
turies regarded every religion as an empty phantom and 
tried to eliminate all such problems from science. But 
recent historical, and especially the ethnographical, inves- 
tigations have proved conclusively that religious ideas 
exist wherever human beings live in social groups, and 
that these ideas, therefore, belong to the elementary 
thoughts of the human mind. 



PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE ii 

The attempt to harmonize philosophy and religion is 
not to be cast aside precipitately as hopeless, since 
indeed no one can deny the possibility of philosophical 
investigation, i.e., investigation which is free from 
prejudice, attaining results which are in harmony with 
refined religious ideas. One thing is certain, namely, 
that philosophical speculation, both in ancient and in 
modern times, has contributed much towards the purifi- 
cation of religious ideas and has brought them, both 
theoretically and practically, closer to the scientific 
world-theory. It is quite as certain, furthermore, that 
philosophy dare not disregard a phenomenon which is 
at once so general and of such far-reaching influence 
upon civilization as religion most certainly is. It must 
therefore take account of the results of the science of 
comparative religion, which has received such a tremen- 
dous impetus in recent decades. The effort to obtain a 
total, comprehensive world-view, requires philosophy to 
show equal regard for the results of the science of 
religion as for those of the other sciences. This leads 
us naturally to the problem of the relation of philosophy 
to the several sciences. 

5. Philosophy and Science 

Philosophy, upon its first appearance among the 
Greeks, is identical with theoretical science. The desire 
for knowledge for its own sake characterizes philosophy 
as well as science. The scientific study of nature, in 
particular, is here as yet wholly confined to philosophers. 



12 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Aristotle, who cultivated and systematized all the learn- 
ing of his age, marks the climax as well as the turning- 
point of this development in antiquity. This marks the 
beginning of the specialization of the sciences as well as 
their differentiation from philosophy. This process, 
however, has unfolded slowly and gradually. The 
human mind, by its severe and constant application to 
these problems, has slowly learned to deduce the laws of 
nature from observed facts and to comprehend and con- 
trol nature by these laws. The constantly increasing 
division of labor which has taken place during the course 
of the centuries has resulted in the gathering of such an 
abundance of facts and the discovery of such complicated 
methods and instruments of thought, that it is utterly 
impossible for a single individual to-day to cover the 
whole field of learning independently. That this serves 
to advance the various sciences there is no question, but 
the coherence of the general body of knowledge is in 
danger of being lost. 

This danger is still further increased by the fact, that 
a general aversion towards all philosophical methods pre- 
vailed among many representatives of the particular 
sciences during the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
This aversion, moreover, is due to the fact that phil- 
osophy was for a long period regarded as the queen of 
the sciences and wished to be recognized as such, and 
hence claimed the right of final decision in ultimate 
problems for all kinds of knowledge. Philosophy not 
only claimed the last word in questions of natural 



PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 13 

science, but even assumed the prerogative of challenging 
facts warranted by exact observation and scientific proof 
and of declaring them impossible because they did not 
fit into the philosophic system. 

Natural science has been compelled to vindicate her 
independence against such wholly unjustified claims, 
as e.g., those made by Hegel and his school and to insist 
repeatedly that the facts and laws discovered by obser- 
vation and experiment are valid independent of every 
philosophic theory. The facts thus discovered rather 
form the foundation upon which scientific philosophy 
must build. 

The unprecedented successes attained by natural sci- 
ence and technology during the nineteenth century, gave 
rise to the opinion among the great majority of investi- 
gators that only the exact methods of research, based 
upon observation and experiment on the one hand, and 
upon mathematics on the other, lead to the real advance- 
ment of our knowledge ; that all philosophic speculation, 
on the contrary, must be regarded as nothing more than 
innocent amusement. 

The methods of natural science, however, were also 
applied in those sciences which are devoted to the inves- 
tigation of mental life. The development of language, 
religion, custom and every social institution was, and 
still is studied on the basis of statistical and comparative 
methods. Here again a species of worship of facts and 
contempt for speculation make themselves felt. 

Science, so a noted contemporary investigator asserts, 



14 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

is nothing more than experience reduced to an economic 
system, and its task consists in describing the processes 
of nature and the human mind as simply as possible. 
The demand, contained in this definition, to eliminate 
everything which we bring with us to the facts, and to 
follow in our thought as correctly as possible the 
processes just as they really take place, is of extraordi- 
nary value as a methodical rule for every scientific inves- 
tigation, and hence cannot be emphasized too often. 

Our native impulse, however, to combine all experience 
into a unitary system, the desire not only to be acquainted 
with nature as well as ourselves, but likewise to compre- 
hend their respective meanings, refuses to be ruled out 
by a principle of methodical investigation. In addition 
to this it must be observed that every so-called fact 
which we learn to know, must be formed by our mind, 
in order that it may become ours. There are certain 
attributes of perception and thought which underlie 
every scientific investigation, which indeed make the 
investigation itself possible. Science furthermore is 
never satisfied with a mere acquaintance with isolated 
facts. It aims to discover the laws which govern events. 
Hence every single investigation, if it is to deserve the 
name of science, must take account of the whole. 

That recent investigators in the various sciences feel 
the need of a comprehensive system and a more thorough 
understanding of the nature of the self is very evident. 
William Ostwald, the noted chemist of Leipsic, has 
published a series of lectures on Natural Philosophy and 



PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 15 

founded a paper, Annals of Natural Philosophy, devoted 
to the examination of the problems of scientific investi- 
gation, and to inquiry concerning scientific methods 
and their bearing on the problems of knowledge. His- 
torical investigators have also become weary of merely 
collecting dates, and insist on understanding the deeper 
meaning of historical development. The credit for this 
change belongs to the philosophy of history founded by 
Herder and Hegel. History thus acquires a foundation 
which is at once much broader and more concrete than 
formerly especially because of the fact that our knowl- 
edge now extends to all the facts of the habitable earth. 
It appears therefore that the representatives of the 
special sciences are becoming more and more conscious 
of the fact that all human knowledge has common 
foundations and common purposes. Philosophy has 
come to regard the investigation of the foundations of 
knowledge as its most important task. This is especially 
true since Kant. Fichte's conception of a science of 
knowledge is again in favor. Noted thinkers of our 
time wish to regard the investigation of the founda- 
tions and presuppositions of all knowledge as the most 
important and, indeed, as the only problem with which 
Iphilosophy has to do. It appears to me, however, that 
community of purpose is the most significant as well as 
the most fruitful viewpoint. All the sciences arose 
from practical needs, and the highest purpose of human 
research will forever remain the endeavor to make human 
life richer and happier. 



i6 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Science and philosophy are devoted to the discovery 
of truth. The concept of truth has, however, recently 
undergone a process of reconstruction. We are begin- 
ning to see that truth is not a static relation between 
thought and fact which remains the same throughout 
all eternity. There is a class of thinkers at present who 
regard truth rather as something dynamic, something 
which actively leads, which serves to bring life to its 
perfection. A judgment is true if it increases our 
power over nature, if it is capable of exerting an efficient 
and beneficent influence upon our activities. Hence, 
just as science serves the practical end of increasing our 
mastery over nature and the human mind in individual 
cases through the discovery of truth, so the purpose of 
philosophy does not consist in intuitive contemplation, 
but in practical influence and in the deliberate formula- 
tion of ideals and the intelligent guidance of thought. 

The question may likewise be raised whether phil- 
osophy is a science or not? In answer I would para- 
phrase a remark of Schiller, to the effect that his poem 
"The Artists," is not less a poem because it is more than 
a poem. Philosophy is therefore not less a science 
because it is more than science. 

Philosophy is science because it rests upon scientific 
foundations and uses scientific methods of investigation. 
It is more than science because it must not only regulate 
experience but also supplement it, and because fancy and 
imagination must cooperate in the attainment of its 
ultimate aim, namely, a consistent world-theory. The 



DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY 17 

present day philosopher cannot ignore the obHgation to 
appropriate the results of scientific research to the 
greatest possible extent, and especially to acquaint him- 
self with the thought-forms which have been developed 
in the various branches of knowledge. In addition to 
this scientific equipment, he must likewise possess the 
moral courage and the gift of artistic construction, 
which will enable him to transcend experience and to 
combine the results of special research into a consistent 
system. 

It is the philosopher's privilege to enjoy a sense of 
pride in a world-theory which he has brought to a suc- 
cessful issue in consistent thinking and artistic finish 
similar to that which is experienced by a general upon 
victory or by an artist in his masterpiece. Such a world- 
theory is at once a faith and a program. It is here that 
science, art and religion can join hands, but always with 
the distinct understanding that science forms the foun- 
dation and that the thought-forms forever remain 
scientific. 

6. Division of Philosophy 

A threefold classification of philosophy has come 
down to us from the Greeks. This division became 
general shortly after Aristotle, i.e., since the beginning 
of the third century B.C. These three divisions are 
Logic, Physics and Ethics, 

Logic treats of the doctrine of knowledge, the laws 
of thought, the criteria of truth, and later also the doc- 
trine of probability. 



i8 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Physics embraces natural science, natural philosophy, 
cosmology and the doctrine of the human soul and its 
destiny. The term metaphysics originated later. Its 
subject-matter was the doctrine of being, i.e., that which 
exists independently of us and must be regarded as the 
essence of things in distinction from that which things 
appear to be. The name metaphysics owes its origin to 
the accident that the work of Aristotle which treats of 
these ultimate problems came after physics in the com- 
pilation of his works, and, since this work had no title, 
it was described as that which comes after physics 
(to. fji€Ta Tot <f>v(nKa), The name and the concept have 
been preserved to this day, but it would be more appro- 
priate to designate this division of philosophy by the 
name of Ontology, i.e., the doctrine of Being. 

Ethics treats of the doctrine of human morals. But 
the concept of morality among the ancients is such that 
ethics is rather the doctrine of the highest good than of 
the nature of moral obligation. Politics was regarded 
as a part of ethics, i.e., the doctrine of the state and its 
forms. 

Plato, Aristotle, and more especially Plotinus inci- 
dentally refer to the doctrine of the beautiful and of art, 
but esthetics does not form a distinct division in the 
philosophy of antiquity. 

The division into Logic, Physics and Ethics was re- 
tained throughout the whole of the middle ages and it still 
serves as the basis for the treatment of the history of 
philosophy. A different classification ;. has been intro- 



DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY 19 

duced in the modern period. This is especially the case 
with Bacon of Verulam (1561-1626) and Christian 
Wolff (1679- 1 754) who attempt to divide philosophy 
according to psychological principles. Kant's (1724- 
1804) division, which has remained the most influential 
even down to the present time, and which we shall also 
essentially adopt, follows the same principle. 

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant gives us a phil- 
osophy of knowledge, in his Critique of Practical Rea- 
son a philosophy of the will, and in his Critique of Judg- 
ment a philosophy of feeling. 

We shall also retain this division. But we shall have 
to divide the philosophy of knowledge into two sections. 
The first will have to investigate the problem concerning 
the possibility, the limits and the origin of knowledge, 
whilst the second will have to do with the objects of 
knowledge. Criticism and the Theory of Knowledge will 
therefore fall to the first section, whilst the second section 
will contain the doctrine of Being or Ontology. 

The philosophy of feeling (sentiment), as we shall 
show, is nothing more than the doctrine of the sublime 
and the beautiful. This discipline, which, since the 
middle of the eighteenth century, has been called 
Aesthetics, now forms a separate division of systematic 
philosophy. 

The philosophy of the will seeks to discover the con- 
ditions and the norms of human action. As practical 
philosophy, or ethics, it has always formed an important 
department of systematic philosophy. However, since 



20 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

it is not only the individual will, but likewise the gen- 
eral will that is responsible for human conduct, we shall 
combine the most recent of philosophic disciplines, 
namely the doctrine of the nature of human society or 
Sociology, with Ethics. We shall also add a few remarks 
on the general principles of education or Pedagogy. 

Psychology and Logic, which have been correctly 
regarded as preparatory or propaedeutic disciplines, will 
require brief consideration before turning to the exposi- 
tion of the various philosophic problems. Psychology 
has recently become an independent science, prosecuting 
its investigations by purely empirical methods, inde- 
pendent of every philosophic speculation. It forms the 
indispensable foundation for all the mental sciences, 
which brings it into intimate relationship with philoso- 
phy. Logic is really an important propaedeutic for 
every one of the sciences, but for philosophy, which 
seeks to systematize the results of special investigation 
according to general principles, it is indispensable. 

The history of philosophy is rightly regarded as an 
important department of philosophic study. There was 
a time when it was thought that philosophy should con- 
fine itself to the study of its history. It seems but 
proper, therefore, to introduce a few remarks concerning 
the importance of this study. 

7. The History of Philosophy 

An acquaintance with its history is of incomparably 
greater importance for the study of philosophy than for 



THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 21 

any other branch of knowledge. Any one, e.g., who has 
chosen mathematics or physics as his department of 
scientific research can acquaint himself with the methods, 
the thought-forms and the results of research in his 
department without being obliged to trace out the his- 
torical origin and gradual development of all the prin- 
ciples of investigation. It is only after having attained 
the heights of knowledge, that many a one will perhaps 
begin to feel the need of history, and then at least per- 
ceive, as Ernst Mach has repeatedly emphasized in the 
case of physics, that a deep and thorough understanding 
of fundamental concepts cannot be attained without a 
knowledge of their historical development. 

Philosophy is quite different in this respect. Here 
even an approximately correct understanding of a 
problem without a knowledge of its historical develop- 
ment is practically impossible. Whoever, e.g., hears the 
assertion: everything which I see, the starry heavens 
above me, the houses, the fields, the trees about me, all 
these are only my idea, they exist only as I perceive 
them, and only as my perception, will at first be disposed 
to regard such a view as insane. A knowledge of the 
historical origin of pure idealism, however, makes it 
perfectly clear to every one. A critical attitude toward 
this problem, as we shall see farther on, is impossible 
without a full knowledge of its history. 

It follows therefore that an acquaintance with the chief 
data of the history of philosophy is an indispensable pre- 
requisite for the understanding of philosophic problems. 



22 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

For this reason many advise that the study of philosophy 
should begin with the study of its history. 

The study of the history of philosophy is at the same 
time highly profitable for those who do not intend to 
specialize in philosophy. Here we become acquainted 
with the origin and the formulation of the thought- 
methods by means of which the human mind has step by 
step conquered the world, acquisitions ''which are so 
easily robbed of our grateful appreciation just because 
they are so common and familiar." Although we to-day 
distinguish between matter and form in almost every- 
thing, and the concepts of possibility and of actuality 
have become perfectly familiar to every one of us, we 
nevertheless forget all too easily that Aristotle was the 
first to work out these concepts clearly and to prepare 
them for our use. 

The chief gain to be derived from the study of the 
history of philosophy consists in acquiring an under- 
standing of the gradual development of the methods of 
thought. The histories of philosophy, of which indeed 
there is no lack, should therefore make this point stand 
out more clearly. 

The history of philosophy is not only philosophy, how- 
ever, it is also history. It frequently happens that the 
mental content of an age is most clearly and most pro- 
foundly expressed in a philosophic system which 
originated within the period. Thus, as has been fre- 
quently suggested before, Kant's categorical imperative 
is a crystallization of the Prussian sense of duty, whilst 



THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 23 

the cosmopolitanism of the Cynics and the Stoics clearly 
manifests the decline of Greek national pride. 

The history of philosophy accordingly forms an im- 
portant element of philosophic study. The terminology, 
which has been a matter of steady growth and with 
which the student is compelled to familiarize himself, 
imposes considerable difficulty. We shall exercise great 
care in our introduction therefore to give exact explana- 
tions of the most important technical expressions in 
order thus to facilitate the study of the history of phil- 
osophy. On the other hand, since we shall at least sketch 
the historical origin of the various problems in the course 
of our presentation, the reader will become acquainted 
with the most important facts of historical development 
and thus at the same time be introduced to the history 
of philosophy. 

LITERATURE 

Fr. Paulsen, Einleitung in die Philosophic. 19 Ed., 1908. Eng. 

Trans, from third Ger. Ed., 1895. 
O. Kuelpe, Einleitung in die Philosophie. 4 Ed., 1907. Eng. 

Trans, from first Ger. Ed., 1895. 
W. Wundt, System der Philosophie. 3 Ed., 1907. pp. 1-20. 
W. Wundt, Einleitung in die Philosophie. 3 Ed., 1904. 
A. Riehl, Zur Einfiihrung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart, 

1903. 
Rudolph Eisler, Kritische Einfiihrung in die Philosophie, 1905. 

A very thorough and comprehensive explanation of the 

problems with valuable bibliographies. 
Rudolph Eisler, Woerterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe. 3 

Ed., 1910. This work is compiled with much care. By 

its definitions of the philosophic concepts and the views of 



24 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the great thinkers of the centuries it greatly facilitates the 
reading of philosophy as well as serves a most valuable 
purpose in scientific study. 

Ueherweg-Heinze, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic, 
4 vols. (Vol. I, Ancient, lo Ed., 1910; Vol. 2, Medieval, 
9 Ed., 1905 ; Vol. 3, Modern Period to the end of the eight- 
eenth century, 10 Ed., 1907; Vol. 4, The Philosophy of the 
nineteenth century, 11 Ed., 1908.) (Vols, i to 3, Eng. Trans, 
from fourth Ger. Ed., 1871. Vol. 4, Eng. Trans, from 
II Ed,, in preparation 1909.) This work belongs to the 
indispensable helps in the study of philosophy. The refer- 
ences to literature on the different subjects, exceptionally 
rich and almost exhaustive, are especially valuable. In Vol. 
i> pp. 9-17 the reader will find an excellent survey of the 
most important productions in the history of philosophy 
together with critical remarks. 

W. Windelhand, Die Philosophic im Beginn des Zwanzigsten 
Jahrhunderts, 2 Ed,, 1907. (This is a series of essays 
memorializing the eightieth birthday of Kuno Fischer. 
Trans,) 

P. Hinneberg, Systematische Philosophic. (This volume belongs 
to the "Kultur der Gegenwart" series. It is likewise a 
series of essays on the chief topics in philosophy. This 
volume together with the one above gives an excellent survey 
of the whole field of philosophy at the present time. Trans.) 



SECOND DIVISION 

THE PROPAEDEUTIC (PREPARATORY) 
DISCIPLINES 

8. The Subject Matter and the Problem of 
Psychology 

Psychology is the science which treats of the laws of 
mental life. Its subject-matter therefore is mental life, 
i.e., our thinking, feeling and willing ; in short everything 
which we experience in the ceaseless flow of psychical 
activity — whatever is given and known to us imme- 
diately as such experience. Hence psychology always 
deals only with processes. The object of its investigation 
always consists of processes, never fixed states of being. 
The inquiry concerning a substantial, persistent vehicle 
of the psychical phenomena which we experience, the 
question whether these activities issue from a persistent 
soul-essence which remains self-identical throughout all 
the vicissitudes of life, does not belong to psychology, 
but is properly relegated to metaphysics or ontology. 
The problem of the seat, simplicity and immortality of 
the soul naturally belongs there too. The various 
religious systems may formulate dogmas by religious 
authority concerning all such matters as find belief 
among the adherents of the respective religious creeds. 

25 



26 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Scientific philosophy may postulate hypotheses concern- 
ing these things on the basis of penetrative analysis. 
But this does not affect psychology in the least. It in- 
vestigates mental life, which is one of the most undoubted 
facts of which we have any knowledge. It seeks to 
reduce the mental processes to their simplest elements, 
and to ascertain the laws which govern them, entirely 
independent of every theological dogma and every meta- 
physical hypothesis. 

Neither does this imply that psychology antagonizes 
any of these dogmas or metaphysical hypotheses. Its 
findings concerning soul-life are valid for every meta- 
physic and every theological dogma. Psychology can as 
little explain the essence of the soul as mechanics the 
essence of energy. In the one case even as in the 
other it is only the law governing the process that is 
sought. Hence psychology approaches very closely to 
the natural sciences, both as respects its purely empirical 
character and in its methods, but it is distinguished from 
them in respect to its subject matter. The conception 
of psychology which is here set forth, and its complete 
independence of metaphysics, is an acquisition of recent 
decades. 

The belief in a distinct soul substance, separate from 
the body, which leaves the body at death and thereafter 
continues an independent existence, is deeply rooted in 
human nature. As a matter of fact, it is found among 
the most primitive peoples, who are still upon the lowest 
plane of civilization. Nearly all the religious systems of 



PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGY 27 

the world have elevated this belief to a dogma and it has 
likewise passed into many philosophic systems as a self- 
evident presupposition. Accordingly the psychology of 
antiquity, of the middle ages and the beginning of the 
modern period, conceived as the doctrine of the soul, 
forms a department of metaphysics or ontology. Not- 
withstanding this, however, we find evidence of the study 
of actual mental life quite early in the history of reflec- 
tive thought. Plato and Aristotle have made valuable 
contributions to this study. So also have the physician 
Hippocrates and his school, as well as the later philo- 
sophical schools of antiquity, the Stoics, Epicureans, 
(especially the poet-philosopher Lucretius^, and the 
Neoplatonists (especially Plotinus). Even the scholastic 
philosophy of the middle ages was not wholly barren in 
this respect, as Siebeck has recently shown. At the 
beginning of the modern period this problem was 
attacked with increasing energy. After the knowledge 
of real soul-life had been greatly advanced by the search- 
ing analysis of such English thinkers of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, as John Locke, George Berkeley, 
David Hume and Adam Smith, James Mill (father of 
the famous logician and political economist, John Stuart 
Mill) published his Analysis of the Phenomena of the 
Human Mind in 1829. This was the first exposition of 
mental life which is free from metaphysics. Herbart, 
who also attempted to apply mathematics to the phenom- 
ena of mind, has the distinction of raising empirical 
psychology to the rank of science. 



28 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Herbarfs distinguished pupil, H, Lotze, afterwards 
described mental life in connection with its attendant 
physiological phenomena in his Medicinische Psychol- 
ogic which appeared in 1852. Shortly thereafter, 
Fcchncr and Wundt investigated this connection more 
closely in specific cases. They also undertook to reduce 
the phenomena of mind to experiment. Fcchncr and 
Wundt therefore deserve to be called the founders of 
modern psychology. Wundt, besides making large con- 
tributions himself, has given a tremendous impulse to 
further effort, primarily through his exhaustive treatise, 
Outlines of Physiological Psychology,^ and likewise 
through the founding of the first laboratory for experi- 
mental psychology in Leipsic, which followed in 1879. 
A large number of institutes after the pattern of the one 
at Leipsic have been estabhshed in Germany, France, 
England, Italy, and especially in America, in which the 
experimental investigation of mental life is being dili- 
gently prosecuted. 

Psychology has thus become an independent empirical 
science, free from every philosophical speculation, and 
it is fitted to serve as the foundation of all those sciences 
which have to do with mental life and which, in modern 
times, are generally classed under the name of the mental 
sciences. We shall now proceed to acquaint the reader 
with the several methods and tendencies which have thus 
been developed. 

^ I Ed., 1874, now in the 6 Ed., 1908. Eng. Trans, now appear- 
ing, Trans. 



METHODS AND SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOLOGY 29 

9. The Methods and the Schools of Psychology 

Just as in the case of every empirical science, it is first 
of all necessary for psychology to collect the largest 
possible number of facts. The first means to this end is 
the observation of events in process of consummation. 
Such observation is essentially different in psychology 
from observation in the natural sciences. Psychical 
phenomena cannot be perceived by our senses in the same 
manner as events in nature. They can only be expe- 
rienced in that peculiar manner which is so well known 
to each one of us, but which baffles closer description. 
I know from experience only those psychical processes 
which I myself experience in my own consciousness. 
In order to collate facts I must, then, observe those 
things which I experience within myself and reduce 
them to a judgment. The most important and most 
fundamental source of information for the psychologist 
is therefore the observation of his own psychical expe- 
riences, or self-observation. The method of self-observa- 
tion, named after its English expression (introspection — 
to look within) the introspective method, is therefore 
the first and most important. 

The introspective method, however, is open to a great 
variety of difficulties and contradictions. The observa- 
tion of my psychical experience is likewise an activity of 
the mind which on account of the inner coherence of our 
mental activities, must necessarily interfere with the 
course of the phenomena to be observed, so as to modify, 



30 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

change or interrupt their course. If I wished, e.g., to 
observe myself in the midst of an angry passion, the 
anger would be cooled in the very moment that I 
attempted to observe it. Many regard the appHcation 
of the introspective method impossible on this account 
and consequently they discard it as utterly useless. This 
view, however, is not correct. Elementary experiences, 
such as sense perceptions, simple feelings, both sensible 
and aesthetic, may, with a little practice, be observed 
without being essentially changed by such observation. 
The more complicated processes, furthermore, can be 
reconstructed in memory and thus likewise be observed 
subsequently. Here the disturbing influence of observa- 
tion is practically eliminated, because the introspection 
combines with recollection. 

After observation comes reduction and analysis. The 
chief business of the psychologist at present consists in 
making these analyses. All the processes of actual 
experience, are upon closer examination found to be 
complex. It is, therefore, necessary to discover the 
elementary processes which give rise to and constitute 
the observed processes. Hence reduction or analysis 
must be regarded as an essential element of the intro- 
spective method. 

The reduction which is made on the basis of the intro- 
spective method, however, soon reaches its limits. The 
visual perception of an object, e.g., appears to intro- 
spection as a simple process incapable of further reduc- 
tion. Here experiment intervenes with splendid effect 



METHODS AND SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOLOGY 31 

and enables us to continue the analysis beyond the limits 
of self-observation. 

The experimental method in psychology, just as in 
the natural sciences, consists in producing the conditions 
for the origin of psychological processes by design and 
systematically, and indeed in so producing them that 
they may be varied both quantitatively and qualitatively 
at will. A psychological experiment as a rule requires 
two persons, the experimenter and the observer. The 
experimenter produces the conditions and varies them 
in such a way that the observer has no knowledge of the 
variation. The observer then reports his impressions for 
record, in part verbally and in part by signs previously 
agreed upon. Naturally, the observer is simply actively 
engaged in introspection. As a matter of fact it requires 
considerable practice to eliminate the sources of error 
and to reach valid results. Psychological experiments, 
are of such a nature that in order to obtain useful results 
it requires a large number of them, including a number 
of different observers. Experiments in the same field 
are therefore continued for years and repeated under 
changed conditions. It is also important furthermore 
that in these cases the unsuccessful attempts, i.e., such 
as have not given the expected result, should be carefully 
recorded. 

The experimental method has been greatly improved 
during the last decades. Much complicated apparatus 
has been invented which renders the experiments easier 
and produces more exact results. This method has been 



32 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

particularly fruitful in the analysis of sense-perception. 
We know now that, along with the retinal stimuli, the 
motions of the eye and the consequent muscular stimuli, 
play an important part in the production of visual- 
sensation. The same is also the case in touch-percep- 
tion. The experimental method has likewise disclosed 
the great significance of muscular sensations in general. 
This has produced a radical change in our idea of the 
nature of our mental life. The temporal succession of 
ideas, the laws of association, the acts of memory, the 
theory of the feelings, especially as affecting the pulse, 
and finally also the elementary esthetic feelings, have 
been greatly illuminated by the experimental method. 
There is reason to hope also that united effort in this 
sphere will result in many more new discoveries. 

In addition to the introspective and experimental 
methods, the observation of others is another source of 
information which is not unimportant. In this case we 
of course cannot observe the psychical process directly, 
but only its bodily expression in movement, countenance 
and speech. The process itself must be inferred, and in 
these inferences the observer's own experiences again 
form the foundation. Such observations upon children, 
and upon individuals for whom some terrible natural 
calamity has closed certain sources of knowledge, are 
particularly instructive. Those who have been born 
blind, deaf-mutes, and the not infrequent cases of the 
deaf-mute and blind, furnish rich sources of information 
and we owe many important discoveries to the careful 



METHODS AND SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOLOGY 33 

observation of such persons. We refer especially to 
the wonderfully instructive education of the deaf-mute 
and blind Laura Bridgman, Helen Keller and Marie 
Heurtin.^ These cases reveal the capacity of the sense 
of touch when unsupported by the other senses and the 
significance of verbal speech in the development of 
thought in a manner which is truly marvelous. 

As previously stated, analysis, which reduces the 
observed processes to their elements, is most closely 
associated with the introspective method. Because of 
the incidental nature of psychical processes, constantly 
representing only an event, never a persistent state of 
being, the analytic consideration naturally passes over 
into the genetic, which conceives mental life as an 
evolving series, and asks which process is the first, the 
true original. The question, what constitutes a process, 
leads inevitably to the question, how and whence does it 
arise. 

The genetic method of investigation, however, carries 
us beyond the individual and forces us to take account 
of the society in which man lives as an important factor 
in his mental development. As far back as we can trace 
man, we find him always and everywhere a social being, 
a gregarious animal. Aristotle's statement, that man 
is naturally a social being, is completely verified by 

* Cf. Jerusalem, Laura Bridgman, Erziehung einer Tauhstumm- 
hlinden. Eine psychologische Studie. 1895. Helen Keller, The 
Story of my Life. Marie Heurtin, Erziehung einer taub und 
blind Geborenen von W. Jerusalem (Oesterreichische Rundschau 
1905. No. 33 and 36.) 
3 



34 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

modern ethnology. Natural environment is not the sole 
factor in giving direction and content to mental life. 
Social fellowship exerts an influence which is quite as 
important. Individual psychology, therefore, naturally 
expands into social, or ethnic psychology. This science, 
founded by Lazarus and Steinthal, has made great 
progress during recent decades. William Wundfs 
comprehensively planned work in ethnic psychology, 
which is now appearing, undertakes an ethnic-psycholog- 
ical treatment of language, myth-formation and custom. 
This work opens up new and very significant points of 
view. The numerous works of Adolf Bastian likewise 
offer material of exceptional value. It would, therefore, 
seem inevitable that every psychologist is under obliga- 
tion to familiarize himself with the results of modern 
ethnology, and to take account of the social factor in the 
development of human knowledge, feeling, and willing 
to a greater extent than has been done hitherto. Darwin, 
in his epochal work on The Origin of the Species, has 
introduced the term ontogenetic for the evolution of the 
individual, and phylogenetic for the evolution of the 
species. In this sense then we should like to insist that 
psychology regard the individual not alone as a solitary 
being, but also as influenced by his racial associates, — 
i.e., that not only ontogenetic methods, but phylogenetic 
methods should also be applied here. 

If we inquire into the origin and development of the 
mental processes, we almost necessarily come upon the 
vital relation of these processes to the preservation of 



METHODS AND SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOLOGY 35 

life. A large measure of our thought and reflection, as 
every one knows, does indeed serve so-called practical 
ends, i.e., it is concerned about the life of the individual, 
his family or the community to which he belongs, either 
to preserve it, to make it more comfortable, or to give it 
more meaning and stability. If we regard mental life 
as a whole from this standpoint, psychology becomes a 
part of biology, i.e., the science of the laws of life in 
general. This biological method frequently casts unex- 
pected light upon the coherence of mental life, and at 
the same time aids us very materially in our survey and 
comprehension of our rich emotional life. Herbert 
Spencer has applied the biological method with excep- 
tional success. The author's text-book of psychology 
has likewise been written from this viewpoint. 

The introspective and experimental methods, com- 
bined with thorough scientific analysis, aim at determin- 
ing psychical facts with the utmost precision; whilst the 
genetic method, in its double form, i.e., the ontogenetic 
and the phylogenetic, in conjunction with the biologic, 
seeks to investigate the origin, development and sig- 
nificance of mental life. 

As respects the different tendencies which are prom- 
inent in the psychology of the present time, they corres- 
pond in part to the preference given to the methods of 
investigation, in part to fundamental views concerning 
the greater or less significance of certain elementary 
classes of psychical processes. 

The distinction between rational, or speculative and 



36 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

empirical psychology which was customary in the past 
has become meaningless. What was formerly called 
rational psychology is now generally regarded as a part 
of metaphysics and is excluded from psychology. On 
this account also the qualifying term "empirical," i.e., 
based on experience, is now taken for granted and its 
use has consequently become superfluous. 

Psychology is again divided in accordance with the 
respective methods employed, into Introspective and 
Experimental. Both these tendencies frequently attack 
each other sharply. The introspective psychologists 
bring the charge against the experimentalists, that the 
results of their tedious investigations are often insig- 
nificant and, furthermore, that they are more profitable 
to physiology than to psychology. The experimentalists, 
on the other hand, frequently make sport of "The Arm- 
chair Psychologists," and claim that psychology can be 
studied in an exact manner only in the laboratory. 

During recent years an effort has been made to com- 
bine these two methods. This has been done most suc- 
cessfully at the Wiirzburg Institute for experimental 
psychology (Director, Ostwald Kuelpe). It amounts 
to a kind of introspection under conditions which are 
determined with scientific precision. The processes in- 
volved in judgment, as well as the other more compli- 
cated intellectual processes have been analyzed with 
greater precision by this method. 

It is apparent from these explanations that both tend- 
encies have their place. Scientific progress demands 



PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY 37 

the cooperation of experiment and introspection, always 
accompanied by scientific analysis. 

In the matter of the relative importance attributed to 
the various psychical processes the view formerly held 
was that perception and idea are primary, and that feel- 
ing and willing are derived states of mind. This tend- 
ency, which still numbers many adherents, may be called 
the Intellectualistic. 

Modern investigators on the other hand assert that, 
not the idea, but feeling and its most closely related 
function, volition, are the original states, from which 
sensation, perception and idea are later variations. This 
view, which is more in harmony with the evolutionary 
theory of life, is known as the Voluntaristic psychology. 
This tendency is growing rapidly and it is constantly 
winning more adherents. 

10. Psychology and Physiology 

The intimate relation between the psychical and the 
physiological processes, or, as it is usually more briefly 
and more popularly expressed, between body and soul, 
has long since been recognized, and it has profoundly 
engaged the most noted thinkers for ages. We shall 
return to the philosophic problems which arise from 
reflection upon this relation, as also to the most impor- 
tant attempts at their solution, farther on. 

Modern psychology regards it as a settled fact that 
the vast majority of psychical processes are accompanied 
by parallel physiological processes. It is furthermore 



38 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

absolutely certain that the fundamental condition of a 
psychological process must always be a nerve-process, 
and indeed always one in which the human brain ulti- 
mately participates. The view that a brain process cor- 
responds to every psychical process without exception 
receives general acceptance only in so far as every 
serious investigator is convinced that no phenomena of 
consciousness can exist without a brain. On the other 
hand, opinion is still divided with reference to the 
problem whether every elementary process of a phenom- 
enon, which has been isolated by psychological analysis, 
likewise necessarily presupposes a similarly elementary 
physiological process. Thus, e.g., Wundt holds that 
every perception of any given fact requires ''that the 
complex which is originated by the object of sensation 
be combined by an act of associative synthesis." This 
act of synthesis, according to the opinion of this famous 
scholar, is of a purely psychical nature and is without 
any parallel process of a physiological nature. 

The fact that psychical processes depend to so great 
an extent upon brain processes has led many investi- 
gators to the conclusion that the sole problem of psychol- 
ogy consists in extending our knowledge of the func- 
tions of the brain, and hence that it is only a department 
of physiology. 

We must not forget, however, that psychical processes 
have a nature which is wholly peculiar to themselves and 
entirely different from physical phenomena. Every one 
of the processes of nature, including those of the human 



PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 39 

body, is accessible to sense-perception, or can be made 
accessible by means of the microscope or some other 
artificial aid to our sensory faculties. Even where this 
has hitherto been impossible, the further perfecting of 
the instruments may still accomplish it at any moment. 
There is no process of nature to which access through 
sense-perception is unthinkable. The psychical processes, 
however, can never be perceived with the senses. They 
can only be experienced in that peculiar manner imme- 
diately known to every one, but which baffles more exact 
description. It is just for this reason that their inves- 
tigation must remain the object of a separate science. 

Psychology may receive valuable suggestions for 
further psychological analysis from physiology, as it can 
in turn also indicate problems and suggest methods to 
physiology. But psychology can never cease to be an 
independent science. Its subject matter will always be 
different from that of every natural science. 

II. Psychology and Philosophy 

Modern psychology, as we have seen, has renounced 
all metaphysical speculation, particularly every philo- 
sophic theory, and developed an independent empirical 
science. Notwithstanding this, the close connection 
between psychology and philosophy still remains. How- 
ever, the relation between these two branches of 
knowledge has been slightly reversed. Strictly speak- 
ing, the psychologist can readily dispense with every 
metaphysical hypothesis, but the philosopher is now 



40 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

more than ever dependent upon thorough psychological 
analysis. 

If philosophy would hope to realize its purpose, i.e., 
the construction of a consistent world-theory, it must not 
confine itself to the laws of the physical universe, as they 
are revealed by natural science, but it is even more 
important that it take full account of the laws of psychi- 
cal events, as psychology undertakes to discover them. 
The philosopher can at present define the limits of human 
knowledge only upon a psychological basis. He can dis- 
cover and learn to understand the forms in which our 
knowledge must necessarily be expressed by the help of 
psychology alone. A psychological analysis of the 
feelings is the only method by which he can determine 
the conditions under which anything is regarded beauti- 
ful, and the rules for artistic construction must likewise 
be drawn from a knowledge of these conditions. 
Thorough analysis and exact study of what transpires 
within us whenever we approve the acts of others, and 
whenever we are either satisfied or dissatisfied with our- 
selves, furnishes the only hope of discovering a method 
by which to establish scientific norms of human action. 

Hence psychology forms the most important founda- 
tion for a truly scientific philosophy. Whoever forgets 
this, or, with audacious but ill-timed confidence in the 
power of speculation, thinks that he can dispense with 
the psychological foundation, "meets with uncertainty 
at every turn, and is the sport of wind and wave." 

Psychology nevertheless naturally leads almost neces- 



THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC 41 

sarily to philosophical problems, even though its right 
to dismiss them is unquestioned. 

Even the theory of sense-perception reveals the re- 
markable fact that we have far more confidence in the 
data of touch than in those of sight and hearing. The 
psychologist is, of course, under no necessity to do 
more than merely make note of this fact. But the temp- 
tation to go further and seek an explanation is very great. 
This, however, already leads far into the theory of 
knowledge. 

The question concerning the moral and religious feel- 
ings, and the phenomena of will, furnish a still stronger 
temptation to enter upon an investigation of the basis 
of moral laws and the problem of the freedom of the 
will. This requires first of all that the psychological fact 
be verified and defined without any reference whatever 
to philosophical theory. But this verification frequently 
implies the solution of the problem, and it is difficult to 
see why the psychologist should not have the courage to 
proceed a few steps beyond the mere verification of the 
facts and propound a theory of explanation. 

Psychology, therefore, according to its present status, 
is an independent science, but it forms the indispensable 
foundation for every philosophical investigation. 

12. The Subject Matter and the Problem of Logic 

Logic is the science of the forms of correct thought. 
We regard thought as correct when it leads to judgments 
which are objectively true. Judgments are said to be 



42 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

objectively true when every one who hears them and 
understandingly follows the thought-processes leading 
to them cannot help but acquiesce in them. The second 
criterion of the objective certainty of a judgment con- 
sists in the realization of the predictions based upon the 
judgment under consideration. 

Objective certainty is the antithesis of subjective cer- 
tainty. The latter cannot as a rule be transferred to 
another. We are subjectively certain, e.g., that our 
friend whom we have known for years, will, under given 
conditions, do a certain thing and not the opposite. We 
are objectively certain on the other hand, e.g., that the 
rise of the barometer indicates an increase in atmos- 
pheric pressure. 

The forms of correct thinking, i.e., of the thinking 
which leads to judgments which are objectively certain, 
are therefore simply the universal conditions of this 
objective certainty. If we should take account of the 
additional circumstance that scientific investigation does 
not always attain to judgments which are objectively 
certain, but very frequently only to probability which 
varies in different cases, we should then define logic as 
the doctrine of the universal conditions of objective cer- 
tainty and probability. 

The discovery of the forms of correct thinking requires 
first of all an examination of the forms of thought in 
general, i.e., we must seek to discover that which is 
common to every act of thought. The judgment-form, 
which is at the basis of all thinking, is found to be the 



THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC 43 

most general of all. The simplest perceptions, as well 
as the results of the most profound deliberations, are all 
expressed in the form of a judgment. Language has 
cast this thought-form into an assertory proposition. 
The proposition and the judgment, or, as we may put 
it, the judgment-proposition, forms the subject-matter 
of every logical investigation. When is a judgment 
formally correct? Under what conditions may a new 
correct judgment be derived from one or more correct 
judgments ? These are the questions which form the chief 
subject matter of logic. Logic could therefore also be 
defined as the doctrine of the universal conditions of 
correct judgment. 

But not every judgment admits of having the universal 
conditions of its validity demonstrated. A large num- 
ber of judgments serve only to formulate and express 
individual perceptions, recollections and anticipations. 
All such judgments, I shall call them judgments of 
intuition, naturally have only subjective certainty, and 
are consequently incapable of logical proof. Such proof 
can be applied only in the case of judgments which make 
general assertions, i.e., to be more explicit, such as set 
forth bare facts without any individual or subjective 
coloring, judgments which express universal laws of 
nature. Such judgments as these are called conceptual 
judgments, and they are the only ones that can be the 
subject of logical proof. 

The traditions of two thousand years have taught 
us that the best method of logical proof consists in arti- 



44 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

ficially reducing the conceptual judgment to its ele- 
ments. The elements of the logical judgment are 
concepts. The concept is a thought-form which is with- 
out meaning except as it appears in a judgment, but for 
logical purposes it must nevertheless receive independent 
treatment. 

Every concept is characterized by universality. It 
originates as the resultant of numerous intuitional judg- 
ments and it is the unitary vehicle of the attributes and 
the states which are common to a number of ideas. Con- 
sciousness retains the concept by means of a symbolic 
sign which is usually a word. The exact meaning of 
the word, i.e., the attributes and states which the con- 
cept bears, forms its intension; the objects in which the 
respective attributes and states are found, form the exten- 
sion of the concept. The traditional method of testing 
judgments treated them as assertions of conceptual rela- 
tion. The relations of extension served this purpose 
best because they could be represented diagrammatically, 
and also because mathematical formulas could be applied 
to them with advantage. The relations of intension, on 
the other hand, always remain abstract, neither do they 
admit of diagrammatic representation, nor of mathe- 
matical formulation. 

The traditional logic is therefore almost exclusively 
a logic of extension. It investigates the possible relations 
of concepts, inquires which of these find expression in 
the judgment, and seeks to ascertain how new concepts 
may be derived from given relations. This method of 



THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC 45 

derivation Is called inference. The traditional divisions 
of logic therefore are the doctrine of the concept, the 
judgment, and inference. 

The theory that the judgment is an expression of a 
conceptual relation for a long time obscured the true 
psychological nature of the act of judgment. As long as 
the judgment was treated as consisting of two elements, 
the fact was overlooked that the process at the basis 
of the judgment, and which really forms it, already con- 
tains both these elements in combination. We shall have 
occasion farther on to say more concerning the psycho- 
logical significance of the function of judgment, as well 
as concerning its importance for the theory of knowl- 
edge. It must here be emphasized, however, that logic 
is perfectly justified in reducing the judgment to its con- 
cepts, in so far as this reduction serves its purposes. But 
an artificial transformation which is made to serve 
definite scientific ends does not carry with it the privilege 
of deciding upon the original and essential nature of the 
psychical act. 

But the task of logic is not exhausted when it has 
treated the doctrine of the concept, the judgment and 
inference. It must also show how these forms are ap- 
plied in scientific thought, and accordingly must examine 
the methods of investigation. Wundfs plan of separat- 
ing the method of the exposition of what Is already 
known from that of investigation is well adapted to this 
purpose. The methods of exposition comprise chiefly 
the definition and the classification of the concepts, and 



46 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the various kinds of proof. Induction and deduction, 
analysis and synthesis, and the more specific methods 
employed by the various sciences constitute the methods 
of investigation. The practical value of the doctrine of 
methods consists in its application to the particular 
sciences and its investigation of the specific methods 
employed by them. We must therefore distinguish be- 
tween the general and the special doctrine of methods. 
The latter sets forth the logic of the special sciences. 
Wundt has performed this gigantic task in his three 
volume work on logic and thereby greatly increased the 
scope of the science of logic. 

13. The Development and the Schools of Logic 

The need of a precise formulation of the universal 
laws of thought made itself felt toward the close of the 
fourth century B.C. The occasion for it was given by the 
so-called Megarian philosophers who challenged the pos- 
sibility of true judgments, on the one hand, and on the 
other hand persisted in confusing their opponents by 
means of sophistical fallacies. After Socrates had in- 
sisted on conceptual knowledge and Plato had instituted 
investigations concerning the definition and classification 
of concepts, Aristotle undertook to exarnine and formu- 
late the rules of inference and of proof with precision 
and in detail, and thus became the founder of logic. 

Aristotle was thoroughly convinced that logic had 
nothing whatever to do with the discovery of new truths, 
but that it was limited to the proof of the results of 



THE SCHOOLS OF LOGIC 47 

ordinary thinking. He expressly says that it is the duty 
of logic to reduce the inferences which are actually 
drawn to definite forms in order to test their validity. 
Aristotle was also well aware that in order to accom- 
plish this we must analytically reduce the inferences 
really drawn to the judgments upon which they rest, 
and must in turn reduce the judgments to their concep- 
tual elements. He therefore, quite correctly, called his 
science, Analytics, i.e., the art of analyzing. 

Aristotle's logical writings (on the Categories or fun- 
damental concepts, Propositions, the Doctrine of Infer- 
ence and Proof, the Doctrine of the Proofs of Probability 
and of Definition, which are contained in the eight books 
of The Topics) were compiled in later antiquity and 
during the middle ages, for text-book purposes, under 
the title of Isagogics (Introduction). The forms of 
the syllogism were still further elaborated and a large 
number of technical terms created by Theophrastus and 
Eudemus, disciples of Aristotle, as well as by the Stoics 
and the scholastic philosophers of the middle ages. With 
these the trained dialectician was expected to operate 
with rapidity and certainty. 

During the sixteenth century, Peter Ramus, a vigorous 
opponent of Aristotle and scholasticism, wrote a text-book 
of logic in which he followed the method of Cicero and 
Quintilian. He arranged the material in the manner which 
is still familiar to us in the ordinary text-books of logic.^ 

^The "Logic" of Peter Ramus, which he also called Ars 
disserendi, consisted of two parts. The first, de inventione, 



48 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

The English philosopher, Bacon, undertook to demon- 
strate the futility of the Aristotelian logic in his Novum 
Organum. He emphasized the importance of induc- 
tion, the process by which we ascend from the particular 
to the universal. Nevertheless the main doctrines of the 
Aristotelian-Scholastic logic still continued to be used in 
the text-book instruction in the schools, where it has 
maintained its influence in large measure even to the 
present day. 

Logic received a new impulse and a different content 
through the labors of Immanuel Kant. He accepted the 
traditional, purely formal logic, and in addition thereto 
he invented a new kind of logical reflection, which he 
called transcendental logic. He believed that he had 
discovered the fundamental functions of the human 
understanding in the forms of judgment, by means of 
which the sense impressions coming from without are 
formulated. Kant regarded these fundamental func- 
tions as a kind of innate possession of the human mind, 
which creates, so to speak, the uniformity of natural 
law by the exercise of these functions. This view, how- 
ever, ascribes a productive, indeed almost a creative 
power, to logical forms. Hegel subsequently developed 
this thought one-sidedly and constructed a metaphysical 

treated of the concept, its definition and division; the second, 
de indicio, of judgment and inference. So general was the use 
of this text-book, e.g., that Secunda Petri (the second part of the 
logic of Peter Ramus) became the expression for the faculty 
of judgment, which is used in this sense even by Kant and 
Schopenhauer. 



THE SCHOOLS OF LOGIC 49 

logic, in which the logical evolution of the concepts is 
construed as coinciding with the actual process of becom- 
ing, i.e., with the nature of things. The logic of Hegel, 
despite the profound influence of his dialectical method, 
seemed to have fallen into complete discredit during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. But at present it 
is being revived again in a modified form. The scho- 
lastic logic of the middle ages is again enlisting zealous 
exponents. In opposition to these tendencies there is 
an entirely diflFerent theory struggling for recognition, 
one which emphasizes the strictly empirical character of 
the logical laws. 

The following schools may be distinguished in the 
logic of our own time : 

1. Psychological logic makes a thorough investigation 
of the psychological foundations of the laws of thought. 
By making actual thinking the starting point this method 
has made rich contributions to the psychology of think- 
ing, and greatly illuminated the nature of the thought 
processes as they really take place. The most outspoken 
exponents of this tendency, among whom the author of 
this volume belongs, regard logical laws as the resultant 
of the combined activity of general and verified ex- 
perience. According to this view, the task of logic 
consists in discovering how much universal and veri- 
fied experience is contained in every single fact of 
experience. 

2. Epistemological logic seeks not only to establish 
the validity of the laws of thought within the sphere of 

4 



50 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the knowable, but also to define the limits of knowledge. 
It thus transcends the boundaries of the specifically log- 
ical and enters upon problems of the criticism of knowl- 
edge and of metaphysics. Many of these investigations 
are exceedingly important, but they serve the specific pur- 
pose of logic, namely, the knowledge of the universal 
conditions of objective certainty, less efficiently, because 
they dig too deep and thus entirely unsettle confidence 
in objective certainty. 

3. Mathematical logic aims to find the most accurate 
mathematical expression possible for the forms of judg- 
ment and inference. The investigations in this depart- 
ment all start from the relations of the extension of the 
concepts, and they have frequently accomplished surpris- 
ing results. In many instances the old rules of the 
schools are thus greatly simplified and expressed with 
greater precision. The simpler formulas which are thus 
obtained could be employed very profitably in general 
instruction, but the more complicated ones are very often 
difficult even for the specialist to understand. A prom- 
ising field of labor has at any rate been opened here. 

4. The Logic of Method is an exceedingly fruitful 
extension of the field of logical inquiry. John Stuart 
Mill's system of inductive logic and the comprehensively 
planned work of William Wundt, previously mentioned, 
have rendered valuable service in this direction. Sev- 
eral very important efforts to construct a logic upon an 
empirico-practical basis, proceeding from American 
thinkers, likewise belong in this list. These efforts have 



GRAMMAR, LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY 51 

been instituted on the basis of the pragmatic principle 
which will receive further attention later on. We refer 
especially to the treatises of John Dewey and Mark 
Baldwin. If we should decide to regard logic simply as 
the doctrine of the methods of thought, and would con- 
sistently apply the concept of the "economy of thought" 
introduced by Ernst Mach, the possibility of extension 
in this direction would become much greater. Logic 
would then be nothing more than a universal economy 
of thought, and its task would consist in discovering 
how thought-instruments have always tended towards 
economic adjustment and how these adjustments may be 
still further advanced. 

Kanfs well-known observation, that it had been impos- 
sible to make a single step of progress in the science of 
logic since the time of Aristotle, but that neither was any 
retreat necessary, scarcely justified when it was made, 
is to-day farther from the truth than ever. Many of 
Aristotle's fundamental principles are only now being 
properly understood and fully appreciated. But in the 
statement and formulation of the problem, we have in 
many respects departed from and gone beyond Aristotle, 

14. Grammar, Logic and Psychology 

Logic has been closely related to grammar both in its 
origin and during the course of its development. The 
distinction between subject and predicate, between sub- 
stantive, adjective and verb is the result of logical rather 
than of grammatical consideration. The only method 



52 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

by which the laws of thought could be discovered was 
by an analysis of its linguistic expression. The amal- 
gamation of logical with grammatical investigations 
during the course of their development, however, has fre- 
quently given rise to error, e.g., the identification of the 
significance of a word with the content of the concept, 
the sentence with the judgment, has led to the notion 
that every grammatical relation coincides with a logical 
relation and, conversely, that the development of lan- 
guage proceeds according to logical law, or at least that 
it should do so. 

Grammar treats of the laws which obtain in the struc- 
ture of human speech. These laws develop according 
to physiological and psychological processes, and hence 
physiology and psychology, but not logic, must form the 
basis of grammar. Language is the verbal expression 
of ideas, thoughts, feelings and attitudes of the will. 
Language has fulfilled its purpose whenever I express 
exactly what I mean, or whenever I understand exactly 
what others say to me. The question whether my asser- 
tions are objectively correct is here of no consequence 
at all, or it is at least only secondary. Grammar must 
therefore be wholly separated from logical inquiry and 
founded upon psychology. 

Logic, however, is obliged to make use of the results 
embodied in language and to adhere to the prevailing 
usages of speech in stating its definitions. Logical dis- 
cipline must undoubtedly exercise an important influence 
upon the accuracy of expression, but logic must never 



GRAMMAR, LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY 53 

dream of wishing to govern language. Logic treats of 
the forms of thought, and its subject-matter consists 
solely of the relations pertaining to thought. Logic may 
frequently depend on language for guidance, but it must 
never permit itself to be led astray by it. 

Our previous remarks have already suggested the rela- 
tion of logic to psychology. Psychology is obliged to 
investigate the actual process of human thought just as 
it does the other activities of the mind. It is likewise the 
business of the logician to familiarize himself with the 
results of psychology which bear on his problems. But 
logic is perfecitly free to make such artificial transforma- 
tions of the natural forms of thought as are necessary 
to test the general conditions of objective certainty. 
This is in fact its real task. 

The matters of chief significance to the psychologist 
are the circumstances under which a judgment is formed, 
the person who forms it, and the subsidiary thoughts and 
motives which are coupled with it. The logician takes 
account of nothing but the judgment, that is, the con- 
ceptual relation. He must isolate the thought from every 
association, every element of feeling, every purpose of 
the thinker, in order to test it on the pure basis of its 
formal correctness. The more accurately, the more 
completely the logician succeeds in this abstraction 
from every irrelevant circumstance, so much the better 
will he succeed in his logical task. He must, however, 
guard against mistaking his artificial product for the 
true, original, living thought itself. 



54 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

It is not an easy matter to fix the limits of the sphere 
of logic clearly and definitely. Because of this we are 
frequently forced to transcend the specifically logical 
problems for higher realms. This leads us to the rela- 
tion of logic to philosophy, to the explanation of which 
we now proceed. 

15. Logic and Philosophy 

Logic is the indispensable preparatory discipHne for 
philosophy and it is frequently taught in intermediate 
schools as a philosophical propaedeutic. As a matter of 
fact, logic is essentially an indispensable preparatory 
disciphne not alone for philosophy, but for every branch 
of science as well. The mind is not fettered by logic as 
if laced up in Spanish boots, as Mephisto jestingly 
remarks, but is disciplined to thoughtfulness, guarded 
against rash and hasty generalizations, and trained to 
distinguish the certain from that which is merely prob- 
able. Logic directs our attention to the laws of thought 
which are used instinctively, and emphasizes the im- 
portance of carefully testing the results of thinking. It 
is, therefore, a discipline which is indispensable for every 
kind of scientific inquiry. 

The investigation of the more profound problems of 
logic leads, almost inevitably, beyond the mere logical 
aspect, into strictly philosophical investigations. Any 
one who wishes to understand clearly the relation of a 
concept to its symbols, as it appears in the doctrine of 
the concepts, any one who undertakes to test the extent 



LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY 55 

or the validity of our judgments and conclusions, cannot 
ignore the problem as to whether the human understand- 
ing is capable of knowing reality. 

This raises the problem concerning the possibility and 
the origin of human knowledge and plunges us at once 
into the very midst of the most important of philosophic 
disciplines, the theory of knowledge. But the problem 
of knowledge already involves the problem concerning 
the object of our knowledge, i.e., concerning ultimate 
reality. In this way logic finally leads us to the doc- 
trine of Being, Ontology or Metaphysics. 

LITERATURE 

PSYCHOLOGY 

Fr. Jodl, Lehrbuch der Psychologie. 2 vols., 3 Ed., 1908. 
(Comprehensive work containing excellent bibliographies.) 

W. Wundt, Grundzuege der physiologischen Psychologie, 3 vols., 
6 Ed., 1908. (A work of fundamental importance.) Eng. 
Trans, in preparation. 

Human and Animal Psychology. (Eng. Trans, from second 
Ger, Ed., 1897. 4 Ed. in German, 1906. (A very valuable 
work as an introduction to the experimental methods.) 
Outlines of Psychology. (3 Eng. Ed. from 7 Ger. Ed., 1907. 
8 Ger. Ed., 1908.) 

Psychologie, in Windelband's Philosophic am Beginn des 
XX Jahrhunderts. 

H. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuege der Psychologie. i vol., 2 Ed., 
1905. (An exhaustive account of the general problems as 
well as the results of experimental inquiry. It is to be re- 
gretted that, due to the author's untimely death in Feb., 1909, 
the second volume will not appear.) Abriss der Psychol- 
ogie, 1908, Eng. Trans. 



56 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

A. Horwicz, Psychologische Analysen auf physiologischer Grun- 
lage. 2 vols., 1872-78. 

Th. Ziehen, Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologic. 7 Ed., 
1906. (Eng. Trans.) 

O. Kuelpe, Outlines of Psychology. (Eng. Trans., new edition, 
1909.) 

H. Muensterberg. Aufgaben and Methoden der Psychologic, 
1891. 

H. Hoeffding, Outlines of Psychology. (Eng. Trans., 1897.) 4 
Ger. Ed., 1908. Introspective, abounding in pertinent obser- 
vations. 

W. James, Principles of Psychology. 2 vols., 1890. (The most 
notable work in introspective psychology.) 
Text-book of Psychology. (Ger. Trans., 1908.) 

A. Bain, The Senses and the Intellect. 3 Ed., 1868. The emo- 
tions and the will. 3 Ed., 1880. 

Th. Lipps, Leitfaden der Psychologic. 2 Ed., 1906. (Introspec- 
tive, containing profound analyses.) 

Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations. 

Max Kassowitz, Allgemeine Biologic. Vol. 4. Nerven und 
Seele, 1906. 

W. Jerusalem, Lehrbuch der Psychologic, 4 Ed., 1907. (Biolog- 
ical.) 
Die Urtcilsfunktion, (a psychology of thought), 1905. 

H. Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologic. 2 vols, (to Thomas 
Aquinas), 1884. 

M. Dessoir, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologic, i 
Band, 2 Ed., 1897. (Vol. 2 in preparation.) 

G. Villa, Contemporary Psychology, (Eng. Trans.) 

A. Pfaender, Einfuehrung in die Psychologic. 1904. 

Titchener, Text-book in Psychology, 1909. Experimental Psy- 
chology. 

LOGIC 

Fr. Ueberweg, System der Logik. (Eng. Trans.) 
H. Lotze, Logik. (Eng. Trans.) 

Chr. Sigwart, Logik, 2 vols., 3 Ed., 1905. (Eng. Trans, from 
2 Ed.) 



LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY 57 

W. Wundt, Logik. 3 vols., 3 Ed., 1907. (Vol. i. Theory of 
Knowledge; 2nd, and 3rd. Methodology. Methodology is 
particularly valuable.) 

B. Erdmann, Logik, i Band. 2 Ed., 1907. (Logic of content.) 

/. S. Mill, System of Logic. 

JV. Jerusalem, Der kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik, 1905. 

Mark Baldwin, Thoughts and Things or Genetic Logic. Vol. i, 
1906; Vol. 2, 1908. 

John Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, 1903. 

Stanley Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, 1870. (Very 
easy.) 

M. W. Drobisch, Neue Darstellung der Logik. 5 Ed., 1887. 
(One of the best expositions of the traditional formal logic.) 

H. Cohen, Die Logik der reinen Erkentniss, 1902. 

E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. 2 vols., 1900. (Revivi- 
fication of scholastic logic.) 

A. Stoehr, Leitfaden der Logik in psychologisierender Darstel- 
lung, 1905. 

St. Jevons, Principles of Science, 1874. 

Schroeder, Vorlesung ueber Algebra der Logik. Mathematical 
Logic. 

Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, 4 vols. (Down to the sixteenth 
century.) 185 5- 1870. 

Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, 1906. 

Joyce, Principles of Logic, 1908. 

Gibson, The Problem of Logic, Vol. i, 1909. 



THIRD DIVISION 
CRITICISM OF KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY 

i6. Dogmatism, Skepticism, Criticism 

Philosophy is at first dogmatic, then skeptical, and 
finally critical on the subject of our ability to know 
reality. Reversions to the mental attitude of an earlier 
period, however, occur quite frequently. 

Dogmatism is the name applied to the school of think- 
ers which reposes complete confidence in the results of 
sense-perception and reflection, and holds that the world 
is really constituted as we perceive it, or as we construe 
it in thought. The naive, unreflective man is dogmatic 
in both thought and action. It never even occurs to him 
to doubt the correctness of his knowledge, much less the 
possibility of knowledge. Religion is also dogmatic. It 
firmly believes in the truth of its doctrines, even when, or 
especially when they refer to objects of the supersensible 
world, such objects as transcend all possible expe- 
rience. But philosophy was likewise dogmatic through- 
out a long period of its development. Plato, who thought 
the essence of things consisted of immaterial ideas, or 
prototypes, is no less dogmatic than Leiicippus and 
Democritus (450 B.C.), who only grant reality to mate- 

58 



DOGMATISM, SKEPTICISM, CRITICISM 59 

rial atoms and to empty space. Descartes (1596-1650), 
who begins with doubt, but afterwards finds in his own 
consciousness an incontrovertible, positive fact, is no less 
dogmatic than the materialists of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, such as Lamettrie, Holhach, Karl 
Vogt and Buechner, who ascribe reality only to matter 
and its properties and energies. 

Skepticism implies an attitude of absolute doubt with 
respect to the possibility of knowledge. The logical 
consequence of this attitude requires the skeptic to refrain 
from every positive statement. This tendency, originated 
by Pyrrho in the third century b.c.^ arose in consequence 
of the conflicting views which were held by the various 
schools of philosophy. It found many adherents, even 
down into the late Roman period. The psychological mo- 
tive for systematic doubt is the desire for tranquility and 
peace of mind. In order to avoid being drawn into the pas- 
sionate strife of the schools these thinkers prefer to make 
no positive statement and they resort to every imaginable 
device to prove that this is the only reasonable method. 
We are quite well informed with respect to the arguments 
which have been offered by these thinkers, but it cannot 
be said that they have contributed anything essential to 
the advancement of human thought. The best that can 
be said is that we may learn from them to withhold judg- 
ment until the presuppositions for a conclusion are given. 
Absolute skepticism, however, cannot be consistently sus- 
tained. The philosophic skeptic is obliged to deport him- 
self in his ordinary activities exactly like the dogmatist. 



6o AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

The ancient skepticism was revived once more during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Montaigne, 
Charron and Pierre Bayle who vigorously maintained 
the logical impossibility of proving the dogmas of relig- 
ion. Pierre Bayle exerted a profound influence upon the 
eighteenth century by his famous encyclopedic dictionary, 
which is permeated throughout with his skepticism. This 
prepared the way for the enlightenment and materialism 
on the one hand, and for philosophic criticism on the 
other. The great English thinker, David Hume (1711- 
1776), is also generally regarded as a skeptic, but his truly 
epoch-making investigations concerning the fundamental 
concepts of thought, which will be explained farther on, 
especially concerning substance and causality, are not 
skeptical, but really belong to the third stage, that of 
Criticism. 

There is a sense in which philosophy is critical at its 
very beginning. Since it undertakes to attain to a 
world-theory by the sheer power of thinking, independ- 
ently of tradition, criticism belongs to its very nature. 
In the narrower sense, however, only that tendency which 
applies critical tests not only to tradition, but also to its 
own capacity for knowledge, is called criticism. Criti- 
cism, in this sense, does not admit the validity of any- 
thing without previous testing. It inquires concerning 
the possibility and the limits of human knowledge. It 
investigates the origin and development of our cognitions. 
It seeks to discover to what extent the origin of expe- 
rience rests upon subjective contributions and to mark 



DOGMATISM, SKEPTICISM, CRITICISM 6i 

off the limits within which human investigation may 
apply itself with hope of success. 

The beginnings of criticism are discernible already in 
ancient philosophy. The doctrine of the Eleatics who 
denied to the senses the capacity of knowledge, the asser- 
tion of Democritus that sweet and bitter, heat and cold, 
as well as color are not real attributes of things, but only 
subjective sensations, these all breathe a decidedly 
critical spirit. The necessity of testing our capacity for 
knowledge makes itself felt with much greater force and 
with far wider meaning in modern times through the 
labors of John Locke, George Berkeley, and David 
Hume. The investigations of the latter made a profound 
impression upon Immanuel Kant, who is the creator and 
founder of philosophic criticism. 

Kant has made it impossible to maintain the view- 
point of dogmatism. It is not at all necessary that we 
agree with Kant everywhere and in every instance, but 
we must at all events reckon with him. We are obliged 
to dispose of the problems which he has propounded 
before we can proceed to any positive assertions. Just 
as the scientific study of law cannot be pursued other- 
wise than historically since Savigny ; just as the forms 
of organisms can no longer be considered otherwise than 
evolutionally and biologically since Darwin, so it is no 
longer permissible to pursue philosophy otherwise than 
critically since Kant. 

Criticism places the problem of knowledge in the front 
rank of philosophic inquiry, because it is the most funda- 



62 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

mental and most determinative. We shall for this reason 
likewise begin our presentation of philosophical prob- 
lems, in the narrower sense, with it. 

17. The Problems of Knowledge 

What do we understand by the term knowledge in the 
ordinary usage of language? When I say of a certain 
person, *'I know him, he is an acquaintance of mine," it 
means the same as : "I can give you the name of the man 
who is approaching yonder, I know many things con- 
cerning him, know his business, his vocation, and perhaps 
also remember having had this or that experience with 
him." To say that I know a plant, means : I am in posi- 
tion to define the plant botanically, to give its name, and 
that I know the place to which scientific investigation has 
assigned it in the classification of plants. 

Every cognition is therefore an intellectual apprehen- 
sion of a given content, which is in itself distinct from 
the cognition. Every cognition, furthermore, is con- 
summated in the form of a judgment, and whoever pro- 
nounces this judgment, in the firm conviction of having 
attained a cognition, is thereby convinced at the same 
time that the cognized object, or the cognized event, 
really exists and is really constituted just as it appears 
to be, independently of the fact whether it is cognized 
or not. Hence cognition, at least according to the ordi- 
nary usage of language, presupposes an object which 
exists independently and which is distinct from the 
cognizing subject. 



THE PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE 63 

The scientific significance of cognition does not essen- 
tially deviate from this customary usage of language. It 
only brings out more clearly the fact that cognition does 
not rest upon sense-perception alone, but that intellectual 
assimilation is also an indispensable element of the 
process. Scientific investigation likewise regards the 
independent existence of the cognized object as a self- 
evident presupposition. 

Thorough psychological analysis of sense perception 
and of the act of judgment shows that the relation be- 
tween the act of cognition and the object or process of 
cognition is not so very simple. The unreflective mind 
regards our ideas and judgments simply as copies of the 
processes represented and adjudged. Upon deeper 
reflection, however, it immediately becomes apparent 
that this conception is incorrect, that it is even impos- 
sible. Our ideas and judgments, being non-sensible, 
psychological processes, cannot be copies of things which 
are sensibly perceived. Our ideas and judgments, there- 
fore, are not copies, but can at most be regarded as the 
symbols of processes which take place independently of 
us. The question then arises whether it is permissible 
to conclude that every change in the symbols, i.e., in our 
idea and judgment, likewise indicates a change in that 
which is symbolized, i.e., in objective reality. The fact 
that our ideas and judgments are by no means determined 
wholly by our environment makes it difficult to answer 
this question. The psychology of ideation and judgment 
rather shows us with increasing clearness, that our own 



64 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

nature, our own organization, both in its physical and 
in its psychical aspects, participates in the formation of 
ideas and judgments. During fever we see forms to 
which no objective reality corresponds, and our imagina- 
tion constructs from elements previously perceived new 
images which are nowhere to be found in the objective 
world. Who shall then tell us in each particular case 
whether or not our perceptions are hallucinations or 
dream-f ancies ? Who shall decide for us to what extent 
the elements of imagination have slipped into our pic- 
tures of memory? Perhaps indeed all of our so-called 
cognitions are no more than our own subjective expe- 
riences and, although we should be justified on this 
ground to speak of changes of our states of conscious- 
ness and of the contents of consciousness, we have no 
right to say anything concerning processes which take 
place independently of us. Such are the questions that 
give rise to the philosophical problems of knowledge, 
and they cannot be permanently ignored. 

To be brief we may call these problems the inquiry 
concerning the possibility and the limits of human knowl- 
edge. This is the problem which engages the criticism 
of knowledge, which is one of the most difficult, but, at 
the same time, one of the most important divisions of 
theoretical philosophy. 

The question concerning the origin and the develop- 
ment of human knowledge is indeed no less important. 
The primary requisite of this division of the subject is 
to determine the respective contributions of sense percep- 



CRITICISM OF KNOWLEDGE 65 

tion and of intellect to the origin of knowledge. Do we 
acquire our world-image through the senses alone? Is 
it only the understanding which comprehends the true 
nature of things? Or does knowledge result from the 
cooperation of the primary, secondary and tertiary 
psychical phenomena? It is further necessary to 
determine the contribution made by the phenomena of 
feeling and of will, and to investigate the significance 
of language; for the development of knowledge. The 
treatment of these problems constitutes the subject- 
matter of the theory of knowledge. 

18. The Development and the Schools of the 
Criticism of Knowledge 

The unreflective have always taken it for granted, — and 
this is true with the majority of men even to-day, — ^that 
the objects of their environment exist independently, 
and that they are exactly as they appear to be. This 
theory, which is not only pre-philosophical, but pre- 
scientific also; this tendency, which antedates all reflec- 
tion concerning our faculty of cognition, and which still 
prevails among the masses, is called naive Realism. It 
is realism because, at this stage of thought man regards 
the objective world which he perceives, and about which 
he forms ideas, as existing independently, i.e., as real; 
and it is naive realism because it has not been tested by 
critical reflection. It is simply postulated as the self- 
evident presupposition of thought and action. We 
simply do not know any better. 
5 



66 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

As reflection supervenes, however, the standpoint of 
naive reaUsm cannot long be maintained. Even such 
familiar illusions of the senses a« occur almost daily, 
shake our confidence in the unquestioned correctness of 
our judgments of sense perception. Experiences like 
the following come to pass early in life : a stick inserted 
obliquely in water appears to be broken, when it is not 
really so, and objects seen at a distance really are larger 
than they appear to be. This unsettles our confidence 
in the trustworthiness of the senses and philosophical 
reflection casts about for other, more certain, sources of 
knowledge. It is readily conceivable that one may here 
easily go to the opposite extreme and ascribe too little 
cognitive power to the senses and too much to the intel- 
lect. One thing, at least, is certain, namely, that two 
essentially different factors contribute to the formation 
of our world-image. The one is outside of us, self- 
active, independent and possibly persistent, i.e., the 
objective factor. The other is our self, our senses, 
thoughts and feelings. This latter, which is of a 
transient, changeable nature, is the subjective factor. 
Naive realism regards the world which we perceive and 
know as wholly objective. The subjective factor does 
not yet exist for it. Just as soon as the subjective factor 
has been recognized we enter upon the criticism of 
knowledge. 

The evolution of criticism takes place in such a man- 
ner, that, first of all, certain sense-impressions such as 
taste, heat and color are recognized as purely subjec- 



CRITICISM OF KNOWLEDGE 67 

tive. But the data of the sense of touch retain their 
objective vaHdity for a much longer time. It has only 
been discovered very recently that hard and soft, round 
and square are just as much data of sense as smell, sound 
and color, and hence, that they too must receive the same 
critical treatment. 

The subjective factor was similarly recognized in the 
results of abstract thought at a much later period even 
though the elaborations of the speculative mind had long 
been accepted as objectively valid. Here it was Kant 
above all others who inquired into the forms of the 
understanding by means of which alone experience be- 
comes possible. The fact that we conceive complexes 
of sensations as independent, persistent things, that we 
attribute causal connection to events which regularly 
succeed each other, all this and much more besides, Kant 
ascribes to innate properties of our understanding. It 
is by means of these fundamental forms or categories 
that we mold our objective impressions, which are chaotic 
in themselves, into the resulting experience. This is the 
only means by which experience can possibly arise. 
Everything knowable in our world-theory is therefore, 
first of all, determined by the innate forms of sensibility, 
space and time, and then also by the categories of the 
understanding. Hence it is only the subjective factor 
that is knowable and within the reach of experience. 
That which remains, after we eliminate the subjective 
factor from experience, is the "thing-in-itself" which is 
absolutely unknowable. According to Kant the exist- 



68 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

ence of this ''thing-in-itself," in its pure objectivity and 
without any dependence upon us, is absolutely certain, 
but this is likewise the limit of our certainty. Hence the 
objective factor really exists, but it is entirely unknow- 
able. 

This existence of the thing-in-itself, which Kant still 
holds, is, however, likewise denied by modern thinkers 
as wholly unprovable, indeed as unthinkable. These 
thinkers say that even existence is only a category of 
the understanding. Thus, in direct opposition to naive 
realism, we arrive at a theory of the universe which is 
stripped of every vestige of objective reality. 

The things which we perceive and infer about the 
objective world, as well as the teachings of science, con- 
sist of nothing more than the contents of our own 
consciousness. If we abstract human consciousness, its 
entire content vanishes with it, i.e., the whole world is 
obliterated. Heaven and earth, land and sea, hill and 
valley are only our ideas. Whoever asserts that there 
is an objective world independent of our consciousness, 
asserts what is inaccessible to proof and even contradic- 
tory. 

This tendency, the direct antithesis of naive realism, 
is generally known under the name of Idealism. Accord- 
ing to this theory the world is nothing more than the 
content of our consciousness, or at least our knowledge 
of it does not extend beyond the content of our conscious- 
ness. Idealism appears in a variety of forms, the most 
important of which will here be indicated. We must, 



CRITICISM OF KNOWLEDGE 69 

however, first familiarize ourselves with the customary 
terminology. 

The term immanent is applied to whatever is given ^s 
the content of consciousness or is regarded as having 
no existence outside of consciousness. Whatever goes 
beyond consciousness and exists independently of it, is 
called transcendent, or extra-mental. The strict idealist, 
consequently, only believes in an immanent world, and 
refuses to grant the existence of a transcendent or extra- 
mental universe. 

The term transcendental, Kant's favorite concept, has 
an essentially different meaning from the term trans- 
cendent. Kant applies the term transcendental to every- 
thing which is independent of experience, that which 
exists before all experience, i.e., whatever is a priori 
provable and certain. Hence Kant's transcendental 
idealism asserts that there are certain primary forms of 
sensibility and of the understanding which do not 
originate through experience, but exist before all expe- 
rience, and indeed make experience possible through the 
formation of the thing-in-itself which impresses them. 
This theory therefore still continues to be realism in so 
far as it concedes the independent extra-mental or trans- 
cendent existence of the thing-in-itself. According to 
it our knowledge is limited to appearance or phenomenon. 
This theory is therefore also known as Phenomenalism. 

Immanent idealism on the other hand, which, in recent 
years, has also been called immanent philosophy, con- 
tends that the existence of the objective w^orld is 



70 m INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

exhausted in the statement that it is the content of human 
consciousness. This concedes the reality of nothing 
transcendent, nothing extra-mental. Whoever maintains 
the existence of a world independent of consciousness, 
the idealists contend, doubles the world in a manner 
which is wholly unjustifiable. 

This world-theory, inasmuch as it virtually implies 
that every thinker only acknowledges the reality of him- 
self and the content of his consciousness, has been called 
Solipsism {solus — alone, ipse — self). 

The so-called Neokantians, Schiippe, Rehmke, v. Le- 
clair, Schiihert-Soldern, etc., represent this strict idealist 
conception. 

The so-called Positivism of modern times represents 
still another theory which is closely related to phenom- 
enalism. This theory teaches that science should con- 
fine itself to the investigation of the uniformity of 
phenomena for the sole, purpose of learning to regulate 
events without regard to the ultimate grounds of being, 
which must forever remain unknowable. The French- 
man, Auguste Comte (1798-1857) is the founder of this 
school. John Stuart Mill of England and Ernst Laas 
of Germany are in a certain sense disciples of Comte. 

In opposition to these idealistic tendencies, realism has 
reasserted itself again. Every scientific thinker must 
indeed concede the futility of trying to maintain naive 
realism. But, after making due allowance for the sub- 
jective factor in our world-theory, there still remains a 
considerable objective residue to be accounted for. And 



CRITICAL IDEALISM 71 

in spite of all that idealism has to say, the existence of 
an objective world which both affects us, and is at the 
same time independent of us, is a demonstrable fact, or 
it is, at least, the assumption which best satisfies sound 
common sense as well as philosophic thought. This 
critical tendency is called Critical Realism. 

We shall have occasion to discuss the various tenden- 
cies of critical realism farther on when we come to the 
explanation of the problem of the origin of knowledge. 
For the present we must acquaint ourselves with the 
idealistic arguments and test their validity. 

19. Critical Idealism 

The view that the world of my environment is only my 
idea, that everything which I seem to cognize by percep- 
tion or thought does not really belong to the objective 
world, but can only be regarded as the content of my 
consciousness, sounds exceedingly strange to the unre- 
flective mind. Our whole practical world-theory indeed 
rests upon the assumption, or rather upon the self- 
evident presumption that that which I see and apprehend 
really exists, and exists also even when I no longer per- 
ceive it. 

The theory of the ideality of the external world be- 
comes at least somewhat more intelligible as we become 
acquainted with its historical development. We readily 
understand that our physical and psychical organism is 
not merely receptive in the process which produces our 
world-image. This world-image is rather the product 



^2 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

of the reactions of the organism upon objective stimuH, 
i.e., of its own activities. It is evident, therefore, that 
we ourselves, i.e., our organism as it is physically and 
psychically constituted, contribute much to the resultant 
experience. A little exercise in psychological analysis 
will render this still more intelligible and furnish a better 
understanding of its details. 

If, e.g., I contemplate the table at which I am now 
working : according to naive realism it is a quadrangular 
piece of wood, painted brown, which rests upon four 
legs. If, however, I examine more closely into the par- 
ticular elements of this perception, I find that, first of all, 
the color exists only as my sensation, the form of the 
table enters my consciousness through a complex of 
retinal and muscular sensations of the eye, its hardness, 
as also its smoothness, if examined closely, are indeed 
only qualities of touch. Accordingly, the table, which 
at the beginning was entirely objective, has become a 
complex of subjective qualities of sensation. The ques- 
tion still remains to what extent this complex appears to 
me as a unit, as an object, the attributes of v/hich are 
the qualities of sensation just mentioned. If I inquire 
into what remains after I abstract color, form, hardness, 
smoothness from the table, a perplexity results to say 
the least, and an answer could scarcely be given. If it 
appears then that this comprehension of sensation-com- 
plexes into unitary things is grounded in the psychical 
organization of man, then indeed, so it would appear, the 
entire table really becomes a mere phenomenon, a con- 



CRITICAL IDEALISM n 

tent of consciousness, concerning which there can be no 
ground for asserting that it exists independent of my 
consciousness. 

I can prove in the same manner that every object of 
my environment is a complex of sensations, the combina- 
tion of which depends upon a definite organization of 
my being. 

Should any one wish to make use of the discoveries of 
physics in order to distinguish the subjective from the 
objective, it would avail nothing against the strictly 
idealistic observation. It might be objected that what 
we experience as light, is in reality vibration of ether, 
and what we experience as sound is in reality vibration 
of air. Colors and sounds are only subjectively present 
but those vibrations which physics has discovered to be 
the objective causes of these sensations exist independ- 
ently of every eye and ear. The idealist would, however, 
answer : The vibrations of air and ether nevertheless still 
remain only vibrations which we have thought, and 
which can, under favorable circumstances, be rendered 
sensibly perceptible. Hence the subjective factor is by 
no means thus eliminated. Even these "objective" 
causes of our sensations remain contents of conscious- 
ness. 

But when we come to consider the causal character of 
these vibrations the situation is a peculiar one. The eye 
and the ear appear to be sense organs which operate at 
a distance. They enable us to perceive processes which 
take place at a certain spatial distance from us. Just as 



74 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

soon as we conceive the sensations of the respective 
senses as results of vibrations which reach the organ 
and there, in consequence of a kind of contact, produce 
the sensation, the respective sensations receive the 
simple character of tactual sensations. Our eye and ear 
thus become organs of touch, which only apparently 
operate in the distance, but as a matter of fact are 
affected just like our skin, only by immediate contact. 
But the sense of touch was for a long time regarded as 
the most infallible sense, because it directly apprehends 
the objects themselves. And this is largely the case 
even yet. Idealism, however, is certainly correct in say- 
ing that the data of touch are of the same subjective 
character as the data of the other senses. 

It consequently appears utterly impossible wholly to 
eliminate the subjective factor from our cognitions. 
Wherever a separation of the objective causes from the 
subjective result seems possible, it always appears that 
the objective causes are likewise only given as a content 
of consciousness. 

Strict idealism has received additional confirmation 
from the modern physiology of the senses. Johannes 
Mueller, in his well known laws of the specific energies 
of the senses, has generalized the fact that our nerves 
of sense, no matter how they are stimulated, always 
react in an identical manner. 

If, e.g., the optic nerve (nervus opticus) is stimulated 
by pressure or by an electric current, color sensations 
arise just exactly as if it were stimulated by light. 



EXAMINATION OF CRITICAL IDEALISM 75 

On the basis of this law, therefore, it is not at all cer- 
tain whether the cause of our sensations is something 
which exists objectively, or whether it is a process 
which originates within the sensory nerve in some other 
manner. 

As long as I contemplate the world simply as a single 
individual there is no way of denying that the world 
exists only as the content of my consciousness. The 
being, or esse, of the things which I have perceived 
exists only in its being perceived (percipi). It is thus 
that Berkeley has briefly and concisely formulated the 
theory of idealism. The assumption of a transcendent, 
extra-mental world, so it would appear, is wholly arbitrary 
and superfluous, and beyond all possibility of proof. 
Such eminent natural scientists as Helmholtz and Mey- 
nert, and, in a certain sense also, Mach, have even 
declared that science should confine itself to the investi- 
gation of the uniformities of phenomena, and that it can 
never expect to furnish any proof of their objective 
nature. Meynert has even regarded the fact that we 
are able to conceive the ideality of the world as the 
evidence and proof of the capabilities of the intellect. 

Let us now proceed to examine the validity of these 
arguments. 

20. Examination of Critical Idealism 

The efforts of more than two thousand years of human 
thought, which have led to the theory that the existence 
of perceivable things consists in their being perceived 



'^6 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

(Esse-percipi Berkeley) y or that the world is my idea 
(Schopenhauer), have revealed what profound depths 
of the human mind must be explored in order to deter- 
mine the nature, limits and validity of human knowledge. 
Confidence in the trustworthiness of the senses was 
shaken by sensory illusions already in antiquity, but 
without affecting the objective reality of the things 
which rest upon abstract thought. Berkeley, Hume and 
Kant afterwards discovered that our pure thought-forms 
are also of a subjective character. They likewise drew 
the logical inference, namely, that only phenomena are 
knowable; the thing-in-itself, behind the phenomenon, 
they pronounced unknowable. 

Thus far the results of the criticism of knowledge must 
be acknowledged without reservation. But in order to 
guard against gross misunderstandings, which only too 
easily slip into trains of thought which are so exceed- 
ingly abstract and in many respects so unusual, we must 
distinguish accurately between mere semblance (Schein) 
and true appearance (Erscheinung). 

By semblance we understand an occasion for ideas 
which lead to false judgments. The sensory illusion, 
which here concerns us chiefly, consists of an objective 
impression made upon our senses in so far as such 
impression leads to a false judgment. Judgments are said 
to be false when they are corrected by subsequent percep- 
tions or reflections, or when the expectations founded 
on the judgments occasioned by the semblance are not 
realized. Two examples will serve to illustrate this. 



EXAMINATION OF CRITICAL IDEALISM 77 

A stick that is plunged obliquely into water looks as 
if it were broken, i.e., it gives rise to the judgment: the 
stick is broken. We then withdraw the stick and find 
that it retains its rectilinear form, and we now form the 
judgment: the stick is not broken. The possibility, how- 
ever still remains, that the water breaks the stick. Then 
in order to convince ourselves we examine the immersed 
stick with the hand, and find that a break of the stick 
even while in the water cannot be established by our 
sense of touch. The greater trustworthiness which we 
accord to the judgment of touch now leads us to the 
judgment : the stick is not broken, it only appears so. 
When we subsequently become acquainted with the laws 
of the refraction of light, we discover that even this 
appearance of being broken is accounted for, and the 
matter is finally settled. We have the same sense impres- 
sion of the broken stick afterwards, but it no longer 
deceives our judgment. 

The case of the apparent motion of the celestial bodies 
is more complicated. We all know from our school days 
that the sun stands still, and that the earth moves. 
Nevertheless the sun seems to all of us as if it rose and 
set daily, whilst the earth apparently does not change its 
place, and as a rule our ordinary judgments are governed 
by this appearance. Our conviction of the correctness 
of the Copernican world-theory is none the less certain 
on this account. But the conviction itself, resting as it 
does upon undeniable and irresistible reflections rather 
than evidences of sense perception, is occasionally 



78 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

obscured by appearances. No well-informed man, how- 
ever, will permit his judgment to be misled by this 
semblance even though it is so universal, so realistic, 
and, literally speaking, so very deceptive. 

But phenomenon, or true appearance, means something 
vastly different. By phenomenon we mean the objective 
world as it is presented to our senses, and in a broader 
sense also, as we conceive it. By phenomenon we under- 
stand not only the first, fleeting objective impression, 
not merely the phantasm which affects our sense-organ, 
but that aspect of the world which is approachable by our 
cognitive faculty. As far as the world is knowable, 
just so far is it phenomenon. Phenomenon does not 
deceive us like semblance does. The word merely 
reminds us that there are limits to our knowledge. 

The incisive question of the criticism of knowledge 
then is, are we justified in concluding from the phenom- 
enon, which is the only thing accessible to us, to the 
existence of a reality supporting it, which, whether 
knowable or not, exists independently of us. Kant, who 
was the first to comprehend the concept of phenomenon 
here developed in its profound significance, and who, as 
no one before him, has profoundly analyzed our faculty 
of cognition, has answered this question with an em- 
phatic afiirmative. Notwithstanding many passages, in 
which he degrades the thing-in-itself to the level of a 
mere thought, it is nevertheless his firm conviction that 
phenomenal appearance of every description is sup- 
ported by a reality, an existent-something independent 



EXAMINATION OF CRITICAL IDEALISM 79 

of the knowing subject. In this sense our deepest and 
truest feehngs agree with Kant and the whole energy of 
our being refuses to acquiesce in a denial of reality in 
phenomena. Whenever we perceive an object with our 
senses, we act under a compulsion which we cannot 
avoid ascribing to an objective factor. We see that our 
fellowmen experience a similar compulsion, and we 
can never believe that the things which we perceive will 
vanish after we no longer perceive them. 

Nevertheless as we have seen above, the arguments 
of strict idealism as advanced by the Neokantians, have 
considerable logical force. As long as I contemplate 
my environment solitary and alone, it is impossible to 
challenge the position of the idealists, according to 
which the world is the content of my consciousness* 
But this gives rise to a situation in the mind of every, 
'serious thinker who is anxious to attain a consistent 
world-theory, which cannot be permanently satisfactory. 
Whilst an inexorable logic forbids a single step into the 
extra-mental, our inmost feeling of reality cannot and 
will not be satisfied with the denial of the objective world. 
But a philosopher can never rest his case on conflicting 
sentiments. He must be able to demonstrate the error 
of anything that impresses him as false. Here, then, 
reflection on the consciousness of others, offers a way of 
escape from the intolerable discord between thought and 
feeling. 

To the strict idealist, associates are obviously only 
phenomena, true appearances, nothing more. So far as 



8o AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the matter pertains to their physical organism there is 
no difficulty, since indeed we must also regard our own 
bodies as belonging to the objective world. But the 
matter becomes more difficult the moment we consider 
the contents of the consciousness of our associates. 

Let us suppose some one, M, visits me, and we engage 
in conversation. So long as I regard M as nothing 
more than the content of my consciousness, I must con- 
ceive the language-sounds which issue from him, just as 
I do the sounds of a bell, as the mere mechanical results 
of his organs of speech. But just as soon as I answer 
him, or do his bidding, I have already tacitly granted 
that I discover the expression of psychical phenomena 
in his words. But by so doing I have acknowledged 
that M possesses consciousness, i.e., contents of con- 
sciousness. But this is already an admission that M is 
a distinct being, independent of me. Inasmuch as he 
has contents of consciousness, he possesses, strictly 
speaking, the same independence of existence which I 
claim for myself. We cannot regard a being possessing 
a consciousness of its own as the content of the conscious- 
ness of another, much less can its existence be resolved 
into a mere idea. 

This becomes still more evident from the following 
consideration. M has certainly had many experiences 
of which I know absolutely nothing. But if I should 
wish to regard M as nothing more than the content of 
my consciousness, then I should either have to deny him 
any consciousness of his own, or, at least, to incorporate 



EXAMINATION OF CRITICAL IDEALISM 8i 

him, as it were, together with the whole content of his 
consciousness, within my own consciousness. But this 
is impossible. For in no event can I claim, unless I am 
willing to go right in the face of the most evident and 
undoubted facts, that I know the whole content of M's 
consciousness. I must indeed frankly acknowledge that 
there are contents of" consciousness which belong to M 
which can under no circumstances, become a content of 
my consciousness. But M was supposed to be nothing 
more than the content of my consciousness. Hence it 
follows, in defiance of all logic, that the consciousness 
which forms the content of my consciousness would not 
be the content of my consciousness at all. 

It is, therefore, evident that critical idealism, consist- 
ently developed to its logical conclusions, leads to logical 
absurdities, whereby its arguments lose all their con- 
vincing force. A world-view which regards our asso- 
ciates as nothing more than physical machines, denying 
to them distinctive centers of • consciousness, cannot 
establish the claim of being an adequate expression of 
reality. 

George Berkeley, the founder of idealism, did not 
hesitate to grant a plurality of minds, feeling and think- 
ing independently of each other, but he fails to discover 
the inconsistency contained in this assumption. Recent 
idealists, as, e.g., v. Leclair, have comprehended the 4if- 
ficulty of the ''alter-ego problem" perfectly. They 
admit, incidentally, that from their standpoint, it is not 
yet solved. They take refuge in the fiction of a universal 
6 



82 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

consciousness, the content of which is the universe itself. 
It scarcely needs to be said that such an hypothesis is no 
longer critical epistemology, but metaphysical and 
transcendent in the highest degree, i.e., that it trans- 
cends every possible experience. But this hypothesis is 
likewise psychologically practically inconceivable. It is 
scarcely possible to imagine one's self as fully compre- 
hending it. A theory, however, which obscures a fact 
as undoubted as the existence of associates who are 
endowed with consciousness, or is able to explain it only 
by the most daring metaphysical hypothesis, naturally 
loses all convincing force and, consequently, all philo- 
sophical value. 

We must inquire furthermore how a doctrine, which 
is in such open conflict with common sense, one which 
the idealists themselves are unable to apply consistently 
to real life, could ever have arisen. We have indicated 
above (page 6j^ that the subjective factor in our cogni- 
tive processes has been constantly gaining in prominence, 
and that the objective factor has been correspondingly 
losing in prominence, even to its total elimination. The 
possibility of such a thing taking place rests upon a cir- 
cumstance which I have more fully developed in another 
work.^ Every human impulse tends to develop more 
fully, in proportion to the demands which the preserva- 
tion of life make upon it. The cognitive impulse, as we 
shall presently show, has arisen from the impulse of self- 
preservation. It has, however, advanced beyond these 

* Urteilsfunktion, p. 232. 



CRITICAL REALISM 83 

immediate demands and gradually elaborated the mighty 
structure of the theoretical sciences. We can readily 
understand how it may happen that the over-develop- 
ment of certain organs or functions of our organism by 
excessive exercise, and at the expense of other organs 
and functions, should seriously impair the whole. In 
such cases we are accustomed to speak of the hypertrophy 
of the organ or function under consideration. Thus, 
for example, certain muscles frequently hypertrophy 
from excessive athletic exercise. Critical idealism, re- 
garded after this analogy, appears as an hypertrophy of 
the cognitive impulse. This hypertrophy, which is so 
thoroughly unsound and so exceedingly detrimental to 
the faculty of cognition as well as to the development of 
the mind as a whole, must be corrected by reversion. It 
is therefore imperative that we return to the common 
sense view and regard the world and its inhabitants as 
self-active and independent beings, whose existence is 
independent of the cognizing subject. But this is the 
viewpoint of Critical Realism. 

21. Critical Realism 

Critical realism approaches very closely to the common 
sense view of things. It is distinguished from the naive 
realism of this stage of thought by its refusal to accept 
the real existence of the world of our perceptions with- 
out critical test. It seeks to verify reality, however, by 
refuting the counter arguments and so modifying the 



84 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

theory as to harmonize it with the results of the criticism 
of knowledge. 

From the standpoint of critical realism, the processes 
of nature as well as of human consciousness possess 
objective reality, and they exist entirely independent of 
the knowing subject. Whatever becomes objectively 
certain or probable through perception, or whatever we 
know by reflection, is the product of two factors, one of 
which is objective and independent of ourselves, and the 
other is our own physical and psychical organization. 
Critical realism likewise regards the data of our senses 
as phenomena, but they are the phenomena of something 
which is real, something which has independent exist- 
ence. "The leaf is green," in the language of critical real- 
ism, means the same as to say : This leaf has the property, 
under favorable illumination, of exciting in the human 
eye the color-sensation, green. Without an eye which 
sees, the green is wholly without content, but the condi- 
tions for the sensation of green may remain although 
there should be neither light nor color. These condi- 
tions belong objectively to the leaf. 

Critical realism does not, like naive realism, assert 
that things are what they appear to be, but it rather 
affirms that we perceive them as they are in reality. 
That which we perceive and apprehend by reflection is 
one side of a real process which takes place independ- 
ently of us, and indeed it is the only side to which we 
have access, but it is also the only side which has any 
significance for us. How these processes might appear 



CRITICAL REALISM 85 

to a being who is differently organized is, we admit, 
beyond the reach of human ingenuity, but that is Hkewise 
a matter of absolute indifference to us. Kant's thing- 
in-itself is, therefore, not entirely unknowable. It 
rather presents to us that phase of reality which is 
accessible to us, and it is the business of investigation to 
discover new paths of approach. 

The human eye did not discern the Roentgen rays for 
a long time, but their existence has finally become known 
through their remarkable efficiency. There can be no 
doubt but that many more forces which exist in nature 
will eventually disclose their presence to the investi- 
gator by their effects. Thus new aspects of the thing- 
in-itself will continue to disclose themselves to human 
knowledge. 

Critical idealism, as we have seen, answers the question 
concerning the possibility of knowing the reality of any- 
thing existing independently of us, in the negative. 
Naive realism never raises the question, because for it 
the question does not exist. Critical realism, on the other 
hand, after careful examination of all the counter argu- 
ments, answers with an emphatic affirmative. The denial 
of the possibility of objective knowledge ' empties the 
question concerning its origin of all content. Its affir- 
mation, however, calls up all the problems which we have 
above designated as constituting the subject matter of 
epistemology. 



S6 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

22. The Development and the Schools of 
Epistemology 

It is the business of Epistemology to investigate the 
origin and development of human knov^rledge, and to 
ascertain the elementary processes w^hich compose the 
exceedingly complex cognitive process. 

The theory of know^ledge is distinguished from the 
criticism of knowledge by the fact that the latter raises 
the question concerning the possibility of knowledge, 
whilst the former assumes the fact that we do know, and 
only undertakes to investigate the development of ou^- 
knowledge and the laws which govern it, and at the same 
time, to exhibit its relation to the rest of our psychical 
life. These two philosophic disciplines, however, very 
frequently coincide. The question concerning the limits 
of human knowledge is common to both of them, and 
they are therefore largely combined into a single disci- 
pline. The separation which we have introduced may 
perhaps contribute somewhat to an easier understanding 
of the problems. 

In the history of philosophy, the theory of knowledge 
appears later than the criticism of knowledge. Even 
the Eleatics, and subsequently the Atomists (fifth 
century, b.c), already denied the possibility of gaining 
knowledge by sense perception, but they made no attempt 
to explain the origin of knowledge. We find a still more 
incisive criticism among the Cyrenaics (fourth century 
B.C.) who even teach a doctrine somewhat akin to phe- 
nomenalism. On the other hand, there was no attempt 



THE SCHOOLS OF EPISTEMOLOGY 87 

to explain the origin and development of knowledge 
worth mentioning before Aristotle, who subjected it to 
searching investigation. The Stoics likewise investigated 
the origin of knowledge, and inquired after the criterion 
of truth. 

It was reserved, however, for modern times to 
elaborate a scientific theory of knowledge. John Locke 
(1632-1704) furnished the strongest impulse in this 
direction. Both Berkeley and Hume likewise made rich 
contributions to its further development. At this point 
Kant is again an explorer and discoverer, for it was he 
who, above all others, established for all time the indis- 
pensable necessity of epistemological investigation. 

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes a sharp 
distinction between the two sources of knowledge: a 
sharper distinction perhaps than psychological facts will 
warrant. These two sources are the sensibility (Sinn- 
lie hkeit, Sensualitas) and the understanding. This 
dichotomous division furnishes the standard for the chief 
tendencies of epistemological theory. 

The question concerning the primary source of our 
knowledge has received two answers. One school desig- 
nates the senses as the most important, indeed as the 
only reliable sources of knowledge. This philosophic 
tendency is called Sensualism. The other school holds 
that accurate knowledge can only be obtained by abstract, 
conceptual thought, whilst the senses only furnish 
chaotic, and confused impressions. This philosophic 
tendency is commonly called Rationalism. Inasmuch 



88 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

as the latter term has frequently been used in another 
sense, namely, to signify the rational explanation of 
miracles, it will be preferable to use the word Intellectual- 
ism, whenever we refer to the epistemological tendency 
which is opposed to sensualism. 

In addition to these one-sided tendencies, the convic- 
tion is constantly gaining ground that knowledge is the 
result of the cooperation of perception and thought. No 
definite name has as yet been coined for this cooperative 
school, which is the only one that corresponds with the 
facts. But this is readily understood, because the views 
which it incorporates are so widely diverse. 

All the epistemological theories hitherto considered 
have confined themselves to the investigation of the origin 
and development of knowledge on the basis of regarding 
man as an isolated individual, i.e., man m.erely as related 
to his environment and as reacting upon the stimuli 
which affect him from without. But modern ethnology 
has revealed the fact that social life and intercourse are 
of great significance, not only for the communication of 
knowledge, but likewise for its origin. This has long 
been recognized with respect to the origin of language, 
and the epistemological significance of language has been 
thoroughly investigated. But the social factor in the 
development of knowledge undoubtedly involves some- 
thing more than the matter of language which is still far 
from having received adequate scientific attention. 



SENSUALISM 89 

23. Sensualism 

All unreflective thought is in a certain sense sensual- 
istic, because it regards sense perception as the most 
reliable source of knowledge. The Greek word oida — 
I know, is the perfect tense of the root id, which signifies 
to see. Knowledge, therefore, in the popular under- 
standing of the Greeks, was originally equivalent to 
having seen. An interesting proof for this popular con- 
ception is found in the passage of Homer's Iliad, 2, 484 ff, 
where the poet appeals to the muses, who are able to see 
everything and who, therefore, know all things. It 
is, furthermore, characteristic of this stage of thought 
to identify the processes of perception and reflection, 
the latter being regarded as a species of sense percep- 
tion. This conception is even found in the older Greek 
philosophy. 

Sensualism, in the philosophic sense, however, does 
not become a definite theory until the senses, in distinc- 
tion from the understanding, are regarded as the sole 
source of knowledge. The Sophist Protagoras (died 
411 B.C.) is a sensualist in this sense. In opposition to 
the Eleatics, who reject the witness of the senses, he 
affirms that nothing exists except that which is per- 
ceived by the senses. He even goes so far as to deny 
the truth of the geometrical axioms whenever they 
appear to be in conflict with sense perception.^ 

^The interpretation of Protagoras' doctrine here given differs 
essentially from, the one usually contained in the majority of our 
histories of philosophy. Gomperz, Griechische Denker. Vol. i, 



90 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

In modern philosophy, John Locke revived sensualism 
again by directing attention to the sensory origin of all 
experience. Locke's sensualism, however, is not entirely 
pure because of the fact that he also recognizes an inner 
perception (reflection). The Frenchman, Condillac 
(1715-1780), is the most outspoken sensualist in modern 
philosophy. According to Condillac, the soul has but a 
single faculty. This faculty is sensuous perception, 
whence all the more complicated thought processes are 
evolved. In order to illustrate his theory, Condillac 
makes use of the fiction of a statue to which the several 
senses are added one by one. It first receives the sense 
of smell, and last of all the sense of touch, which pro- 
duces the idea of the objective world. 

Sensualism was for a long time completely over- 
shadowed by the great intellectualistic systems of Kant, 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, but it has regained a cer- 
tain measure of recognition again in present day science 
and philosophy. The conviction that sense-perception 
forms the ultimate source of all experience is becoming 
ever more general. If the task of science is confined to 
the mere description of facts, as Kirchhoff and Mach 
maintain, and if, according to Mack's formulation, 
science is nothing more than experience economically 
arranged, then of course their theory is a kind of sen- 
sualism. If mathematics, the most important instrument 
of thought which we employ in our descriptions and 

p. 362 ff. and W. Jerusalem, sur Deutung des Homo — mensura — 
Satzes in Eranos Vindohonensis, (1893), p. 153 flf. 



INTELLECTUALISM 91 

economic arrangements, is, in the last analysis, also 
reducible to sensuous perception, then the theory becomes 
even more sensualistic than ever. Sensualism is un- 
doubtedly correct when it regards sense-perception as 
the most original source and the final arbiter of expe- 
rience, so far as physical phenomena are concerned. 
There are, however, two facts of which it fails to take 
account : first, that in the observation of our own mental 
phenomena we have another, coordinate and equally 
reliable, source of experience ; and, secondly, that higher, 
that is, more complex mental phenomena merge insensibly 
in the processes of perception. 



24. INTELLECTUALISM 

Philosophy was led to regard the senses as unreliable 
sources of knowledge at a very early date. This was due 
to the perplexity resulting from sensory illusions and 
individual differences in sense perception. 

The belief prevailed that the true nature of things 
could be accurately comprehended by abstract thought, 
wholly withdrawn from the world of sense and absorbed 
within itself. This is the reason why intellectualism 
arose at such an early date. 

As has frequently been noted before, the Eleatics be- 
lieved that knowledge of the real world could be obtained 
through pure thought alone. Plato follows them in this 
and adds the idea that the soul, imprisoned in the body, 
is polluted by contact with the corporeal, and that true 



92 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

knowledge is only possible through absolute renunciation 
of bodily conditions. 

St. Augustine, starting from this conception of Plato, 
declares that our mind knows nothing so certainly as 
that which is present to it, and nothing is more certainly 
present to it than itself. {Nihil tarn novit mens, quam 
id, quod sibi praesto est, nee menti magis quidquam 
praesto est, quam ipsa sibi. De Trinitati. 14, 7.) 
Descartes afterwards made this idea the starting point 
of all philosophy, when he declared that our knowledge 
of our own thought is the only fact which is absolutely 
certain and indubitable. It was due to the gradual 
spread of the Copernican theory of the universe, how- 
ever, that the intellectualistic conception of the cognitive 
process, contained in the reflections of St. Augustine 
and in the Cartesian axiom (cogito, ergo sum), received 
such general recognition. Whoever accepted this 
theory, was forced to admit that the evidence of the 
senses, to the effect that the earth is at rest, and that the 
sun daily rises and sets, could no longer be defended 
against the overwhelming force of the Copernican dis- 
covery. Mathematics was an important factor in 
securing the supremacy of abstract thought over the 
senses as a source of knowledge. Especially was this 
the case in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
during which arithmetic, unaided by objective presen- 
tations, became a more powerful agency in the advance- 
ment of knowledge than geometry, which always 
employs such aid. At that period no one thought of 



INTELLECTUALISM 93 

finding the source of these indubitably certain mathe- 
matical judgments in sensuous intuition. It was uni- 
versally believed that the reason draws these profound 
truths wholly from within itself, and furthermore that 
reason succeeds with such absolute certainty just because 
it avoids the illusory influence of phenomena. 

The credit for making the first inquiry into the validity 
of this belief belongs to Kant. He formulates the prob- 
lem thus: "How is pure mathematics possible?" But 
his answer is not of the purely intellectualistic order. 
Kant is convinced that the senses furnish the material of 
knowledge. By doing so they incite the understanding 
to the exercise of its native functions. Knowledge, how- 
ever, does not exist until the matter which has been 
furnished by the senses is given form by the understand- 
ing. The understanding ascribes its own uniformity to 
nature, and thus becomes, according to Kant's famous 
expression, nature's law-giver. But Kant takes still 
another important step in advance. According to him 
the understanding is capable, by means of its funda- 
mental concepts (categories), to project its construc- 
tions beyond its intuitional foundations, whereby "The 
thought of the object may still continue to have its true 
and beneficent effect upon the way in which the subject 
exercises his reason." {Critique of Pure Reason, 2 Ed., 
No. 2y, HI, 135 Hartenstein's Ed.) Hegel afterwards 
made such a sweeping use of the limited authority which 
Kant ascribed to reason, that the intellect is no longer 
merely nature's law-giver, but in fact the creator of 



94 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

nature Hegel regards mind as the essence of the uni- 
verse and our concepts, in their dialectical evolution, 
represent the cosmic process. 

Here intellectualism attains its climax. The estrange- 
ment between reflective thought and its material elements, 
furnished by sense perception, is absolute. Accordingly 
it is no more than natural, that, recoiling from this 
extreme view, philosophy should become more sensual- 
istic again. 

Intellectualism is doubtless correct in asserting that 
every sense perception must be given form by out^ 
understanding in order to become real, serviceable knowl- 
edge. This function of thought which gives form and 
creates relations has, in the course of time, produced a 
variety of formulas and instruments of thought which 
have become, as it were, part of our nature. Such, 
among others, is the concept of thing with several dis- 
tinctive qualities, or substance and attribute, and such, 
furthermore, is the concept of cause, which we cannot 
but apply to every event. It easily happens therefore 
that we should regard such concepts as these as an 
original possession of the understanding and believe 
them to be innate. The doctrine of innate primary 
forms or categories, however, always involves very 
much that is doubtful and contains elements which are 
quite incomprehensible. Genetic analysis of the forma- 
tive function of the understanding must therefore take 
the place of such assumptions, in order thus to ascertain 
the origin of those forms as they arise in experience. 



MYSTICISM 95 

However, before entering upon the discussion of the 
problems arising in the genetic theory of knowledge, we 
must yet make brief reference to an offspring of the 
intellectualistic school which has been widely dissem- 
minated in every period and is at present again making 
increasing pretensions. We mean that search after 
mysterious sources of superior knowledge, which super- 
ficially dispenses with all observation called Mysticism. 

25. Mysticism 

Intellectualism, in the last analysis, rests upon the 
assumption that the soul, if it only knew how to main- 
tain its freedom from bodily limitations, would be able 
to discover pure and unconditioned truth. This idea of 
the soul's renunciation of the corporeal, however, is a 
thought which is usually combined with religious 
notions, and it has been the occasion of profound relig- 
ious agitations. 

The Orphic sects, which spread over Greece after the 
sixth century B.C., with their theory of the transmigra- 
tion of souls and their deep sense of the need of deliver- 
ance from the flesh, gave occasion for the elaboration of 
an esoteric philosophy. Their secret cults, or mysteries, 
gave rise to a variety of measures and mythical theories 
for the purpose of delivering the soul after death. 
Mysticism was developed into a philosophic system by 
the Neoplatonists and Neopythagoreans, who acquired 
an increasing influence in the Greek and Roman world 
from the first century a.d., onward. Plotinus, Jamhliciis, 



96 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

and Proclus are the best known exponents of this 
tendency. The middle ages gave rise to Christian mysti- 
cism, which finds abundant occasion to assume extraor- 
dinary sources of knowledge in the mystery of the 
Trinity, the immaculate conception, the firm belief in the 
immortality of the soul, and ascetic depreciation of the 
body. Master Eckhart, Bertholdt von Regensherg, John 
Tauler and Jacob Boehme developed these fanatical 
ideas and exerted a profound influence. 

Mysticism continued its influence during the modern 
period, and even the illumination of the eighteenth cen- 
tury was unable to smother it. During the closing 
decades of last century it became intensely active again 
in the form of spiritism which has attracted a large num- 
ber of adherents. 

Mysticism, so far as it is philosophical, rests upon the 
belief that it is possible, under favorable circumstances, 
to penetrate, in pure spirit, delivered from every vestige 
of corporeality, into the very presence of God and appre- 
hend the sublimest truths without the mediation of the 
body. The accomplishment of this generally involves a 
profound emotional agitation, an exaltation and fixation 
of psychical energy, such as is possible only in a state of 
ecstasy, in which everything earthly has been discarded 
and the subject has surrendered himself absolutely to 
Deity. The imagination, which has thus been intensified, 
is capable of conjuring up visions of the most fantastic 
sort. The medium believes in the reality of these 
phantasms and his devotees accept his interpretation. 



MYSTICISM 97 

A further thought of mysticism, which allies it with 
magic and witchcraft, is the belief that one can hold 
direct communication with spirits by means of the 
heightening of psychical energies and thus receive 
revelations of higher truths without the intervention of 
the senses. This kind of mysticism, which is at present 
peculiarly popular, is called spiritualism. It is generally 
believed that only certain persons (mediums) are capable 
of intercourse with spirits. The method employed in- 
volves a magnetically, or, more correctly, hypnotically 
induced sleep. Here, however, there is too much room 
for the most exaggerated imposture, and even noted 
scholars have become the dupes of pure jugglery. 

The theory of reflection and feeling, expressed in 
mysticism, has exerted a profound influence upon 
epistemology and metaphysics, which has not as yet been 
sufficiently recognized by the writers of the history of 
philosophy. The yearning after fellowship with God, 
one of the dominant characteristics of mysticism, has 
made large contributions to the development of the 
monistic systems of thought. (See Section 28 ff). And 
the increased clearness of apprehension produced by 
this emotion, whether real or imagined, has resulted in 
the assumption of a third kind of knowledge, in addition 
to that which is received by sense perception and that 
which is obtained by the processes of the intellect. This 
has been regarded as a kind of spiritual vision and has 
therefore been called intuitive cognition. Karl Joel has 
shown the evidence of this influence of mysticism in the 



98 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

earlier Ionian philosophy of nature, and in the philos- 
ophers of the Renaissance. It is even possible to show 
a strong mystical thread in Spinoza, and even in Kant 
and Hegel. 

This fact is of vast importance for the psychology of 
cognition, because it shows that cognition is not an 
isolated faculty, but that it stands in the most intimate 
relation with the other psychical processes and is influ- 
enced by them. The theory of evolution has also given 
further confirmation to this view. It is becoming more 
and more evident that human knowledge is a part of 
human life and can only be clearly construed as such. 
The genetico-biologic theory of knowledge, which is 
explained in Section 27, rests upon this view. Several 
American philosophers have in recent years published 
similar theories and thus suggested a new conception of 
the cognitive process upon this basis, which they call 
Pragmatism. We shall describe this school before we 
proceed to the presentation of our theory which is so 
closely related to it. 

26. Pragmatism 

Several American philosophers, at the close of last 
century, starting with the assumption that the critical 
investigation of human cognition and the metaphysical 
speculations concerning the primary cause of things, 
have resulted in an estrangement between the real world 
and human life, resolved to change their point of view. 
They assumed that theoretical reflection really serves 



PRAGMATISM 99 

the practical purpose of guiding human action and lead- 
ing human life to a richer content. They accordingly 
directed their attention to this practical bearing of reflec- 
tion. This gave rise to a new theory of knowledge to 
which the name Pragmatism was afterwards applied. 

Charles Pierce is the author of this new method. In 
an article, published in 1878, on the subject, "How to 
make our ideas clear to ourselves," he showed that our 
judgments and convictions are really nothing more than 
rules of action.^ Whenever we wish to ascertain clearly 
what is the real meaning and content of a given idea, we 
always try to show what eflfect it would have upon human 
action. There are no thought distinctions, no matter 
how subtle they may be, which are not conditioned by, 
or based upon, practical distinctions. Thoughts which 
show no practical bearings whatever are meaningless 
and amount to nothing more than an empty combination 
of words. An understanding of the practical conse- 
quences of a given thought is identical with the under- 
standing of its complete and only meaning. 

This is the fundamental principle from which the 
pragmatic method starts. Hitherto it has received a 
twofold application. Pragmatism has been engaged, 
first of all, in discarding such problems as have no prac- 

^ Pierce's article appeared in The Popular Science Monthly 
(January, 1878). It is most accessible in the French translation 
published in Revue Philosophique (Dec, 1878, and Jan., 1879). 
The word "Pragmatism" does not occur in the article. Cf. Jeru- 
salem, in the Deutscher Literaturzeitung, 1908, No. 4, and Lud- 
wig Stein, in Archiv. f. Sys. Phil., 1908. 



100 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

tical bearing on life. The first question with the prag- 
matist always is: What are the practical consequences 
of this solution of the problem, or of that solution? If 
it should appear that in either case we should have to do 
the same thing, then no problem exists. Such is the case, 
for example, in the matter of the reality or the ideality 
of the objective world. The idealist must treat the 
objective world in precisely the same manner as the 
realist. Hence the entire controversy is at once dis- 
posed of, because, for the pragmatist, it has no value and 
consequently no meaning. But the problem whether 
God is the Creator of the universe, or whether it came 
into being through purely material processes is of a dif- 
ferent nature. Its bearing on life has profound sig- 
nificance. The universe holds far richer promises for 
me, if I can regard God as its Creator, than if it should 
be nothing more than a result of material force. The 
pragmatist therefore regards this as a problem worthy 
of reflection. 

The other use to which the pragmatic method has been 
applied is the explanation of the cognitive process and 
the concept of truth. Pragmatism conceives reflection 
to be part and parcel of life. According to this concep- 
tion, therefore, the truth of a judgment consists solely 
in the practical consequences which follow from it. A 
judgment is true when the measures it involves prove 
favorable to the interests of life. Pure, abstract truth, 
which is completely finished in the bare statement of the 
fact, does not exist, according to pragmatism, because 



PRAGMATISM loi 

of the vital relation between thought and life. It is still less 
permissible to postulate an absolute truth which shall 
remain the same for all time and for all thinking beings. 
Truth always contains an active, directive principle. It 
is not eternal, but forever directed towards the future. 

This new theory of the concept of truth destroys our 
firmly rooted habits of thought and hence it meets with 
strong opposition from various quarters. The mathema- 
ticians and the champions of formal logic are particularly 
opposed to the pragmatic conception of truth. Logicians 
and mathematicians maintain that there are absolute 
truths, which are discovered independently of all expe- 
rience and which must be true for every possible 
experience. The controversy for and against pragmatism 
has consumed much space in English and American 
periodicals during the past decade. The new method 
was the subject of much lively debate at the Philosophical 
Congress which convened at Heidelberg in 1908. The 
specific views have not yet been clearly defined. The 
controversy will, however, necessitate a more thorough 
development of the central principle of pragmatism. 

The evolutional theory of the cognitive process, which 
shall engage us in the following section, would seem to 
indicate that pragmatism, with its activistic theory of 
truth, is essentially correct. The interpretation of im- 
pressions expressed in every judgment always awaits 
verification. But the interval between interpretation 
and verification frequently varies, being either longer or 
shorter in proportion to the complexity of the conditions 



102 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

of life. We interpret an impression and preserve the 
interpretation for future verification. We likev^ise learn 
to form our judgments on the basis of past experience. 
Knowledge is and forever remains "means and medi- 
ator," as F. C. S. Schiller, of Oxford, one of the most 
ardent advocates of pragmatism, asserted at Heidelberg. 
In the final analysis all judgment, and consequently 
science in general, aims at verification. Ernst Mach 
has expressed himself to the same effect.^ However, the 
interval between interpretation and verification just 
noted, requires a formula which is at least similar to 
the traditional concept of abstract truth. Such a formula 
is necessary as a storageplace for the preservation of 
interpretations which have been previously consum- 
mated. The possibility of its realization must forever 
remain the criterion of truth, but much will be gained by 
defining the conditions of realization with greater pre- 
cision. We shall have occasion presently to examine 
what formula is best adapted to this purpose. But prag- 
matism will have to concede the necessity of such a 
formula for the simple statement of facts. 

The new method therefore is entirely correct so far 
as its central principle is concerned, but there is still great 
need of further elaboration in its appHcation. 

2y. Genetic and Biological Epistemology 

It is now generally agreed that knowledge does not 
originate through the senses alone or through thinking 
^ Ernst Mach, Erkenntniss und Irrtum, 2 Ed., p. 462. 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 103 

alone, but that the cooperation of both these factors is 
always necessary. The question then arises : What divi- 
sion shall be made between these two sources of knowl- 
edge, and what is their relation to each other? Kant 
says, ''Concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind," in which he certainly hits 
upon one part of the truth. Mere sense perceptions, 
without any contribution from the regulating under- 
standing, are confused, chaotic. Mere abstract reason- 
ing, operating with pure concepts, lacks a material or 
substantial foundation and contains no guarantee of 
real validity. If we should say: sense furnishes the 
matter, the understanding the form of knowledge, it 
would be, generally speaking, correct. This is, how- 
ever, entirely too general to furnish any satisfactory 
explanation. 

It devolves upon the genetic view to investigate the 
knowledge-process in its vital relation to the rest of 
psychic life. Epistemology dare not forcefully sever 
knowledge from its vital relationship with feeling and 
volition. In short, epistemology must be constructed 
upon a psychological basis. 

Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that the im- 
pulse to acquire knowledge has its origin in the impulse 
for the preservation of life. Man must adapt himself 
to his environment. If he is to maintain himself in the 
midst of objects and forces which constitute his environ- 
ment and eventually gain control over them, he must 
know which of them are essential to his welfare ; he must 



104 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

learn to understand and interpret their actual and poten- 
tial energies. As a matter of fact each of the various 
sciences owes its origin to some practical necessity. Thus 
astronomy was developed in the interest of agriculture 
and navigation, and perhaps also for the purpose of a 
more exact division of time. Geometry arose as the art 
of surveying land, and arithmetic grew out of the needs 
of commerce. Necessity has not only taught us to pray, 
but likewise to think. But once the impulse for knowl- 
edge was awakened, it developed into something which 
is much broader and much more powerful than the 
requirements of immediate necessity. It eventually be- 
came a functional demand of our organism requiring 
exercise on its own account. In this way the desire for 
knowledge for its own sake arose. Theoretical wonder, 
which we have above designated as the beginning of 
philosophy, has likewise been evolved in this way. And 
we must not forget the biological origin of the knowl- 
edge-impulse when explaining these higher forms. 

When it is said, furthermore, that the senses furnish 
the material, and the understanding the form of knowl- 
edge, an effort must be made to define this form more 
accurately. Kant discovered the primary forms of the 
understanding by a process of reflection upon the pos- 
sible forms of judgment. But these forms are only 
artificial products of formal logic, and they must not be 
identified with judgments as they really take place in 
life. Hence it would appear more accurate to investi- 
gate the form of the judgment as it actually takes place 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 105 

in ordinary thinking. Every cognition, a single sense- 
perception as well as the results of the most involved 
process of thought, must indeed be thought out and 
expressed in the form of a judgment. 

The essential thing in every act of judgment is not 
indeed, as is commonly supposed, a combination of con- 
cepts or an association of ideas. As a matter of fact the 
judgment-process is present, as a comprehensive idea, 
before the judgment has arisen. The content of the 
idea then receives a definite formulation and articulation 
through the judgment. This takes place in such a way, 
that the process is referred to a given, self-active poten- 
tial center and put forward as the potential expression 
of that center. The fragrant rose is present to con- 
sciousness as a complete whole before we form the judg- 
ment. In the judgment: "The rose is fragrant," frag- 
rance is comprehended as the expression of the potential 
center, the rose. The potential center is the subject, its 
expression is the predicate. 

This view becomes still plainer as we attempt to dis- 
cover the psychologic law, the activity of which it is the 
manifestation. This process involves nothing more than 
a kind of apperception which is common to all men. By 
apperception we understand the formation and assimila- 
tion of an idea resulting from the arrangement of ideas 
which has become actual through attention. If we con- 
centrate attention upon a certain object, we bring that 
object to the fixation-point of consciousness, and at the 
same time quicken all the ideas which have an affinity for 



io6 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

that object, either by similarity or contiguity. The ideas 
thus aroused, simultaneously reflect their light back upon 
the object, and the object itself thus receives a new 
setting. 

In any given combination of ideas, those which are the 
most fully developed and, accordingly, the ones which 
predominate in that particular individual are naturally 
most readily quickened by attention. One and the same 
object will therefore quicken different groups of ideas in 
different persons, i.e., it will be apperceived in a differ- 
ent manner by each individual. The groups of ideas 
which are most easily excited we shall therefore call the 
controlling mass of apperception. Thus, e.g., the weary 
traveler sees in a forest only a place which offers restful 
shade, the painter, on the contrary, observes the color- 
shadings and tree-groupings, the carpenter would note 
the length and thickness of the trunks, the forester the 
foliage, the sportsman the evidences of game. 

However variously the same objects may be perceived, 
there is, nevertheless a method of conception, a kind of 
apperception, in consequence of which every event affects 
all of us similarly. When a child tries to compress a 
solid object, it interprets the resistance which it expe- 
riences as proceeding from a will which is opposed to its 
purpose. The child ascribes a volitional impulse sim- 
ilar to its own to the objects of its environment, and 
construes observed processes as expressions of volition. 
A child apperceives every process in such a manner as 
to excite the activity of its dominant ideational disposi- 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY lo; 

tion. But of all predispositions of this kind there is 
none that even approximately approaches the strength 
of our natural disposition to experience impulses of 
volition. This is constantly impressed upon us by the 
movements of our body. Of all our past experiences it 
is the volitional impulses that are most easily recalled, 
and it is reminiscences of this sort that form the domi- 
nant mass of apperception which the child brings to every 
process to which it directs its attention. The child 
regards every object which it perceives as an animated 
being, and it interprets everything which it observes in 
the object as proceeding from a volitional impulse 
originating within the object. A similar hylozoistic 
(animistic) and anthropomorphic tendency is found 
among primitive races. The flow of water, the blowing 
of the wind, the shining of the sun, of the moon and 
stars, all these processes are interpreted as expressions 
of the will of visible or invisible beings. We call this 
form of apperception which interprets all the processes 
of our environment as the expressions of the will of inde- 
pendent objects, fundamental apperception. 

Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason (Transcendental 
Deduction of the pure Concepts of the Understanding, 
Vol. 3, p. 114 fif. Hartenstein Ed.), repeatedly speaks of 
a "synthetic," "original" or "transcendental unity of 
apperception." He means by this that thought has the 
power to combine that which is intuited within the unit 
of self-consciousness. He says : "The T think' is implied 
in all our ideas." According to him, furthermore, this 



io8 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

fundamental presupposition of all knowledge is manifest 
in every act of judgment, and he expressly says, that 
"a judgment is nothing more than the way by which 
given cognitions are brought into the objective unity of 
apperception." (p. 121). According to Kant, there- 
fore, every judgment involves transcendental appercep- 
tion, and he regards this as the fundamental form and 
primary condition of all knowledge.^ 

Following Kant, but at the same time differing from 
him in several important respects, we shall call this 
fundamental form and primary condition of all human 
knowledge, not transcendental, but fundamental apper- 
ception. Whilst, according to Kanfs view, the unit of 
apperception is given before all experience, it is trans- 
cendental and hence a priori; in fundamental appercep- 
tion, i.e., according to our view, an experience is present, 
but an experience which every human organism which 
has been evolved under the influence of environment 
and received impressions from it, necessarily must have 
and as a matter of fact does have. Whilst Kant regards 
the transcendental unity of apperception as nothing 
more than the formal condition of combining ideas and 
articulating them into self-consciousness, which it is 
impossible to define more exactly; we believe that we 
find the exactly defined, specifically human and personal 

''In my memorial address on Kant, (Vienna, 1904), P- 15 ff- 
I have endeavored to show that this contains a new and very 
important psychological discovery made by Kant I have also 
adverted to it in my work: Critical Idealism and Pure Logic. 
(Vienna, 1905), p. 10. 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 109 

formulation which must take place with every object 
before it can become a part of our mental property, in 
fundamental apperception. Fundamental apperception 
translates the processes of our environment from the 
language of the universe into that of man. 

Let us then attempt a brief sketch of the evolution of 
human knowledge as it is construed under fundamental 
apperception. 

The beginning of psychic life probably consists of a 
vague feeling of life which alternates between the oppo- 
site extremes of pleasure and pain. We must consider 
this feeling as the original, wholly undifferentiated 
reaction of consciousness upon the stimuli which result 
from the combined action of the organism and its 
environment. This feeling seems to be wholly without 
ideas of any kind and of a blurred, chaotic character, 
expressing itself in vital motions without any discernible 
purpose or direction. Our experience upon awaking 
from a deep sleep or swoon is similar to it. We are like- 
wise justified in assuming a state of consciousness similar 
to this in new-born infants. 

At this stage the pain states appear to be more clearly 
defined than those of pleasure. An infant is capable of 
experiencing a variety of pleasant and painful sensations 
even during the first days, indeed perhaps during the 
first hour of life. Psychic life begins at once to differ- 
entiate itself and to become more complex. The infant 
soul somehow seems to take account only of such things 
as are favorable or unfavorable to its development. The 



no AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

processes of its environment exist for it only in so far as 
they bring pleasure or pain. The child's feeling-states 
are differentiated in proportion to the greater variety of 
impressions which force themselves upon it. As the 
interval between sleeping and crying lengthens and the 
child has leisure to receive impressions from its environ- 
ment, the various states of pleasure and pain are grad- 
ually more clearly separated from each other. Cold 
produces a different kind of pain than hunger. A warm 
bath produces a feeling of pleasure which is clearly dis- 
tinguished from the feeling which the child experiences 
for instance in receiving its nourishment. A new ele- 
ment thus enters the varying states of consciousness 
which the child experiences, in addition to the feeling of 
pleasure and pain. This new element is clearly dis- 
tinguishable from the others, and it stands in much 
closer relation to the nature of the inciting cause than 
to the original feelings of pleasure and pain. 

This element is the psychical factor which we call sen- 
sation. Sensation is above all else a definite change of 
a state of consciousness, which is just as clearly dis- 
tinguished from the feelings of pleasure and pain as any 
other changes which accompany it. 

Simple sensations never occur in the adult conscious- 
ness. Here we constantly find sensation complexes 
which are referred to external or internal stimuli, and 
these complexes consequently appear to us as real things 
or processes. Such complexes of sensation we call per- 
ceptions. It is the function of fundamental appercep- 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY in 

tion to combine the various groups of sensation into 
single, uniform perceptions. The perceived thing is the 
potential center, and the sensations which it produces in 
us are its potential expressions or attributes. 

Sense perceptions produce such dispositions in our 
organism, as enable the image of the object to arise in 
consciousness afterwards without any objective sensory 
stimulus. These reproduced sense perceptions are gen- 
erally called ideas. The behavior of these ideas follows 
different laws, but they are chiefly determined by a kind 
of concentration of the organism, which we call atten- 
tion. The instinct of self-preservation impels man, in 
his primitive state, above all to concentrate his attention 
upon those attributes of the objects of his environment 
which are of the greatest importance for the preservation 
of his life. This concentration of attention upon the 
attributes which are biologically significant gives rise to 
the so-called typical ideas which form the initial stage of 
the logical concepts to be developed later on. The 
origin of typical ideas is, therefore, well adapted to 
render the biological factor in the development of human 
knowledge, which gives rise to them, conspicuous. We 
learn, first of all, to combine similar things into a single 
idea by means of the fact that we take special note of 
the things which contribute to the preservation of our 
life, and thus acquire one of the most important instru- 
ments with which to arrange our experiences to our 
advantage, i.e., economically. 

The evolution of language effects one of the most sig- 



112 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

nificant advances in this respect. Linguistic sounds have 
evidently originated from the spontaneous utterances 
which express feeling. After frequent repetition of the 
same impressions the feeling element recedes, and the 
sounds then serve to express processes which take place 
in the environment of the speaker. These sounds are 
understood by our associates and afterwards used inten- 
tionally for the purpose of communicating with racial 
companions in the interest of mutual advantage. The 
most elementary linguistic sounds, generally monosyllable 
root-forms, express an entire process, without making 
any distinction between the object and its activity. 

After these simple sounds no longer sufficed to com- 
municate all that was desired, the effort to describe events 
by means of two such root sounds arose. Thus the 
original root was separated into subject and predicate, 
and the form of the proposition was evolved. This phase 
of development, which is frequently observed among 
children who are learning to talk, is of profound signifi- 
cance. Fundamental apperception therefore attained its 
adequate expression in the proposition. The form in 
which we are henceforth obliged to comprehend the world 
is thus definitely prescribed. The process which is thus 
expressed is perfectly formed, properly related to other 
processes, and at the same time objectified. We shall 
call fundamental apperception as it is thus developed by 
language, the function of judgment. The subject of the 
judgment is thus singled out as a center of energy which 
is wholly objective and the predicate sets forth the ex- 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 113 

pression of that energy as it impresses itself in the 
process of its self-expression. 

However, owing to the fact that a single sound no 
longer suffices to describe a process, there now arises a 
new and very significant phase of development. The 
subject of the judgment, "The rose is fragrant," i.e., the 
word "rose," now no longer expresses an entire process. 
It becomes, instead, the basis for every possible effect 
which may proceed from the idea of the rose. All 
objects possessing similar potencies are described by the 
same name and are thus comprehended under the single 
act of thought. The word finally bears the attributes and 
states which appertain to all objects which have the same 
name and thus the typical idea develops into the fixed 
concept which is always expressed by that word. 

But the predicate splits off, as it were, the attributes, 
states and relations, from the subject to which they 
belong. This admits them to separate consideration. In 
this way attributes such as hard and soft, states such as 
motion and sleep, relations such as large and small, be- 
come distinct objects of thought, and are thus developed 
into the form of concepts. It is only after all this has 
taken place that it becomes possible to reduce the sim- 
ilarities and uniformities of nature from mere passing 
impressions to permanent possessions of human thought. 
The human mind, however, thus acquires new and better 
instruments of thought with which to organize expe- 
rience advantageously, as well as to comprehend and 
control events. The function of judgment continually 



114 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

evolves new forms of increasing complexity and rich- 
ness, and discovers concise, simple and convenient for- 
mulas for more comprehensive thought-contents. 

In addition to the value of language in the economy of 
thought we must call attention to still another phase of 
this matter. Owing to the fact that all who speak the 
same language express similar concepts with the same 
words and similar judgments with the same propositions, 
the element of social universality is combined with that 
of the economy of thought. The words and proposi- 
tions which I use, in their accepted significance, are the 
products of the combined efforts of all who speak the 
same language. My assertions are at the same time con- 
veyed, so far as their linguistic formulation is concerned, 
by the common product thus evolved. I presuppose a 
tacit agreement whenever I use propositions which are 
generally understood and generally accepted. A stock 
of universally accepted judgments is thus evolved from 
this common heritage of language. Every one is born 
into this estate and the social inheritance of language 
and thought exercises a profound influence on the devel- 
opment of the individual. This social factor in the devel- 
opment of epistemology requires brief consideration. 

In addition to perceptual judgments, in which an event 
which has just been perceived is formed, articulated and 
objectified in the usual manner, conceptual judgments 
likewise arise in which the uniformities of events are so 
formulated that definite concepts are ascribed to definite 
attributes. The proposition: 'The whale is a mammal" 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 115 

asserts that the attributes which are common to all mam- 
malia belong also to whales. It then becomes possible, 
upon the basis of this judgment, to assert that whales have 
warm red blood, breathe through lungs, give birth to 
living offspring, etc. But the original form of the judg- 
ment remains unchanged. The crude anthropomorphism 
found among primitive civilizations, as well as among 
children, which regards the whole environment as ani- 
mated and every attribute of things as the effluence of 
volitional activity, cannot keep pace with advancing 
knowledge. But even the most abstract concept remains 
a kind of potential center for our thought, so that we 
conceive its attributes as the results of its activity.^ 

The concept of truth, which is of such vast importance 
for epistemology, likewise arises from the function of 
judgment. Even Plato and Aristotle correctly held that 
the judgment is distinguished from the idea, or, as 
Aristotle expresses it, from "unassociated speech," by the 
fact that truth and falsehood can be predicated of judg- 
ments alone. The idea which I experience is really 
present, but as such it is neither true nor false. If, not- 
withstanding this fact, we should speak of correct or 
incorrect ideas, it is only by the license of an abbreviated 
form of expression. A correct idea is an idea which 
leads me to a correct judgment, a false idea is one that 

^ This conception is more fully elaborated and more completely 
established in my work, Die Urteilsfunktion, Vienna, 1895. For 
the psychological development of the process of knowledge, of. 
my Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 3 Ed., (1905), (p. 33-147). 



Il6 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

results from an incorrect or untrue judgment. The 
predicates true and false, however, do not apply to the 
decisions of feeling and will. It is only of judgments, 
which frequently precede our feelings and acts of will, 
and form an important element in these experiences, 
that we can predicate truth or falsehood. The expe- 
diency of the state of feeling and will thus conditioned 
very frequently depends upon the truth or untruth of 
such judgments. 

Truth, therefore, only applies to the judgment. The 
problem which still remains is, how does this concept 
arise and what does it signify. On the basis of the view 
here outlined the answer is not very difficult. The judg- 
ment articulates and objectifies a given ideational con- 
tent. This implies that the judgment is a result of the 
spontaneity and self-activity of our mind. It is the act 
by which the received impression acquires an interpreta- 
tion. If we but recall that this act of spontaneity has 
its roots in the struggle for self-preservation, we shall 
readily understand that the interpretation, resulting from 
the impression, in its entire content and aim, has in view 
the determination of what measures the organism must 
employ in order to properly adapt its reaction to the 
impression. The interpretation is therefore correct at 
this stage of its evolution, whenever its consequences re- 
sult in the favorable adaptation of means to ends; it is 
false, whenever it becomes the basis for erroneous 
means, i.e., such as are detrimental to the preservation of 
life. To speak more accurately, this means that the 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 117 

relation between the interpretation and the actual status, 
which we later recognize as truth or falsehood, at first 
exists only in the form of a tendency of the organism to 
react. However, as civilization advances and the con- 
ditions of self-preservation become more complicated, 
as man is enabled to conceive of such higher ideals as 
can only be attained by means of a lengthy series of care- 
fully chosen efforts, and is impelled to strive for their 
realization, the interval between the interpretation and 
the verification of impressions becomes longer (cf. above 
p. 102). We frequently make interpretations which we 
do not immediately verify. The reduction of such inter- 
pretations to language and written documents enables 
us to preserve the judgments for future verification. But, 
inasmuch as not every interpretation proves useful, selec- 
tion becomes necessary. We search after the conditions 
of future utility, and thus give rise to the concept of 
truth. The truthfulness of a judgment is nothing more 
nor less than its practical value for the determination of 
the means necessary to human welfare. This activistic 
element of the concept of truth, which constantly antici- 
pates future activity, has not been recognized nor 
properly appreciated until quite recently. All abstract 
thought is provisional judgment directed towards future 
utility. Since human activity, however, is becoming 
more and more far-sighted and proposes ever higher 
destinies, abstract thinking interposes an ever lengthening 
interval between interpretation and utility. It is in this 
way that abstract thought and investigation attains a 



ii8 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

relative independence, which often begets the impression 
that thought is a separate function, independent of Hfe. 
Pure, abstract thought does, nevertheless, formulate rules 
and concepts which lead to new ways of stating the con- 
cept of truth. 

There is one fact of social intercourse, however, which 
contributes much towards a clear understanding of the 
abstract concept of truth. I refer to the origin of nega- 
tion, or the negative particle. Different persons very 
readily interpret identical facts in different ways. At 
the beginning of cultural development each interpreta- 
tion at the same time contains the implication of certain 
practical measures. Whoever refuses to accept my 
interpretation, rejects the practical measures implied in 
that interpretation. This rejection is at first accompanied 
with an intense emotion which is expressed by a charac- 
teristic sound. With the frequent repetition of such 
rejections the emotion eventually vanishes and its cor- 
responding sound, as negative particle, becomes a formal 
element of the judgment. In the case of every interpre- 
tation, i.e., in every judgment, I must reckon with the 
possibility of rejection. Whenever I maintain my orig- 
inal interpretation, notwithstanding rejection, my defense 
produces a clearer consciousness of the truth of the 
judgment. 

Hence truth consists in a definite relation between the 
act of judgment and the event under consideration. We 
must now define the nature of this relation and the con- 
ditions under which it exists. We are accustomed to 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 119 

say that truth consists in the agreement of a judgment 
with the process which gave rise to it. This would 
mean that the judgment simply follows the objective 
process, that is to say, copies it. This naive way of 
conceiving it, however, does not correspond to the 
present conception. We know that the judgment formu- 
lates and articulates the ideational content. Hence 
there is no longer any room to speak of agreement. We 
must rather say: a judgment is true, whenever the 
formulation and objectivation which it expresses, cor- 
responds to the real process in such manner that 
predictions founded upon the given judgment are really 
verified. It follows from this that the judgment cor- 
responds to the process which gave rise to it, that 
it is compatible with or adequate to it. The judgment 
must be a function of a real process in the sense that 
a change of objective fact results in a corresponding 
change of judgment, and that the consequences which 
result from the judgment retain their validity for the 
process.^ 

The final verification of its presuppositions is the most 
important and most decisive criterion of the truth of a 
judgment. We shall call this the objective criterion. 
The convincing proof of the truth of a judgment does 
not lie in its so-called evidence, not in its necessity, but 
only in its agreement with the predictions which it 
involves. This is the only way that the universe 

^ On the evolution of the concept of truth cf. Der kritische 
Idealismus etc., p. 162 ff. 



120 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

can irrefutably furnish demonstrative proof for our 
judgments. 

Of course there are judgments which will not admit 
of such verification. Wherever we pass judgment con- 
cerning past events, or, inspired by the thirst for knowl- 
edge, transcend the bounds of experience, we must be 
satisfied with a criterion of truth which is less certain, 
but which still offers a sufficient guarantee to assure us 
that we have not entered upon paths of thought which 
are wholly unwarranted. Such a criterion is the acquies- 
cence of contemporary thinkers. We shall call this the 
inter subjective criterion. 

These two criteria furnish the standard by which we 
estimate the truthfulness of a judgment, even though we 
are not always conscious of it. In propounding a judg- 
ment, the verifications, involved in the predictions which 
have been previously realized in similar cases, recur to 
us in such a way that we assume it unnecessary to await 
the outcome. We often anticipate the acquiescence of 
our contemporaries in a similar manner. In all math- 
ematical judgments, i.e., such as refer to quantity and 
number, we are firmly convinced, assuming of course 
that the judgments are made according to the known 
laws of mathematics, that our predictions based upon 
them must be realized, and that every thinker who under- 
stands the meaning of the judgment will acquiesce in 
the same. In consequence of this universal conviction 
of the correctness of certain judgments, many thinkers 
are of the opinion that there are certain judgments of 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMCLOGY 121 

which we are unquestionably certain, antecedent to all 
experience, and without being required to await verifica- 
tion in experience. It is upon this supposed fact that 
Plato bases his argument for the preexistence of the 
human soul, because it possesses knowledge which it 
could not have gained by experience in the present life. 
These intuitions are recollections from the time when 
the soul, as yet unmingled with the body, existed as an 
untainted, pure, divine being, in consequence of which 
it was able to attain correct intuitions into the essence 
of things. This thought appears again, in a somewhat 
less mystical form, in the philosophers of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, when they speak of innate 
ideas, original intuitions, and ascribe to reason the capac- 
ity of discovering truth by its own powers. Kant 
examines this faculty in his Critique of Pure Reason. 
In the first part of this work he attempts to answer the 
question: "How is pure mathematics possible?" He 
wishes to show by what original possession of our intui- 
tional faculty it is possible for us to form judgments 
which contain no empirical elements, and why these 
transcendental judgments must be valid for every con- 
ceivable experience. 

The biological theory of the knowledge process, and 
especially of the concept of truth, however, shows that 
the assumption of such an innate possession of original 
intuitions of this nature, is not only superfluous but even 
wholly untenable. In every case in which we speak of 
evidence, or of logical necessity, this evidence and log- 



122 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

ical necessity rest upon previous experiences. The 
human mind has learned, during the course of its evolu- 
tion, to arrange its experiences economically. It has 
discovered means by vi^hich to turn the experiences of 
preceding generations to good account and to reduce 
them to the simplest possible formulas. Inasmuch, there- 
fore, as each succeeding generation builds farther upon 
the basis of what has been previously attained, it is spared 
the trouble of repeating the task from the beginning. 
Children are taught, even in the public schools, how to 
use the traditional instruments of thought, so that we 
naturally come to regard the thought-forms with which 
we have been familiar from childhood as a native posses- 
sion of the human mind, whilst, as a matter of fact, they 
are really nothing more nor less than the laboriously 
accumulated legacy which has been handed down from 
past generations. 

Should any one undertake an analytical description of 
the process of knowledge as it actually takes place to-day 
in the consciousness of adults, he would indeed soon 
come upon elementary processes concerning which the 
individual would no longer be in position to show that 
they originate in his own experience. Thus again the 
appearance of an a priori, a native possession of con- 
cepts and thought-forms, would arise. But it is just for 
this very reason that the analytical, descriptive method 
is inadequate to the investigation of psychological facts 
and laws. The real facts of the situation are only dis- 
covered by the aid of the genetic and biologic method of 
explanation. 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 123 

This method of explanation therefore justifies us in 
saying : There is no a priori knowledge. The knowledge 
forms which are common to all men evolve from the 
cooperation of the organism and its environment. And 
we must regard fundamental apperception, and the func- 
tion of judgment which follows from it, as the most 
important and the most fundamental of these forms. The 
thought-forms or categories of substantiality and causal- 
ity, which Kant ascribes to the innate fundamental con- 
cepts of the understanding, are likewise evolved by this 
process. 

The concept of substance, by which we understand the 
permanent, unchangeable reality behind the ever vary- 
ing phenomena, exists already in prototype in sense-per- 
ception, where complexes of sensations are combined 
into unified things by the faculty of fundamental 
apperception. In our conception of a "thing" we dis- 
tinguish it from its attributes and regard it as that which 
remains and preserves its identity throughout all changes 
of states and relations. The function of judgment like- 
wise creates something permanent in the subject which 
is regarded as the source of the activities issuing from 
it. If we also learn to distinguish between matter and 
form in things, then again, matter is that which through- 
out all change of form and motion still remains and 
preserves its identity. Thus the concept of an unchange- 
able, permanent being, which is the basis of all change 
and forever remains self-identical, is formed. Since 
every subject includes within itself the concept of sub- 



124 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

stance, we readily see that it must recur in every con- 
ception of reality. This is the reason why some regard 
it as an innate, fundamental form of the human under- 
standing. We find that the concept of substance is in 
use in philosophical systems as well as in the theories of 
natural science. Physics and Chemistry for a long time 
regarded atoms as the ultimate unchangeable substances, 
as the permanent substrata of all change. This is still 
the case to a considerable extent even to-day. In 
biology the cells or parts of cells (neurone, plasome) 
are regarded as the ultimate organic substances. In 
recent years the attempt has indeed been made to elimi- 
nate the concept of substance from the study of nature 
entirely. We shall return to this attempt farther on, but 
must here remark that this elimination can never be com- 
pletely and effectually carried out by our powers of 
thought. 

The thought-form of causality is given immediately, 
in our acts of will on the one hand, and in every act of 
judgment on the other. If we transform the perception 
of a blooming tree into the judgment, "the tree blooms," 
then we conceive the tree as a potential center which 
causes the blooming from within itself. In our own 
acts of will we experience the transition from a conclu- 
sion of will to the contraction of muscle in a single 
unbroken succession. Among the events which tran- 
spire in our environment we frequently perceive only a 
single member of a series. We, however, supply the 
missing units after the analogy of our acts of will and, 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 125 

in consequence of fundamental apperception, conceive 
series of events which ordinarily follow each other, as if 
a similar unbroken succession had likewise taken place 
in them. We must construe every process which we 
perceive, or infer, as caused by that which preceded it. 
We are unable to eliminate the causal connection from 
our thought. The very act of judging postulates poten- 
tial centers which are active, and the relation of subject 
and predicate remains the prototype for every causal 
connection. 

David Hume was the first to concern himself with the 
psychology and criticism of the causal concept. He 
thought he could prove that immediate experience only 
gives regular succession and that we have interjected the 
idea of causality into the world without warrant. Kant, 
for whom this criticism, as he himself says, "broke the 
silence of his dogmatic slumbers," afterwards thought 
that he had discovered in causality a primitive form of 
the understanding, which we must necessarily bring to 
the matter of sensation which affects us objectively, in 
order to make experience possible. Our method of 
explanation shows that causality is necessarily evolved 
from the function of judgment and that, like the latter, 
it is a product of the interaction between the organism 
and its environment. It follows therefore that causality 
does not arise from the subjective factor of knowledge 
alone, the objective factor likewise cooperates with it. 
There is rational ground therefore for assuming objec- 
tive causes. There has been considerable tendency 



126 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

recently to return to Hume. It is assumed with him, 
that experience furnishes us with nothing more than the 
succession of events and that it never reveals their 
causal connection. And, it is insisted, that mere suc- 
cession is clearly distinct from causal connection. Be- 
sides mere temporal succession there exists also an 
internal coherence between events which regularly suc- 
ceed each other, which appears similar to the connection 
which we invariably experience in acts of will between 
the volitional impulse and muscular contraction. Wher- 
ever we find such connection, or have good reason to 
assume it, there we postulate causal connection ; wherever 
it is lacking, temporal succession is all that we are justi- 
fied in asserting. Should the appearance of a comet pre- 
cede a destructive war, the understanding, enlightened 
by experience, can never regard the comet as the poten- 
tial center of which the war is the expression. This is 
simply a case of temporal succession. If, on the contrary, 
a dose of quinine is followed by a reduced bodily tem- 
perature in fever, we are justified, on the basis of repeated 
experiences, to assume that administering quinine intro- 
duces a physiological process which brings about a 
reduction of bodily temperature. 

The concepts of number are likewise evolved from the 
function of judgment. Groups of similar objects sug- 
gest the repetition of the same denominating judgment. 
Members arranged in pairs may have furnished the first 
occasion for this. "Hand, Hand," "Eye, Eye," "Foot, 
Foot." Repetition was certainly originally accompanied 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 127 

by gestures and the number of repetitions determined 
by the number of objects. Whoever, at the sight of a 
group of three trees should propound the judgment: 
"Tree, Tree, Tree," would be stopped at the third repeti- 
tion. The occasion for further continued repetition is 
wanting, i.e., the required object is not present. The 
last repetition may have been attended by a sound from 
which the corresponding numeral was gradually 
evolved. This would then be used for every group of 
objects which occasioned the same number of repetitions, 
and thus the first numeral concepts may have arisen. 
Each numeral then becomes an aggregate of units, which, 
upon closer examination, shows definite relations to these 
units, and to other numerals. These relations are the 
same in all groups of objects and must therefore be valid 
for all objects. Thus the synthesizing function of 
thought in cooperation with language effected the inven- 
tion of an exceedingly important thought-instrument, 
which is likewise of a high degree of generality and 
exceedingly useful for the economic arrangement of 
experience. 

Thus the cognitive forms and thought-instruments, 
with which we operate and which form our mental 
equipment, are gradually evolved from the function of 
judgment. Fundamental apperception, however, always 
remains active, and even the most complicated judgments 
always effect the formulation and objectivation of given 
contents in the same manner. We acquire mental pos- 
session of the impressions produced by our environment 



128 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

by translating them from the language of the universe 
into that of man. The value of this acquisition consists 
in the fact that we are thus enabled to so control the 
forces of nature as to make them serve us in preserving 
our life under difficult conditions and in giving it ever 
increasing significance. We may now sum up the result 
of the interaction between the human organism and its 
environment, as follows: Knowledge of the world by 
formulation, and formulation of the world by knowledge. 
Truth, which is usually regarded as the goal towards 
which all knowledge strives, is, as we have seen, a definite 
relation between the act of judgment and the process 
formulated and objectified by it. This relation naturally 
exists only in the consciousness of thinking beings and 
we see it most clearly, when we compare the judgments 
which have been handed down to us with the processes 
which they describe. This testing of the judgments of 
others brings psychical phenomena to light, which are of 
vast significance for the evolution of knowledge. If we 
would understand a judgment which we have heard or 
read, we must combine anew the ideational content pre- 
viously formulated and articulated by that judgment. 
Inasmuch as the judgment which has been formed inde- 
pendently is analytic, the judgment which has been 
handed down requires a process of synthesis. In this 
act of combining and reuniting we frequently encounter 
difficulties and obstacles. So long as we fail to construe 
the judgment expressed by another into a uniform idea, 
we do not understand what we have heard. We then 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 129 

seek enlightenment by inquiry.^ But it also frequently 
happens that we easily succeed in following the idea 
expressed in a given judgment, but that we find the 
interpretation indicated by the given judgment incorrect. 
In this case we understand that which we have heard or 
read quite well but we do not believe it. It is in this way 
that the psychical phenomenon of faith, or, as it is more 
generally expressed, belief, arises. 

The view has recently been frequently expressed that 
the essence of the function of judgment really lies in the 
act of belief. The English logician, John Stuart Mill, 
says : ''To judge and to believe a judgment is one and 
the same thing." But this view is untenable simply be- 
cause the object believed in can only be a judgment, 
since, e.g., a bare idea is neither true nor false it follows 
that its truth cannot be affirmed or believed. The only 
point of importance in this view is this, namely, that 
every act of judgment contains an objective element. 
If then, belief is not identical with judgment, it becomes 
necessary to investigate the nature of this phenomenon 
and discover its different forms and the various degrees 
of its intensity. 

Both knowledge and faith are characterized by the 
phenomenon of belief. The difference between these 
two experiences is not one of antithetical opposition, as 
is frequently held, but only of degree. Knowledge is 
the highest degree of belief which we are able to attain. 
We use the term knowledge whenever both the objec- 

^ Cf. Jerusalem, Urteilsfunktion. 169 ff, 
9 



130 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

tive and the intersubjective criteria of the truth of a 
judgment are present (see above p. 119) ; whenever the 
agreement of its predictions have been attested by expe- 
rience, and whenever the acquiescence of our contem- 
poraries appears self-evident to us. But when this is not 
the case, and we are still inclined to regard a given judg- 
ment as true, we then speak of conviction, faith. It is 
meaningless to speak of degrees of intensity in the case 
of knowledge, because knowledge is the highest degree 
of belief which therefore admits of no increase. But 
faith and conviction are experienced in different degrees 
of intensity. We can believe with a greater or less 
degree of firmness, or be more or less convinced. 

If we inquire into the psychological nature of faith 
and conviction, the fact that both are graduated, as 
respects their intensity, already leads to the presumption 
that their determining elements are not thought processes, 
but feelings. Reflection upon the fact that the antithesis 
of faith, doubt, is indeed acknowledged by each of us 
to be a state of feeling, strengthens this view. 

If we also inquire into the conditions under which 
these feelings arise, it is not difficult to find an answer. 
The feeling of faith or conviction arises whenever the 
agreement of a judgment with the total of our previous 
experiences, i.e., with our world-theory, becomes clear 
to our consciousness. We withhold belief in a judgment 
whenever it contradicts all our previous experiences, and 
whenever we are unable to reconcile it with our world- 
theory. The severest mental struggles frequently result 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 131 

from such new judgments as confront us in the unfold- 
ing of experience and the natural advance of knowledge. 
Thus for a long time people refused to believe the teach- 
.-ings of Copernicus, because they were accustomed to 
regard the Bible as final authority even in scientific 
problems.^ 

It must naturally happen during the course of the 
development of knowledge that certain judgments once 
generally accepted should eventually be found incorrect. 
But as a general thing such judgments have been 
reduced to concepts before this happens and their use 
nas become a matter of custom. If, however, the judg- 
ments are no longer true, the concepts can no longer be 
regarded as really existing potential centers. When, 
e.g., during the first centuries of the Christian era, the 
heathen were converted to Christianity, the deities which 
they previously worshiped lost the reality which was 
once ascribed to them. The chemists of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries firmly believed in the reality 
of phlogiston, a substance which was supposed to be 
found in all combustible matter. When Lavoisier after- 
wards explained the process of combustion correctly, this 
concept lost its validity, phlogiston its reality. A 
thought-instrument analogous to the concept of truth is 
thus formulated, which expresses the relation of the con- 
cept to reality. We call this thought-instrument the 
existential concept. This view has also been much dis- 

^ For a further development of this thought see : Urteilsfunk- 
Hon, 198 ff.; Lehrhuch der Psychologie. 4 Ed., 123 ff. 



132 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

cussed recently and has given occasion to much contro- 
versy. We conceive existence as a predicate, which 
expresses the efficiency of its subject. If v^e say: God 
exists, it impHes that God is not the creature of human 
imagination, but that He exists independently of our 
belief in Him. He is an independent potential center, 
which we know from His works. The tyrant Dionysius 
in Schiller's Burgschaft did not believe that there was 
any such thing as self-sacrificing loyalty. But he after- 
wards experiences an incident which he cannot but 
interpret as the result of even just such loyalty as he had 
previously doubted. Whereupon, convinced, he ex- 
claims: "Loyalty is not an idle fancy after all." In the 
German even the linguistic form suggests the vital rela- 
tion of existence and efficiency. That which exists is 
(called '^the efficient" (das Wirkliche) . 

Our method of genetic and biological explanation has 
shown that human knowledge issues from the impulse of 
self-preservation. Its development has enriched the life, 
both of the individual and of the race. Our centralized 
organization, concerning which physiological and psycho- 
logical investigation is constantly furnishing us more 
exact information, gives our cognitions their universal 
form. We have discovered this form in fundamental 
apperception, and we have learned to understand it better 
in the resulting function of judgment. All human cog- 
nition consists of an appropriation of reality, by means 
of an articulation and objectivation which is conditioned 
by our centralized organization. But in order to give 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY I33 

this entire process a rational explanation, we must pre- 
suppose, in accordance with common sense and on the 
basis of critical realism, the independent existence of 
objective reality. But what is this reality? This prob- 
lem belongs to the second division of the philosophy of 
cognition. This is at once the oldest and likewise the 
chief division of philosophy. We mean the doctrine of 
Being, which is generally called Metaphysics or Ontology, 

LITERATURE 
A. Riehl, Der philosophische Kriticisrnus. 2 vols., 1876-87. 

Vol. I, 2 Ed., 1908. 
W. Wundt, Logik. Vol. i., 3 Ed., 1906. System der Philosophic. 

3 Ed., 1906. 
Herbert Spencer, First Principles. 6 Ed., 1899. 
E. Schuppe, Erkcnntnisstheoretische Logik. 1878. (Idealistic.) 
A. V. Leclair, Der Realismus der moderne Naturwissenschaft. 

1879. (Idealistic.) 
E. Laas, Idealismus und Positivismus. 3 vols., 1879-82. (The 

third volume is very important.) 
/. Volkelt, Erfahrung und Denken. 1886. (Refutation of ideal- 
ism.) 

Die Quellen der menschlichen Gewissheit. 1906. (A strong 

defense of realism.) 
W. Jerusalem, Die Urteilsfunktion. 1895. (A valuable treatise 

on the psychology of thought. Trans.) 

Der kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik. 1905. 
O. Liehmann, Analysis der Wirklichkeit. 3 Ed., 1900. 
H. Cohen, Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung. 2 Ed., 1885. 

System der Philosophic. Vol. i, Logik. 1902. 
L. . Busse, Philosophic und Erkenntnisstheorie. I Teil : Meta- 

physik und Erkenntnisskritik. 1894. (Realistic.) 
H. Muensterherg, Grundziige der Psychologic. Vol. i, 1900. (An 

attempt at furnishing a basis for psychology in the theory 

of knowledge.) 



134 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Ed. V. Hartmann, Kategorienlehre, i8g6. 

P. Natorp, Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Meth- 

ode. 1888. 
H. Kleinpeter, Die Erkenntnisstheorie der Naturforschung der 

Gegenwart, 1905. 
G. Heymans, Die Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen 

Denkens. 2 Ed., 1905. 

E. Mach, Erkenntniss und Irrtum. 2 Ed., 1906, 

/. Kl. Kreibig, Die intellectuellen Funktionen, 1908. (Descrip- 
tive and biological.) 

Rud. Eisler, Einfiihrung in die Erkenntnisstheorie, 1907. (Splen- 
did orientation of existing schools and a voluntaristic sys- 
tem of the theory of knowledge.) 
Grundlagen der Philosophic des Geisteslebens, 1908. 

Heinrich Gomperz, Weltanschauungslehre. Vol. 2, 1908. 

Henri Bergson, Essai sur les donnees immediates de la con- 
science. 6 Ed., 1908. (A profound analysis.) 

Abel Rey, La philosophic moderne, 1908. (Contains a thorough 
discussion of the relation of philosophy and science.) 

Julius Schultz, Psychologie der Axiome, 1899. 

Die drei Welten der Erkenntnisstheorie. (Evolutionistic, and 
very noteworthy.) 

PRAGMATISM 

William James, Pragmatism. 

F. C. S. Schiller, Humanism, 1903. 

Studies in Humanism, 1907. 

Axioms as postulates. (Published in Sturt's compilation; 
Personal Idealism, 1902.) 
John Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, 1903. 

Closely affiliated to this school is H. Bergson, Matiere et 
memoire, and L'evolution creatrice, by the same author. 



FOURTH DIVISION 
METAPHYSICS OR ONTOLOGY 

28. The Ontological Problem 

The ontological problem is very closely related to the 
problems of knowledge. The inquiry into our capacity 
for knowledge leads at once to the further inquiry : What 
constitutes being? What is the essence of reality? 

Owing to the fact that the senses and human reflection 
are first directed to the objective world to which we must 
adapt ourselves in order to live, the latter inquiry arose 
historically earlier than the problem of knowledge. Man 
begins to reflect on himself much later than upon things. 
It is for this reason that the problem concerning the 
nature of being has meaning and interest for those who 
have not yet risen above the plane of naive realism in the 
theory of knowledge. 

The unreflective mind answers the question, What is 
reality? by saying it consists of the objects of my 
environment, the things which I see, hear, and touch. 
The naive idea of being therefore consists of a confused 
mass of individual things. Nevertheless the distinction 
between the animate and the inanimate excites attention 
even on the plane of a practical world theory, long before 

135 



136 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

there is any attempt at abstract speculation. Inanimate 
things remain motionless so long as they are undisturbed 
from without, living things move upon their own initia- 
tive and in a manner which shows purposeful adaptation. 
Something must therefore inhabit living beings which is 
capable of producing this motion. During sleep this 
inner being departs from the body temporarily, at death 
its departure is permanent. This being is represented 
as breath-like. It has the same form as its body but it 
is intangible, in a certain sense immaterial. This inner 
being is the soul, which is regarded as a distinct entity, 
entirely different from the body. Belief in the existence 
of the soul, as ethnology has conclusively shown, is com- 
mon to the whole human race. Nowhere has a people 
been found who are without this faith, which results 
naturally and almost necessarily from the phenomena of 
death and of dreams. 

The universe is thus divided, even upon this plane of 
thought, into two large divisions which are entirely dif- 
ferent from each other ; into the kingdom of bodies, and 
the kingdom of souls. This separation is of course not 
made as yet with logical precision. The dead body, or 
at least the body of one who has recently died, is still 
considered as capable of sensation and as possessing 
attributes which we regard as psychical. When Achilles 
drags the slain Hector about the city, he wishes to tor- 
ment his enemy in this way; and when the soul of 
Patroclus mourns because it must relinquish so much 
manly courage and youthful vigor, the body is even 



THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM 137 

regarded as possessing these attributes. Generally 
speaking, at this stage of development, the body is looked 
upon as the substrate of personality whilst the soul is 
regarded as a being which is entirely distinct from it. 
On the other hand the soul possesses form, occasionally 
becomes visible, and yet is at the same time intangible, 
incorporeal, but not in the strict sense immaterial. 

Philosophical speculation is, however, not content with 
a conception which is so vague and ill-defined. It is 
obliged, in recognition of the all-pervasive reign of law 
and the uniform correlation of things, to conceive and 
explain the struggle involved in the process of becoming, 
the World-all, under a single uniform principle. 

The doctrine, that a single principle is sufficient for 
the explanation of the universe, that all existence is by 
nature uniform and similar, is called Monism. 

The theory, moreover, which assumes two dissimilar 
substances or essences is called Dualism, and the doctrine 
according to which there are more than two original sub- 
stances is called Pluralism. 

The conception of the unreflective mind may be 
described as vague Dualism. Monism on the other hand 
may be of various kinds. It may be claimed that only 
the corporeal exists, that there is nothing but matter, 
and that all mind must be looked upon as a function of 
matter, or even as something material. This tendency 
is called Materialism, 

But it may also be claimed that real existence apper- 
tains to mind alone, whilst everything material exists 



138 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

only as idea, and hence must be considered only as the 
phenomenal form of mind. This is the theory of 
Spiritualism, which is also frequently called Idealism. 

Besides these there are still other forms of Monism, 
frequently very complex, which, however, by disregard- 
ing minor distinctions, may be referred to two types. 
One form of Monism assumes a kind of original sub- 
stance, which in itself is neither matter nor mind, but 
contains both of these within itself either as irradiations, 
attributes, or in some other form. This original sub- 
stance, which is construed as self-caused (causa sui), 
frequently also as Deity, either remains unchangeably 
the same, or incessantly unfolds new forms. We shall 
call this world-theory, which has famous representatives, 
the Monism of Substance. 

There is another kind of Monistic thought, which is 
radically different from the preceding, and, taken 
strictly, does not really claim to be a world-theory. 
Several recent investigators have attempted to annul the 
distinction between the physical and the psychical by 
reducing everything to experience. Experience shall be 
reduced to its elements and its functional relations, and 
science shall concern itself only with the economics of 
experience. Thus the concept of energy, or the still 
more general concept of becoming, is substituted for that 
of substance. Inasmuch as the quantity of energy re- 
mains constant and its forms admit of unlimited trans- 
position, the universe is conceived as an orderly process 
which is governed by uniform law. We shall call this 



MATERIALISM 139 

world-view, which is rather complex, and difficult to 
understand, the Monism of Becoming. 

The theory on the other hand which approaches more 
closely to that of the unreflective mind, as against these 
monistic conceptions, assumes two distinct essences, 
matter and mind. This dualism must of course be dis- 
tinguished from that of naive thought. Its logical con- 
tradictions must be removed and the reciprocal relation 
between mind and matter must be construed so as to 
harmonize with the facts. 

The return to the viewpoint of the unreflective mind 
has in recent years been carried even farther than this. 
Several representatives of the pragmatic tendency, 
described above, hold that the universe as given in expe- 
rience is a manifold, and advocate Pluralism. The unity 
of the world, according to this school, of which William 
James is the most noted representative, is conceived as 
a destiny to be realized, a given task, but not its begin- 
ning, not the logical starting point. 

Each one of these several thought-tendencies will 
require separate treatment. 

29. Materialism 

At the beginning of his History of Materialism, Lange 
says, ''MateriaHsm is as old as philosophy, but no older." 
He thus summarily rejects the wide-spread but wholly 
erroneous view, that materialism is the theory of the 
naive understanding. Materialism is much rather a 
metaphysical hypothesis, i.e., a transcendental theory, 



140 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

which attempts a rational and coherent explanation of 
the world-process. 

The first efforts of the Greek philosophers to interpret 
the universe are decidedly materialistic. They search 
for an original substance which is the source of all 
things. Some claim to have discovered it in water, 
others in fire, still others in air. These theories offer no 
explanation of mental life because mind has not yet be- 
come a subject of philosophic reflection. Empedocles, 
the author of the doctrine of the four elements, and 
Anaxagoras (both about 450 B.C.), were the first to make 
use of the principle of mind for the explanation of the 
universe. The former postulates .love and hate, the 
latter a regulating mind, as the governing principles. 
Mind and matter have been contending, as it were, for 
world-control ever since that day, and during the ages 
philosophy has ascribed it now to one, now to the other, 
and again to both in common. 

The Atomism of Leucippus and Democritus, as well 
as the epistemology of the Stoics is decidedly material- 
istic. Owing to the supremacy of theology, philosophy 
is dualistic during the middle ages and at the beginning 
of the modern period. Descartes has given dualism its 
most accurate philosophical expression. 

In the eighteenth century the French physician La- 
me ttrie (1709- 1 751) advocated an unqualified material- 
ism in his book U homme-machine (man considered as a 
machine) and explained all thought as a result of phys- 
ical causes. Baron Holbach (died 1789) afterwards 



MATERIALISM 141 

undertook a detailed verification of materialism in his 
System de la nature. His chief purpose was to contro- 
vert religious prejudices. 

Materialism fell into disfavor for a time through the 
influence of the idealistic systems of Kant, Fichte, Schel- 
ling and Hegel, only to revive again after the decline of 
Hegelianism. Vogt, Moleschott and Buechner vigor- 
ously defended the materialistic world-theory. Buech- 
ner's book Force and Matter which has appeared in many 
editions, has contributed most largely to the spread of 
this doctrine. The progress which has been made in the 
investigation of the physiology of the senses and in our 
knowledge of the brain have given a mighty impulse in 
the same direction. In recent decades materialism has 
again lost influence in scientific circles, but it is still quite 
widespread among the cultured laity. We must now 
examine the most important assumptions of materialism 
and study the arguments which are made in its defense. 

Materialism seeks first of all to prove, that everything, 
which we call a psychical process, and which we expe- 
rience as such in our consciousness, is really nothing 
more than the function of our organs, particularly the 
brain. The real essence of a psychical process, that is 
of a thought, an emotion, or an act of volition can only 
be known after the corresponding brain-process has been 
examined. Psychology, according to materialism, is 
nothing more than physiology of the brain. Materialism 
is especially anxious to prove that the assumption of a 
psychical substance, distinct and separate from the body. 



• 142 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

is unscientific and contradictory to all experience. The 
most important arguments adduced in proof of this 
claim, are the following : 

1. The Methodological Argument: The assumption 
of an immaterial psychical substance which is persistent, 
independent and distinct from the body, is prescientific 
and unscientific. Whoever holds such view is still on 
the level of the nature-peoples, who conceive every pro- 
cess as the act of an invisible demon. Experience reveals 
nothing more than the body and its organs. Every- 
thing which this organism does, and which transpires 
within it, must be conceived as the function of its organs. 
The assumption of a psychical substance is a meta- 
physical dogma which is at once superfluous and unten- 
able, and which exact science must eliminate entirely. 

2. The Mechanical Argument: The natural science 
theory of world-processes has postulated the law that the 
sum of potential force, or energy present in the universe 
can neither be increased nor diminished, but always 
remains constant, and finds this law verified. All be- 
ccjming consists only of the transmutation of energy into 
different forms. Thus motion is transformed into heat, 
heat into motion; the electric current, when conducted 
through water, produces chemical results, and the pre- 
supposition that no new creation of energy ever takes 
place simplifies the whole mechanism of the universe. 
If, however, we assume a psychical substance which is 
distinct from the body and which causes the muscles to 
contract and produce motion through its own — not 



MATERIALISM 143 

mechanical — initiative, it involves an increase of existing 
energy, which implies the creation of new force. This 
assumption contradicts the principle of the conservation 
of energy which science has so often verified and it is 
therefore to be rejected as unscientific. 

3. The Cosmological Argument: There was a time 
when our earth was a glowing gaseous nebula. At that 
time organic life could not have existed upon it. There 
could hen have been no human beings and hence no 
mental activity. It was only after the earth had suffi- 
ciently cooled off, and the conditions for the origin of 
organic life were given, that plant and animal life came 
into being, from which man also was evolved at a later 
stage. Hence mental life came into existence with 
organic life and is limited to the presence of its physio- 
logical, conditions. There is no meaning therefore in 
assuming mind as something distinct from the organism, 
because its origin is connected with the organism and 
they will certainly perish together. 

These arguments taken together have considerable 
force. They are at least persuasive. It is not a matter 
of surprise therefore that in wide circles materialism is 
considered as the only possible scientific world-theory. 

First of all, then, as respects the methodological argu- 
ments against the assumption of a psychical substance, 
modern psychology must concur with materialism, but 
on quite different grounds. At any rate experience 
never reveals any psychical substance distinct from the 
psychical processes, which must be regarded as the sub- 



144 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

strate of our thinking, feeling, and willing. It is char- 
acteristic of psychical processes that they always appear 
to us only as occurrences, as effects in which there is no 
room for a substantial substrate. If, however, in spite 
of this fact we speak of a soul or mind, our authority 
for this mode of speech really lies in what we have pre- 
viously described as fundamental apperception. The 
function of judgment, once evolved, can only appropriate 
a thought-content in the form of subject and predicate. 
So long as psychology uses this soul-concept in the same 
manner as the physicist speaks of magnetism and electric- 
ity, where magnetic and electric phenomena are most 
certainly all that is really given, so long as the soul is 
only regarded as the subject of psychical processes and 
is not considered as a self-existent substance, this form 
of expression cannot be called unscientific. As soon, 
however, as we assume a psychical substance apart from 
the body, having independent existence and even con- 
tinuing to exist after death, we are then going beyond 
the evidence given in psychical experience. 

Every substance, however, no matter how thoroughly 
everything material is eliminated from it, is still always 
represented to the mind under a material aspect. Every- 
thing which persists must, by the very necessity of our 
ways of thinking, occupy space and hence be material. 
The assumption of a soul-substance, which materialism 
so strenuously, and indeed so justly rejects, therefore 
finally leads to materialism. The only way to keep in 
harmony with the facts, is to confine our judgments to 



MATERIALISM I45 

the psychical events, and never assume a psychical entity. 
Such an event, which is at the same time without sub- 
strate, is the only thing that is really essentially different 
from all matter. 

Strict scientific method, which aims to confine itself 
to the description of facts, teaches us that there is some- 
thing given in our ordinary experiences as well as in our 
most profound emotions, which is essentially distinct 
from everything perceivable by sense, from everything 
material, indeed utterly incomparable with it. The 
scientific method to which materialism appeals accord- 
ingly decides against this world-theory. 

The educated laity as well as the majority of natural 
scientists regard the mechanical argument as the most 
convincing. Neither is it a very simple matter to expose 
its utter untenability. In its refutation reference has 
been made to the fact that psychical interaction with the 
body does not involve a creation of new force, but that 
it only discharges potential energy already present. The 
term discharge, as used in physics, means that a small 
quantity of energy effects the release of a much greater 
quantity of energy of a different form, as e.g., when by 
the introduction of a burning match a barrel of powder 
is exploded. All stimuli which affect the body and pro- 
duce sensations are discharging processes, because the 
physiological effect is always much greater than the 
physical cause. But even if it requires only a minimal 
quantity of energy to effect great results, it is not even 
permissible to treat this minimal quantity as nothing. 

10 



146 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

It cannot be reduced to zero. And if psychical interven- 
tion must be conceived as the application of physical 
energy, then indeed materialism is right, and the question 
whether the energy-equivalent of the psychical process is 
great or small is of no consequence whatever. The 
method therefore which construes psychical interaction 
as a mere discharge serves rather to strengthen the 
mechanical argument than to refute it. Notwithstanding 
this, however, the argument is wholly untenable. The 
application and validity of the principle of the conserva- 
tion of energy is limited to physical and chemical proc- 
esses. There are indeed noted physicists, who refuse 
to grant the unqualified validity of this principle even 
within this sphere. But this law is utterly inadequate 
for the explanation of vital processes. The centralized 
organization of all organic beings, the remarkable adap- 
tation of all the parts to a common purpose, all this can- 
not be explained in physico-chemical terms. Even the 
purely biological evolution of organisms reveals con- 
stant creative activity. And when we contemplate the 
mental process in its evolution hitherto, we are obliged, 
with Wundt, to postulate an increase of psychic energy, 
whilst the attempt to apply the principle of the conserva- 
tion of energy to mental development leaves some of the 
most evident facts of experience unexplained. 

As a matter of fact, the mechanical argument offered 
by the materialists, when brought to the light, is not an 
argument, but merely a presupposition. It is only by 
assuming from the start that every process, i.e., vital as 



MATERIALISM 147 

well as psychical, can be explained and described accord- 
ing to the physico-chemical laws, that this protest of the 
materialists against the violation of the principle of the 
conservation of energy can have any meaning. But if 
we are guided by the facts, rather than by a definite 
theory, we must concede that the principle of the con- 
stancy of energy contributes absolutely nothing toward 
simplifying and explaining what really takes place in the 
sphere of the organic and psychical. The facts which 
have been established at this point, as well as the present 
stage of mental evolution, much rather require an entirely 
different principle of explanation. As a matter of fact 
this is conceded by noted scientists. As Wundt has 
shown, there is a kind of creative synthesis active here, 
whose nature and governing principle still require more 
careful investigation. The mechanical argument loses 
its force the moment we relinquish the materialist pre- 
supposition and abide by the most unassailable facts of 
our own experience. 

The cosmological argument deals with hypotheses 
which belong to a realm in which verification is exceed- 
ingly difficult. The genesis and the destiny of mental 
life are never given in experience. Even if we can 
demonstrate that our experience of psychic life demands 
certain physical conditions, it does not by any means 
follow that these are the only conditions under which it 
is possible. One thing, however, is certain, namely, that 
psychical life, just as life in general, follows its own 
peculiar laws which cannot be derived from the laws of 



148 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

inorganic matter. This is a distinction which it will be 
impossible to overcome as long as the universe, as we 
know it at present, endures or shall continue to endure. 
Whether there shall some day be a universe without 
psychical life, or whether such a universe is possible, is 
a matter which transcends our powers of knowledge. 

Hence all these arguments do not in any wise affect 
the fact that the psychical processes which we experience, 
are entirely different from everything material. The 
thorough analysis of this problem by Henri Bergson has 
contributed much towards a better comprehension and 
fuller appreciation of the radical distinction existing 
between these groups of phenomena in all its profound 
depth. Any one who has really experienced the psy- 
chical in its genuine immediacy and sublimity can never 
be satisfied with materialism. 

Materialism has done splendid service in the develop- 
ment of the intellect and in shaping tendencies. It has 
given us a better understanding of the intimate relation 
between the brain and the soul and inspired important 
investigations into the particular facts of this relation. 
Materialism still continues to be of considerable impor- 
tance as a methodic and a heuristic (guiding to the dis- 
covery of new facts) principle, but as a world-theory it 
fails to explain a large part of experience. As the ideal- 
ist is helpless in the presence of the consciousness of 
others, so is the materialist in the presence of his own, 
and yet, neither of them is able to eliminate these phe- 
nomena which they are unable to explain. 



SPIRITUALISM 149 

30. Spiritualism 

Spiritualism, or the doctrine that the true nature of 
things, behind all phenomena, is spiritual originated 
through epistemological intellectualism. If we are un- 
able to know the true nature of things by the senses, but 
only by abstract thought, it must follow that this nature 
itself is spiritual. Plato was the first to make this infer- 
ence deliberately. He believed that he had discovered 
ultimate reality in the prototypes, or ideas, w^hicli are not 
perceptible to the senses. Plato's theory has had a more 
powerful effect than is generally appreciated. Its influ- 
ence continues even to the present day. If we should 
wish to characterize our own age by its dominant ideas 
we should have to call ourselves Platonists. The Neo- 
platonic thinkers of the Roman period, especially Plotinus, 
developed this doctrine in the direction of mysticism. 

The middle ages are thoroughly dualistic. But at the 
beginning of the modern period, when Descartes made 
consciousness the criterion of certainty, spiritualism 
revived again, to find in Leibnitz one of its most im- 
portant exponents. The monads of Leibnitz are spiritual 
entities and, according to his theory, they constitute the 
world. The English philosopher, Berkeley, who is the 
founder of Critical Idealism (see above p. 81) is, strictly 
speaking, a spiritualist, in that he asserts that only minds 
exist, and the world must be considered as the content 
of their consciousness. 

In our own day, William Wundt has founded a spirit- 
ualistic metaphysics by construing the content of reality 



ISO AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

as a multiplicity of the individual volitional activities 
which are of a spiritual nature. Hermann Lotze and 
Theodore Fechner also believed that spiritualism fur- 
nished the most satisfactory solution of the ontological 
problem. Lotze conceives matter and mind as the phe- 
nomenal forms of an Absolute which is predominantly 
spiritual, whilst Fechner assumes a universal soul and 
hence even explains the material atoms, in their ultimate 
analysis, as spiritually constituted. 

Finally also Schopenhauer and Jacob Frohschammer, 
the former regarding the will, the latter the imagination 
as the ultimate and real essence of things, are also to be 
regarded as spiritualists. However, when modern 
Spiritism, with its mystical tendencies described above, 
and whose method of operation consists of jugglery 
rather than argument, assumes the respectable name of 
spiritualism, it must be rejected as inadmissible. 

Rudolf Eucken in Germany and Josiah Royce in 
America are at present vigorously defending a spiritual- 
ism which is characterized by a decidedly religious trend. 
Eucken is emphatic in his demand that we should rise to 
the acceptance of a real psychical life by severe self in- 
spection, in which he sees the true life, the "self-fellow- 
ship" of life. Eucken regards this psychical life, not as 
the product of the combined psychical effort of the human 
race, but as something transcendent, something divine. 
Josiah Royce is likewise convinced that true reality is 
spiritual in its nature, and that the ultimate ground of 
things is an eternal, divine world-order. The philosophy 



SPIRITUALISM 151 

of Royce acquires peculiar significance from the fact that 
he strongly emphasizes the social factor in the life of the 
individual, and from this constant interaction of minds 
infers the existence of an eternal, divine being v^hich is 
spiritual in its nature. 

Spiritualism is closely related to critical idealism. 
Both tendencies regard the real nature of the world as 
spiritual. The essential distinction lies in the fact that 
critical idealism rejects every step beyond experience, 
i.e., all metaphysics. It bases its claims on the fact that 
it accepts only what is given in experience, whilst 
spiritualism, professedly and by intention, is metaphysics 
and as such transcends immediate experience. To criti- 
cal idealism the world is the content of consciousness, 
to spiritualism it is the absolute spiritual reality inde- 
pendent of the knowing subject. 

Spiritualism, properly understood, is simply the philo- 
sophical development of the animism of Nature-peoples. 
Primitive man regards trees, fountains, and indeed even 
stones as animated beings endowed with will, which 
either serve or harm him from choice. The philosophical 
spiritualist recognizes the uniform regularity of natural 
events and regards the objective world as constituted of 
atoms which attract and repel each other according to 
mechanical and chemical laws and in this way "weave a 
living garment of deity." It, however, ascribes mind 
and consciousness to these ultimate units, because it is 
unable to conceive of the independent existence of any 
object which is devoid of spiritual subjectivity. No 



152 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

matter whether this spirituality of the essential nature 
of things be conceived as idea, will, or phantasy, this 
universal animation is still under the ban of our "funda- 
mental apperception." The form under which we are 
compelled to conceive the world is certainly one side of 
its true nature. We believe, however, that to make this 
the whole of it is as untenable as it is useless. 

There is a sense in which spiritualism stands higher 
than materialism because it includes in its world-theory 
the facts immediately given in psychical life and does 
not set them aside as a superfluous by-product. But it 
also obHterates the distinction between the psychical and 
the physical. It is quite as difficult for us to conceive 
how matter can think as that mind should have the attri- 
bute of extension. Material processes, as we have pre- 
viously indicated, are accessible through sense perception, 
but this is not the case with the spiritual processes. How 
two utterly incomparable processes should arise inde- 
pendently and then pass from one to the other remains 
just as profound a mystery if mind is conceived as pro- 
ceeding from matter, as if matter is to proceed from 
mind. 

Spiritualism also suffers from still another, deeper 
defect. If the world is supposed to consist of spiritual 
entities, then the concept of something which persists, 
the concept of substance, is introduced into the psychical 
process. But it is characteristic of our mental life as 
we experience it in our consciousness, as previously 
remarked, that we never know it except as an event, an 



SPIRITUALISM 153 

occurrence. The concept of a persisting substance is, 
however, wholly unsuited to express this occurrence. 
As a thought-form it is essentially confusing. Modern 
physics would even eliminate this concept from natural 
science, entirely, and speak only of the laws of occur- 
rence but never of a persistent substrate. This proposal 
appears to be futile to us in the case of the physical 
processes, but the explanation of psychic life demands 
the complete elimination of the concept of substance. 
Modern psychology likewise insists on this demand. It 
has indeed partly accomplished it already. It must 
appear contradictory to speak of spiritual substances if 
the nature of psychical phenomena is conceived in 
harmony with the facts. Psychology must on this ac- 
count protest against a world-theory which fails to 
accord with the real nature and course of the spiritual 
processes. 

The solutions of the ontological problem offered by the 
other monistic systems, of which we have spoken above 
(p. 137), are not as one-sided as materialism and spirit- 
ualism. By a process of further abstraction they aim to 
secure a higher concept which shall comprehend both 
matter and mind, both physical and psychical processes. 
One school presumes to have discovered this higher con- 
cept in a persisting eternal substance, the other in the 
law governing the process which it construes as inces- 
sant becoming. We therefore distinguish two further 
forms of monistic theory, the Monism of Substance and 
the Monism of Becoming, 



154 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

31. The Monism of Substance 

The oldest form of this theory is the doctrine of the 
so-called Eleatics, which originated among the Greeks 
during the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. The school 
receives its name from the city of Elea in southern Italy 
which was the home of most of its disciples. Xenoph- 
anes, the founder of the school, protested against the 
anthropomorphizing conception of the gods which 
appears in Homer and Hesiod and taught that the Deity 
is not like man either as respects form, nor in his manner 
of thought. The doctrine, however, received its onto- 
logical development at the hands of his disciple, Par- 
menides of Elea. We have already become acquainted 
with the Eleatics as the founders of an intellectualistic 
theory of knowledge. Sense-perception, according to 
Parmenides, is wholly illusory.^ The goddess to whom 
he appeals, warns him against "the unseeing eye and 
the buzzing ear." Pure thought alone leads to the 
knowledge of real being. This Being is One and 
Eternal. It is uncreated, knows no past and no future, 
but only an eternal "Now." Being is furthermore indi- 
visible, unchangeable and therefore knows neither plu- 
rality nor motion. Parmenides was not in a position to 
carry this severe abstraction through to its logical con- 

^ Parmenides committed his thoughts to didactic verse about 
480 B. C. About 150 lines of this poem are still extant. The 
best edition is by Herman Diels : Parmenides Lehrgedicht, Greek 
and German. Berlin, 1897. It is also contained in the same 
author's published compilation : Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 
I vol., 2 Ed., 1907. 



THE MONISM OF SUBSTANCE 155 

elusion. His imperceptible being, which is only con- 
ceived by pure thought, as he expresses it, is like '^the 
mass of a well rounded sphere, in which the distance 
from its center to all its sides is equal." He therefore 
represents the abstract also as having sensible form. 
Zeno of Elea, the disciple of Parmenides, with keen an- 
alysis and great subtilty endeavored to verify the doc- 
trine of his master. He adduced a number of proofs 
against the trustworthiness of the senses and against the 
real existence of plurality and motion. The doctrine of 
the Eleatics exerted considerable influence upon Plato, 
who regarded his ideas, after the Eleatic mode of thought, 
as eternal and unchangeable, and as pure spiritual enti- 
ties, imperceptible to the senses, and comprehensible only 
to those who do not permit the soul to be deceived by the 
illusoriness of phenomena. 

The fundamental thought of the Eleatics retains its 
significance even to the present time, and it is likely to 
continue to do so in the future also. That sense-per- 
ception does not have the last word even in questions of 
natural science, was most clearly and conclusively demon- 
strated to the thinking world by Nicholas Copernicus. 
If it were necessary to persuade men that the sun, which 
rises and sets before our eyes every day, really does not 
change its place, then abstract mathematical thought, 
indeed even constructive scientific imagination, must 
possess more convincing power than "the unseeing eye 
and the buzzing ear." But Copernicus has taught phil- 
osophers even more than this. The earth, which was 



156 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

until then regarded as the center of the universe, became 
a small, insignificant planet revolving around the sun 
along with many others. Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) 
was the first philosopher who drew the ontological conse- 
quences which follow from the astronomical doctrines of 
Copernicus. He proclaimed his doctrine of the eternity 
of the world and the unity of the universe with fervent 
enthusiasm. Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake 
as a heretic in Rome on Feb. 17, 1600, because his theory 
conflicted with the prevalent dogmas, and because he 
refused to compromise his conviction by recantation. 
Bruno's theory of the unity of the universe, however, 
which identified God with the world as will be shown 
later, still remained active. Baruch Spinoza (1632- 
1677) revived it again, though in a somewhat different 
form. Whilst Spinoza is less vivid he is logically more 
consistent. It is in his system that the monism of sub- 
stance finds its purest expression. 

Spinoza, a son of Jewish parents, born in Amsterdam, 
was acquainted with the Old Testament from his early 
boyhood and was afterwards also introduced to the doc- 
trines of the Jewish philosophy of religion. Here he 
became acquainted with a concept of Deity which, so far 
as this is attainable by human thought at all, is free from 
everything anthropomorphic. This Deity at all events 
remains a being which is distinct from the world. He 
was, "before the mountains were brought forth" (Ps. 
90) and created the world by his word. But after 
Spinoza became acquainted with the philosophy of Des- 



THE MONISM OF SUBSTANCE 157 

cartes (1596-1650) and learned to understand the 
precision of mathematical proof, this dualism of God 
and the world no longer satisfied him. He conceived 
the commandment to love God, so often emphasized 
in the Old Testament, in the strictest and broadest 
sense and could not think of this commandment other- 
wise than that it required the unreserved devotion of 
man to the infinitude of God. From this he was 
gradually led to the concept of God as the only sub- 
stance, whence all being, the corporeal as well as the 
spiritual, must be derived with logical consistency. 
Hence for him, just as for the persecuted Giordano 
Bruno, God and the world are one and the same (Deus 
sive natiira). 

This single substance, the very concept of which im- 
plies existence, has two attributes, thought and extension. 
Every single thing in the whole universe, i. e., including 
every human being, is nothing more than a phenomenal 
form, a IMode of this single substance. If we should 
regard things from the viewpoint of eternity {Siih specie 
aeternitatis) , rather than as isolated events, then all being 
and becoming form a perfect harmony. We have always 
to deal with only the one substance whose attributes 
are manifest in a variety of phenomenal forms. The or- 
der of ideas in the human mind is the same as the order 
of things because both proceed from the same source, 
namely the single, eternal, indivisible substance. The 
highest aim of human knowledge as well as the climax 
of human happiness consists therefore in unconditioned 



158 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

surrender to the universe, or as Spinoza formulates it, 
intellectual love towards God. 

Spinoza's theory regarded from the viewpoint of its 
uniformity and rigid consistency is without doubt a mag- 
nificent system. Closer inspection however reveals the 
fact that certain very important matters are neglected 
in its fundamental principles. The first mistake, which 
has been frequently adverted to by others, is this, namely 
that Spinoza identifies the logical relation of ground and 
consequence with the ontological relation of cause and 
effect. He thinks that it is possible to derive all being 
and becoming from the concept of substance by the 
same method as geometry deduces its propositions from 
its definitions of the forms of space. Hence he believes 
that his metaphysical hypotheses, which he deduces in his 
Ethics according to the geometrical method, have the 
same irrefutable force as the geometrical propositions. 
He forgets that geometry operates with concepts of its 
own creation, whilst those used by philosophy are ob- 
jectively given. A second difHculty with Spinoza con- 
sists in the fact that he likewise eliminates time from the 
world-process. In his conceptual deduction, Spinoza 
sees only the eternally persistent, that which forever 
remains self-identical, and fails to observe that in the 
world-process change and development are continually 
in progress. As the third error of the Spinozistic world- 
theory we must furthermore call attention to the purely 
intellectualistic doctrine of psychic life prevalent at that 
time. Like Descartes he regards thinking as the sum 



THE MONISM OF SUBSTANCE 159 

total of psychic life. But modern psychology teaches 
that feeling and volition are the original forms of the 
activity of consciousness and that intellectual activity is 
a later differentiation of mental life. 

Spinoza's monism of substance therefore, in its rigid 
form, is unsatisfactory. Goethe, upon whom Spinoza 
exerted a permanent influence revived the rigid concept 
of substance independently. The identity of God and 
nature appealed strongly to him; but to him nature 
is life, development and constant change. Goethe there- 
fore hailed the appearance of Schelling's Philosophy of 
Nature (1797) with great joy — a work which retained 
the central thought of Spinosa, the identity of nature and 
mind, but combined with it the idea of development. 

Schelling (1775-1854) accepted the theory of Spinoza 
without reservation. He expresses the hope already in 
one of his earliest works that he might be able to de- 
monstrate the reality of ''the Idea" as a supplement to 
Spinoza's Ethics. He writes to Hegel : 'T have become 
a Spinozist, you will ere long see how." Schelling 
also regards nature and mind as phenomenal forms of 
the Absolute ; the universe too is uniform throughout. 
But in distinction from Spinoza, Schelling did not regard 
nature and mind as attributes, but as the two poles of 
the Absolute. Schelling regards the law of polarity, as 
it is revealed in the phenomena of magnetism and elec- 
tricity, as a universal law. Just as the magnet shows 
neither northern nor southern attraction at its center, but 
a kind of indifference to both, so in like manner does 



i6o AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the Absolute divide itself in nature and mind. But the 
true reality of the Absolute still remains a spiritual 
entity. Nature, according to Schelling, is "mind become 
visible." Thus Schelling's so-called philosophy of iden- 
tity, which regards thought and being as one and the 
same thing, inclines towards spiritualism again. The 
Absolute, according to Schelling, is essentially unchange- 
able and forever the same; but it manifests itself in 
the phenomenal world in a variety of forms, which 
Schelling conceived as an evolutionary process. Schel- 
ling described nature under the concept of the two poles 
of the Absolute in considerable detail, and his Philosophy 
of Nature exerted a marked influence for a while, even 
though it really contained nothing new. It became 
necessary for modern science to reject the Schellingian 
method of deducing natural laws from philosophic ideas 
root and branch, and to destroy it completely. In 
recent years, however, we begin to perceive that Schel- 
ling's theory, which explains all the forces of nature 
from a single general principle, contains much that is 
true. Modern science has gradually arrived at the the- 
ory of regarding all natural processes as the trans- 
formation and transposition of a single uniform energy. 
The Monism of Substance has received its most logical 
and consistent treatment at the hands of Hegel (1770- 
1831). Hegel conceives the identity of thought and 
being in such a manner that the logical, or in Hegel's 
language, the dialectical evolution of the concepts is iden- 
tical with the evolution of the world-process. Hegel con- 



THE MONISM OF SUBSTANCE i6i 

strues Schellin^s law of Polarity as the purely logical 
antithesis of the concepts. Every concept, according to 
Hegel, compels us to think of its antithesis. Every A 
at the same time demands a non-A to complete the 
thought. But in the very moment when the concept has 
brought out the thought of its antithesis, there arises at 
once the logical necessity of combining both concepts 
under a more general one, or, as Hegel puts it, of 
"annulling" the antithesis. This implies that we can 
discover absolute truth by following the self-evolution 
of the concepts abstractly. Thus Hegel leads us from 
the pure abstract concept of being to the idea, which 
"discharges itself as nature from subjectivity into 
objectivity," in order to return to itself again as mind. 
Evolution reaches a climax in the three stages of the 
evolution of mind, the subjective, the objective, and the 
absolute mind, the last of which reveals itself in art, relig- 
ion and philosophy, but only to return again to its start- 
ing-point, abstract being. Whilst Schelling directed his 
attention chiefly to nature, Hegel's strength lies in the 
philosophy of mind. In this department he has greatly 
improved the historical method of investigation chiefly 
through the concept of the "objective" mind as realized 
in law, morality, and custom, and as it is actively displayed 
in the life of the family and the state. We have learned 
from him that every individual human being is under 
the influence of objective mind, and that no stage of men- 
tal development can be understood except by an exhaust- 
ive study of its antecedent history. But Hegel thought 
II 



i62 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

that his dialectical method spared us the trouble of exact 
investigations in natural science and in history ; and that 
it enabled us to deduce the laws of Being and Becoming 
by pure speculation. It is for this reason that exact 
science was forced to resist his influence so vigorously, 
and that Hegel personally found such violent opposition 
among scientists. At present, since the study of facts 
has long been the accepted method of investigation, we 
have once more regained that unprejudiced state of mind 
which enables us to form a more impartial judgment of 
the services of Hegel to the advancement of human 
knowledge. Hegel's philosophy deserves our esteem and 
admiration above all, as an imposing and inherently logi- 
cal intellectual structure. But the historical method of 
interpreting everything which appertains to mental pro- 
cesses is likewise a valuable legacy from the positive 
content of his doctrine. 

The Monism of Substance has been carried out con- 
sistently only by the Eleatics and Spinoza. Schelling 
and Hegel combine with it the further idea of develop- 
ment : Schelling in the sense of an actual change ; Hegel 
rather as a self-unfolding of the concept. With Schel- 
ling and Hegel, as we have previously observed, this 
Monism likewise savors of Spiritualism in that the nature 
of the Absolute, according to each of them, in the last 
analysis is mental. 

Recent naturalists, especially Ernst Haeckel, have 
placed this type of Monism on a more materialistic basis 
again. Ernst Haeckel, in his widely circulated book, 



THE MONISM OF BECOMING 163 

The Riddle of the Universe, has attempted to describe 
the cosmic process as a unitary evolution. He starts 
with the concept of matter which he conceives as already 
furnished with a variety of potencies and tendencies. In 
this evolution the most complicated phenomena of indi- 
vidual and social life issue gradually from simple mate- 
rial elements, which however contain within themselves 
the germs of psychic life. 

Another school of thinkers, on the basis of certain 
physiological and physical theories, have undertaken to 
eliminate the concept of substance, conceived as a per- 
sistent reality which permanently preserves its identity, 
from the philosophical view of the universe entirely, and 
to regard change, which is incessant and regular, as the 
only thing that endures. We shall now proceed to de- 
scribe this latter theory, which we have called the Monism 
of Becoming — a theory which is beset with many and 
great difficulties, but which has been worked out with 
remarkable consistency. 

32. The Monism of Becoming 

The Monism of Becoming, like the Monism of Sub- 
stance, originated in Greek antiquity. Heraclitus of 
Ephesus (200 B.C.), in direct contradiction of the Elea- 
tics, postulated Becoming and Change as the principle of 
the Cosmic process. ''All things are passing, and nothing 
abides," is one of his characteristic sayings. Comparing 
the cosmic process to a flowing stream, he remarked, 
"We cannot step into the same river twice, for it is then 



i64 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

no longer the same."^ Heraclitus moreover recognized 
the fact that Law, a sort of universal reason, which he 
called Logos, governs this constant change. He says: 
"This cosmic order, the same in all beings, has been 
created neither by God nor man, but it always was, and 
is, and ever shall be an ever-living fire." The fire, which, 
according to Heraclitus, constitutes primary matter, 
seems moreover to be only a symbol of eternal motion. 
Heraclitus is likewise already familiar with the idea of a 
constant evolution towards higher forms. Hence he 
calls Strife the father of all things. According to his 
view, gods and men, the bond and the free, have sprung 
from this Strife. 

The Stoics to a certain extent revived the doctrine of 
Heraclitus, but without a full appreciation of the pro- 
found meaning of his fundamental principle. And 
Giordano Bruno, whose enthusiastic spirit is enraptured 
with the thought of eternal growth, likewise reveals the 
influence of Heraclitus. Hegel was disposed to ascribe 
the fundamental ideas of his own system to Heraclitus. 
Lasalle, a disciple of Hegel, afterward wrote a two vol- 
ume commentary on Heraclitus, in the same spirit. 

^There are over a hundred fragments of the works of Hera- 
clitus extant, which are most readily accessible in the work of 
Herman Diels : Herakleitos von Ephesus, Greek and German. 
Berlin, 1901. It also appears in the collection: Die Fragmente 
der Vorsokratiker. (The English student will find them to 
the best advantage in Bakewell's Source Book of Ancient Phil- 
osophy, 1907; or, Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy. 2 Ed., 1908, 
Trans.) 



THE MONISM OF BECOMING 165 

There is no doubt but that both Hegel and Lasalle have 
frequently attributed a meaning to the sayings of Hera- 
clitus which is wholly foreign to the Greek philosopher ; 
but their judgment is correct, so far as it pertains to 
essentials. Heraclitus did not regard the universe as a 
persistent Substance, but as a cosmic process. 

Modern scientists, on the basis of the doctrine of evo- 
lution, have appropriated this thought enthusiastically 
and carried it through to its logical consequences with 
rare consistency. Before turning to the explanation of 
this, the most modern type of Monism, let us pause a 
moment with the doctrine of Evolution to which we have 
just referred. 

Kant had applied the idea of evolution according to 
mechanical laws to the explanation of the inorganic world 
with strict logical consistency in his General Natural 
History and Theory of the Heavens. (Published 1755.) 
His hypothesis of fiery nebulae, whence our solar system 
evolved, was afterwards stated in very similar terms 
by the French astronomer and mathematician Laplace, 
who arrived at the same conclusion independently of 
Kant. This hypothesis is now commonly known as the 
Kant-Laplace theory.^ Helmholtz, in a brilliant essay, 

^Laplace did not explain his hypothesis in as much detail 
as Kant. It is published in a note, of considerable length, as an 
appendix to his work: Exposition du systeme du monde (pp. 
498-509, Vol. 4, of the large Paris edition of his complete 
works). But whilst Kant, with absolute confidence, exclaims: 
"Give me matter, and I will construct a world," the astronomer 
and mathematician is much more reserved. He thus announces 



i66 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

has shown that this theory Hkewise corresponds best 
with the present state of science.^ Kant stops short 
dehberately at the border of the organic world. Whilst 
he has such complete confidence in his hypothesis, that 
he thinks it is safe to say : "Give me matter, and I will 
construct a world, that is; give me matter and I will 
show you how a world should evolve from it;" he will 
not presume even to suggest an explanation of the genesis 
of a single plant or a caterpillar. 

The investigations of Goethe, Lamarck, Geoifroy- 
Saint-Hiliare, Spencer and Darwin have greatly increased 
our insight into the evolution of the organic kingdom. We 
know that the most complex organic structures likewise 
evolve from simple elements, and we have at least a 
suspicion of the laws governing the evolution. We must, 
of course, assume that the fundamental properties of life, 
such as growth, nutrition, adaptation of functions to en- 
vironment, are already present in the elements — the cells, 
neurones, plasomes, or whatever else you choose to call 
them. But this much is quite certain, namely, that all 
organs and all functions develop according to fixed ten- 
dencies which are directed towards the preservation 

his theory: 'T will propose an hypothesis, in a note at the end 
of this work, which, as it appears to me, can be deduced, with 
a high degree of probability, from the phenomena here described ; 
but which I nevertheless, offer, with that profound hesitation, 
with which everything, which is not the result of observation 
and calculation, must fill every one of us." p. 477. 

^Helmholtz : "Concerning the origin of the Planetary System," 
issued in Essays and Addresses. Vol. 2, p. 53 ff. 



THE MONISM OF BECOMING 167 

of the organism and its species. Biology, the science 
of the laws of life, which is an outgrowth of this 
method of explanation, has made marvelous progress by 
diligent investigation of details. It has now become im- 
perative that the evolution of the human mind likewise 
be explored from the viewpoint of the preservation of 
life, or, to express it in scientific terms, according to 
biological principles. Herbert Spencer made the first 
attempt in this direction in his Principles of Psychol- 
ogy. He has made important contributions to our 
knowledge of the psychical processes notwithstanding 
the fact that his definition of life was not broad enough. 

If we conceive everything which takes place in the 
human organism as a vital process, it would seem to sug- 
gest the possibility of discovering a combining principle 
for physical and psychical phenomena, and of postulating 
a concept which would really comprehend both. Such 
a concept would furthermore at once enable us to extend 
our observation to all manner of events and to formulate 
a monistic theory which is far more comprehensive and 
at the same time more consistent and accurate than any- 
thing hitherto attempted. Richard Avenarius and Ernst 
Mach have undertaken the task of elaborating such a con- 
cept. The Empirio criticism of Avenarius is the most 
logical monistic system thus far proposed. 

Avenarius and Mach reached their respective conclu- 
sions independently of each other and by different paths. 
Avenarius, who, at the beginning, was much occupied 
with Spinoza, and perhaps strengthened by these studies 



i68 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

in the desire for a strictly monistic theory of the universe, 
starts from tlie viewpoint of materiaHsm, whilst Mach, 
at the outset, stands much closer to idealism. Mach 
tells us that, even in his early youth, he was impressed 
with the thought, while reading Kant's Prolegomena to 
every future Metaphysics, that the assumption of a trans- 
cendent thing-in-itself was wholly superfluous. 

The central thought of the Avenarius-Mach Monism 
is the nullification of the distinction between physical and 
psychical phenomena. These philosophers however do 
not annul this distinction by the adoption of a trans- 
cendent materialistic or spiritualistic hypothesis, but by a 
penetrating analysis of the ego-consciousness. Just as 
Copernicus has compelled us to abandon the geocentric 
standpoint, and to regard our earth as nothing more than 
a mere planet among a number of others in the universe, 
so these investigators aim to show that what we call 
our Ego, is nothing more than a complex of separate 
elementary processes, the union of which, though stable, 
is by no means indestructible. David Hume, with 
whose epistemological theory Ernst Mach finds himself 
in sympathy in other respects also, is the forerunner in 
this dissolution of the concept of the ego. The relative 
dependence of the primary processes constituting my 
Ego upon the processes of my environment, are pre- 
cisely the same as the relative dependence which obtains 
between the other processes of the universe. Mathe- 
matics has invented the concept of function in order to 
generalize the various interrelations of magnitudes. 



THE MONISM OF BECOMING 169 

The formula a=:f (b) (a is the function of b), means 
that for every change in the magnitude of a, there is a 
corresponding change in b. If we amplify this concept 
of function so as to include not only quantitative, but also 
qualitative relations of dependence, we shall be able to 
say: Elements, related to each other functionally, are 
the only factors discoverable in the universe. If this is 
true, then science has nothing more to do than to 
describe these elements and their functional relations 
as simply as possible. An economical arrangement of 
experience must at the same time accompany this 
description, in order that a single thought may com- 
prehend the common element of a variety of expe- 
riences and thus combine and utilize the largest possible 
number of functional relations with the least possible 
expenditure of mental energy. Thus, for example, 
the concepts of number are simply very convenient 
instruments of thought which enable us to handle 
relations of the widest generality in short and precise 
formulas. 

The universe, in the language of a recent scientist 
(Heinrich Gomperz), \?> thus construed as a well- 
ordered event. Hence it is entirely out of place to 
speak of substances and causes in this connection. 
Every substance immediately dissolves into a series of 
events, and all that can be said of these events is, that 
a regular succession and concomitance exists between 
them, but no causal connection. The only permanent 
thing about it is the purposiveness of the biological 



170 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

functions exhibited in the Hfe of organisms ; but this is 
simply a characteristic sign, a guide to future exact de- 
scription advantageous to the organism. 

According to Avenarius, the elements, between which 
the functional relations obtain are of a material, substan- 
tial nature. He regards every human being, together 
with his perceived environment to which he is related, 
as a "Principial-co ordination/' i.e., as a coordinated 
system which has existed from the beginning. The 
''self-styled Ego" together with its environment, consti- 
tute one whole. The system C, by which Avenarius 
means the brain, is the central member of this principial- 
coordination. In the theory of the universe which every 
human being formulates spontaneously, the perceptions, 
thoughts and feelings of his associates are injected into 
the minds of each of them respectively. We distinguish 
the tree in our spatial environment, ''the real tree" so 
to speak, from the image of the tree which our asso- 
ciate possesses in his ''soul." This "ascription" or "in- 
jection," according to Avenarius, is a duplication of the 
world contrary to fact, because we thus correlate our 
"thoughts" with the "things" of our environment anti- 
thetically. And then we finally classify our body with 
things; but within it there dwells a peculiar being, 
unique in its kind, the soul, the substrate of our thoughts 
and feelings. Avenarius regards this duplication of 
facts as a perversion of true experience. Every human 
being is merely a central member of a principial-co- 
ordination, and his environment, so far as he perceives 



THE MONISM OF BECOMING 171 

it, is the same as his thoughts and feelings : "Dependen- 
cies of System C" (the brain). 

Avenarius thinks that he has solved the antithesis be- 
tween the physical and the psychical by the introduction 
of the concept of principial-coordination, and by con- 
ceiving of psychical phenomena merely as "Depend- 
encies of System C." He thinks he has thus restored 
the natural concept of the universe, which, in his opin- 
ion, admits of but a single species of events. But since 
he makes the brain, i. e., a material organ, the basis of 
his monistic theory, his monism still savors of material- 
ism. The things which he describes as "Dependencies 
on System C," as well as the System C itself, and every- 
thing which transpires within it, are nevertheless sub- 
stantial processes, limited to a material substrate. His 
deductions, followed to their logical consequences, finally 
lead to a materialistic monism. 

With Mach the matter stands quite differently. As 
previously observed, Mach's starting-point is idealism. 
He expressly says that he does not wish in any wise to 
conceal the idealistic origin of his views. He conse- 
quently seems to develop the Monism of Becoming far 
more rigidly and consistently than Avenarius. Accord- 
ing to Mach, the elements which constitute the universe 
are, primarily, sensations. These, being psychic phe- 
nomena, bear the impress of mere events, of processes 
pure and simple, without substrate, which is the dis- 
tinctive characteristic of all psychic experiences. Mach 
is of the opinion that even physical phenomena, if thor- 



172 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

oughly analyzed, are not represented as persisting sub- 
stances, but merely as events between which uniform 
relations prevail, just like the psychical. He thus arrives 
at a real monistic theory which is free from materialism. 
The unifying principle at the center of all these reflec- 
tions is the concept of Becoming. The elements are not 
permanent, unchangeable atoms, but primary processes 
which are governed by functional relations. This like- 
wise accounts for Mack's emphatic declaration that the 
idealistic origin of his theory is not to be concealed. 
For, as a matter of fact, the only way to reach the con- 
cept of pure becoming, as well as its logical application, 
is by means of introspective observation of our own 
psychic life. In order to fully comprehend this theory, 
we shall, of course, have to rise above all personal 
prejudices concerning the ego. We shall have to dis- 
cover, so to speak, the point of Archimedes, external to 
the Ego, whence to survey the course of cosmic events. 
Then, as we come to identify ourselves with the universe 
and, in harmony with the sentiment of ''Johnny the 
stone-breaker" in Anzengruher's Kreuzelschreihern, 
reach the conclusion that "you are a part of this whole 
thing, and this whole thing is a part of you," we begin 
to see that what we call our Ego is after all only an 
evanescent conglomeration of cosmic events, governed 
by precisely the same laws which control the rest of 
nature. The universe will thereafter appear to the clari- 
fied vision of the philosopher as a series of uniform 
events, and the distinction of the elements which are 



THE MONISM OF BECOMING 173 

governed by these functional relations will vanish entirely. 
Mach has described his monistic theory still more def- 
initely in his recent work, Knowledge and Error. In 
this work he acknowledges that the Monism of Becom- 
ing is the correct name for his theory (p. 460, 2 Ed.). 
He defines the distinction between physical and psychical 
facts as follows: "The totality of whatever can be per- 
ceived in space by every one alike is physical in its na- 
ture," "on the other hand whatever is immediately 
given to only one, but accessible to all others only by 
analogy, should be known as a psychical process." (p. 
6.) This distinction, however, does not occur at the 
beginning of experience, but only follows from the 
social experience of human fellowship. "If any one 
should by accident attain maturity in isolation from 
human companionship, he would scarcely make the 
analysis by which his scanty store of ideas would be 
contrasted with his sensations; he would never reach 
the idea of the Ego, so as to distinguish it from the 
universe. For him all Becoming would combine into 
one grand event." (p. 460.) "When man, by analogy, 
made the discovery that there are other living beings, 
similar to himself in nature and conduct, human beings 
as well as animals ; and when he was forced to recognize 
that these beings must be judged with reference to 
circumstances which are not accessible to immediate 
sense-perception but by analogies which were familiar 
to him through his own individual experience, there 
was only one course open to him: he must divide the 



174 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

processes into two classes, namely, such as could be 
perceived by everyone, and such as could be perceived 
by only one observer. At this stage he became defi- 
nitely conscious of the idea of the self in distinction from 
the self of others. The two ideas are inseparable." (p. 
459 ff.) Both Mach and Avenarius regard the distinc- 
tion of physical and psychical facts as an arbitrary one, 
and hence as unjustified. Both of them wish to restore 
''pure experience," to the status in which this distinction 
had not yet been made. They do not by any means in- 
tend to combine the physical and the psychical by means 
of an unknown third principle, as Spinoza does, whose 
divine Substance transcends both the physical and the 
psychical. The standpoint towards which both Mach 
and Avenarius are striving is rather more elementary 
than either the physical or the psychical.^ There is but 
one universe, but a single cosmic process, for the divis- 
ion of which into two worlds there is absolutely no 
ground whatever. In the discussion of the problem, 
Avenarius is governed more by the systematic, Mach by 
the methodological, viewpoint. Avenarius is in search 
of a ''natural theory of the universe," that is to say, a 
system, or theory of the world and of Hfe. Mach, on 
the contrary, is after a point of view which is equally 

'^Spinoza combines the physical and the psychical by a third 
principle, Substance, which he postulates as the reality behind 
these respective Modes ; Mach and Avenarius make the combina- 
tion in the concept of experience which is discovered on this i. e., 
the subjective side of the physical and the psychical phenom- 
ena. Trans.) 



THE MONISM OF BECOMING 175 

well adapted to the purposes of physics and psychology. 
Mach's theory, therefore, is not metaphysical, but only 
methodological monism. As such it is nevertheless of 
vast importance for the advancement of science, espe- 
cially for the elimination of superfluous problems. But 
it cannot be denied that Mach's methodological prin- 
ciples do contain the elements of a world-theory which 
must be described as the Monism of Becoming. 

This theory is unquestionably more exact and con- 
sistent than any other attempt at monistic interpreta- 
tion. But criticism must still raise the question, whether 
even this theory will work out. Can we conceive of 
experience prior to the recognition of physical and 
psychical facts? Can we seriously speak of a theory of 
the universe at this stage? Experience does not merely 
consist of the experience of the bare facts. It presup- 
poses, in every instance, some kind of formulation and 
analysis of these facts. Every impression which has an 
objective origin must, so to speak, traverse the whole 
centralized organization of man, — in the language of 
Avenarius, through System C — in order to become expe- 
rience. Human fellowship and cooperation are likewise 
-indispensable for the production of experiences which 
are biologically useful. But experiences of this kind are 
impossible without fundamental apperception, as indi- 
cated above, which already presupposes the antithesis of 
Ego and World. It is difficult to believe, therefore, that 
experience of any kind can be possible prior to the 
recognition of this distinction or even without it. It 



176 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

appears to me therefore that this attempt at a monistic 
world-theory, although of vast significance, does not 
entirely clear itself of dualism. 

The monistic attempts to solve the ontological prob- 
lem have greatly increased the powers of the human 
intellect, and they have taught us to contemplate things 
from the viewpoint of their totality. As a matter of 
fact, however, we do not as yet seem to have succeeded 
in explaining the manifold of the phenomenal world 
from a single, fundamental, unitary principle. But 
when we confine ourselves to the formal concept of 
Becoming, and regard* the universal reign of law as 
the unifying principle, we find that dualism still remains, 
as we have just observed. Consequently, of late years, 
there has been a growing tendency to return to dualism, 
which is apparently less scientific, but it at all events 
corresponds better to actual experience. We must now 
turn our attention to the problems resulting from these 
inquiries. 

SS' Dualism 

Dualism, as we have observed before (p. 137), is the 
world-theory which commonly prevails among unreflec- 
tive minds. At this stage body and soul are conceived 
as two distinct realities, which abide together and co- 
operate with each other for a definite period of time. 
But in this view the idea of the soul is not strictly 
immaterial. The soul is a persistent being, possessing 
its own separate existence, and hence material in its 



DUALISM 177 

nature, no matter how we may refine or sublimate its 
materiality. 

Philosophical dualism must endeavor to eliminate all 
materiality from the concept of the soul. The only way 
in which this can be done successfully requires us to 
give up the postulate of a permanent psychic substance, 
and regard the psychic phenomena as nothing more 
than a process, which, absolutely unextended, exhibits 
nothing but temporal progression. This strict concep- 
tion, the only one capable of doing justice to all the 
facts, is of very recent origin, and it has not as yet found 
general acceptance among philosophers. The theory of 
a substantial soul still survives. This theory involves 
the difficult problem of the reciprocal relation of body 
and soul which has been the subject matter of incessant 
controversy ever since the beginnings of philosophy. 

At the very beginning of its investigations dualism 
is confronted with this problem of the relation between 
body and soul, which really forms the kernel of every 
dualistic theory. 

Aristotle was the most thorough-going dualist of 
antiquity. He of course regards the soul as only the 
Form, the Perfection (Entelechy) of organic being, 
which perishes with the body. But, in addition to the 
soul, there is also a Spirit which is separable from the 
body. This spirit inhabits the body during its lifetime, 
departs at death and thereafter continues its own inde- 
pendent existence. The Aristotelian doctrine was most 
readily harmonized with the dogmas of the Christian 
12 



178 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

religion, on account of which it maintained its influence, 
with sHght modifications, throughout the middle ages. 
Dualism received a far more thorough and concise 
formulation at the hands of Descartes, who completely 
separated body and mind as two distinct entities ; the 
characteristic attribute of body being extension; that of 
mind, thought. Extended being (res extensa) and 
thinking being {res cogitans) are the two substances 
which are by nature radically opposed to each other. 

Descartes solves the problem of interaction by locating 
the soul in the brain (the pineal gland), where it may be 
acted upon by the body and react upon the body in turn. 
But the interaction between two substances, so wholly 
unlike, seemed a logical impossibility to subsequent 
thinkers. An effort was then made to explain the unde- 
niable relation existing between physical and psychic 
facts in some other way. The so-called Occasionalists 
assumed {Geulincx, i624-i66g, and Malehranche, 1638- 
171 5) that God, upon the occasion of every physical 
process, produces the corresponding psychical process, 
and vice versa. This implies that the processes only 
furnish the occasion for God to interpose. Leibnitz 
afterwards substituted a predetermined correspondence 
or preestablished harmony for this incessant interference 
upon occasion. Just as a skilful jeweler might con- 
struct two clocks, which, without being directly con- 
nected, would still keep even time, so God, in his omnip- 
otence, has disposed the body and the soul to remain In 
perpetual harmony, so that every stimulus is invariably 



DUALISM 179 

followed by its corresponding sensation, and every voli- 
tional act by corresponding movement, although soul 
and body never act upon each other. 

Dualism has really not had any consistent and serious 
defender since Descartes. The idea has seemed to pre- 
vail that it could be annulled by a superior Monism. 
But the problem of the reciprocal relation between 
physical and psychical processes nevertheless still re- 
mains a subject of controversy. 

Recently the theory of psycho-physical parallelism has 
been proposed as an explanation of this reciprocal rela- 
tion. According to this theory the physiological proc- 
esses within the nerves and more especially within the 
brain, upon which the psychical processes ultimately 
depend, are psycho-physical processes. As a matter of 
fact, only one process takes place, which, however, pre- 
sents two aspects to our observation. Objectively re- 
garded, its nature is physical and it belongs to the causal 
series of natural processes; subjectively, however, the 
same process is psychical in its nature, it is sensation, 
perception, idea, emotion or volition. 

Psycho-physical parallelism is only an apparent, not 
an actual, solution of the problem presented in the in- 
evitable fact of the reciprocal relation between physical 
and psychical phenomena. To speak of an "inner 
aspect," is to make use of an illusive metaphor. We do 
not describe psychical phenomena as inner processes 
because they appear to be located within our organism. 
In this sense, indeed, even the purely physiological 



i8o AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

processes, such as digestion, assimilation, circulation of 
the blood, all of which take place within the body, would 
have to be included under this term. The "inner aspect" 
of the psycho-physical process therefore, is its psychical 
nature only, conceived as a process of consciousness. 
But just as soon as the process of consciousness, to- 
gether with the coordinated cerebral process is conceived 
as single and unitary, we at once approach a material- 
istic interpretation. There is then no escape from say- 
ing that at the moment when the physiological processes 
attain a certain degree of complexity, psychic expe- 
riences supervene. But in that case these would be 
nothing more than functions of the physiological process. 
Thus conceived, the unitary process is material, and the 
psychic element, as Ribot expresses it, is merely super- 
added (surajoute), and has really no bearing whatever 
on the nature of the process. But in this way psycho- 
physical parallelism is transformed into pure material- 
ism, and all the arguments adduced against the latter 
apply also to the former. Mach's standpoint is the only 
method that avoids the problem of the reciprocal rela- 
tion between the physical and the psychical phenomena. 
But we have already shown that even here. Dualism 
has not been completely overcome. 

In our opinion Dualism has not been conclusively 
refuted by any means. There is nothing whatever in 
the concept of causality to justify the assertion that 
things which are unlike cannot interact. Furthermore, 
the interaction between physical and psychical factors 



DUALISM i8i 

is one of the most primitive facts which we experience. 
Whenever we execute a movement on the basis of a 
volitional choice, we feel, as it were, how cause and 
effect pass in transition from one to the other. This 
very combination, as Jodl has expressed it, is the pro- 
totype of all causality. But if we recall our explanation 
of the origin of the function of judgment, we are pre- 
pared to say even more. This combination of volition 
and movement is the only causal connection which we 
actually experience as it occurs. But, due to the funda- 
mental apperception to which it gives rise, this combina- 
tion is likewise the source of all our judgments, and, 
consequently, of all our knowledge. 

It scarcely seems reasonable to characterize a funda- 
mental fact of this kind as unintelligible. It appears 
unintelligible only so long as we regard causal relation 
one-sidedly, i.e., from the standpoint of natural science, 
and subordinate every reciprocal relation to the law of 
the conservation of energy. This principle, especially 
since its real significance has become known through 
the investigations of Robert Mayer, Joule, Helmholts, 
Mach, and very recently Ostwald, has been brilliantly 
verified as applied to all chemical and physical processes. 
There is abundant methodological justification, there- 
fore, for adhering to this well-established principle just 
as long as it is possible to do so, and even for applying 
it to newly discovered forms of energy, as observed, e.g., 
in radio-active substances. But the principle of the 
conservation of energy is by no means the only mode by 



i82 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

which causaHty is expressed. We observe causal rela- 
tions within the realm of psychical phenomena, i.e., in 
the domain of intellect, where the idea of the constancy 
of energy is wholly out of the question. Even in the 
case of every individual human being mental develop- 
ment reveals a constant increase of psychic capacity. 
And this increase becomes far more imposing and im- 
pressive when we contemplate the historical develop- 
ment of the whole human race. The discovery of the 
art of printing has increased the intellectual possibilities 
of mankind to an extent which simply staggers compre- 
hension. To-day we employ concepts with playful ease, 
the formulation and construction of which engaged the 
severest application of an Aristotle. We see, therefore, 
that the law of the conservation of energy is not adapted 
to explain the evolution of mind. It appears to us that 
the law of the increase of psychic energy, postulated by 
Wundt {Witndt, Ethik, 3 Ed., II, y2 ff), is far more 
appropriate in the realm of mind. In the physical uni- 
verse causality is a closed series which rests upon the 
principle of the equivalence of cause and effect. In the 
realm of mind and of minds, every process is, indeed, 
likewise caused by preceding processes, but the effects 
far exceed their antecedent causes. Physical processes 
discharge mental processes, after which the latter, owing 
to the fact that great numbers of our fellows are affected 
by them, undergo a multiplication and a diversification 
which approaches the immeasurable. Causality there- 
fore does not appertain only to the realm in which the 



DUALISM 183 

conservation of energy prevails. The reciprocal rela- 
tions which actually exist between physical and psychical 
processes, relations which are matters of constant expe- 
rience, cannot be interpreted otherwise than by reference 
to mutual interaction and reaction. This interpretation 
in nowise conflicts with any scientific law of thought, 
as has frequently been charged. The concept of causal- 
ity by no means requires that the effect must be equiva- 
lent, or even similar in nature, to its cause. Even in 
the physical world, the so-called ''discharging" causes 
are not at all equivalent to the discharged effects. But 
all psychic processes are of the nature of discharges and 
in turn produce discharging results. The theory of 
interaction between physical and psychical factors is 
therefore scientifically tenable, all objections to the con- 
trary notwithstanding. 

Accordingly there are physical processes in the uni- 
verse, i.e., processes which are or may be sensuously 
perceived, and which appear at the same time to be 
inseparably combined with a substantial substrate. But 
there are also psychical processes which can never be 
sensuously perceived, and which, in themselves, furnish 
no occasion for the assumption of a substantial substrate. 
Their union in the human organism rests upon interac- 
tion, which fact, in itself, contains nothing incompre- 
hensible. 

Inasmuch therefore as this theory is scientifically pos- 
sible, dualism still deserves to be mentioned among the 
accredited theories of the universe and of life. 



i84 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

In addition to dualism, several contemporary Amer- 
ican philosophers have again revived the very primitive 
theory of Pluralism. This is a thoroughly deliberate 
but much more radical reversion to the viewpoint of 
common sense. The movement is closely related to 
pragmatism. It is also defended by William James, the 
most vigorous representative of pragmatism. Accord- 
ing to this theory man's native impulse for unity is 
directed towards the future only, never towards the past. 
The world, when viewed from the standpoint of its 
origin, is the very opposite of unity. It is rather the 
vocation of man to bring about a unified organization in 
the future. According to these thinkers, philosophy, 
has nothing whatever to do with the universe as a whole. 
Its sole concern is with this earth and its inhabitants. 
Pluralism is radical empiricism on the one hand, and 
thorough-going activism on the other. Whilst this latter 
tendency, characterized by its progressive spirit, con- 
stantly insisting on results, can be exceedingly useful, 
it would still seem that in its theoretical principles it has 
greatly neglected the unification which has thus far been 
realized by science. The physico-chemical processes 
have so much in common that their comprehension under 
a single general concept is justified, even required. All 
psychical phenomena likewise exhibit the common attri- 
bute of being non-sensuous and of the nature of a 
process. As long as we preserve intact these two 
groups of phenomena, we make adequate allowance for 
all real experience. 



GOD AND THE WORLD 185 

34. The Cosmologico-theological Problem, God 
AND THE World 

The antithesis between animate and inanimate nature, 
body and soul, which even impresses the primitive mind 
and which philosophy either recognizes (Dualism) or 
endeavors to bridge (Monism), becomes a matter of 
profound significance through the reflective contempla- 
tion of man. The universe, as man's habitation, how- 
ever, was the subject of philosophic speculation long 
before man himself. 

The coherence of cosmic processes, which had been 
observed from the earliest times, the uniform regularity 
presented even in the recurrence of the seasons, awak- 
ened the desire for an explanation of these phenomena. 
The nature of the World-all, its origin, its history, and 
its final destiny, constitutes the cosmological problem. 
The solution of this problem belongs to the philosophy 
of nature, which is a subdivision of metaphysics. 

The oldest Greek philosophers believed that the co- 
herence and uniformity of the cosmic process could be 
best explained by the assumption of a single original 
substance as the source of all things. Water, Air and 
Fire were assumed by various thinkers to be such original 
substance. Empedocles afterwards postulated the well 
known four elements (water, fire, air, earth), whilst 
Leucippus and his disciple, Democritus, the founders of 
Atomism, regarded the universe as composed of minute 
bodies, which are qualitatively alike, differing only as 
respects form and size. These particles, which are re- 



i86 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

garded as indivisible (atom-indivisible), produce the 
various bodies by different forms of combination. 

This theory, which has been worked out in much 
greater detail by means of the improved methods of 
modern science, still forms the basis of the mechanical 
theory of the universe among a majority of the physicists. 
The atomic theory of to-day, due to the more accurate 
determination of the laws of motion and our better 
knowledge of the chemical properties of matter, has a 
vastly different content and is much more complex than 
that of Lencippiis and Democritus, but the fundamental 
thought still remains the same. 

The mechanical theory, however, has not been uni- 
versally accepted nor permanently satisfactory. The 
evident purposiveness of so many processes of nature 
soon gave rise to the idea of an architectonic intelligence 
which has organized every thing according to design. 
Anaxagoras was the first philosopher who assumed an 
intelligence of this sort for the purpose of explaining 
the cosmic order. His "Nous," or mind introduces 
order into the chaotic World-all. The cosmological 
problem has ever since then been intimately associated 
with the inquiry concerning the intelligent author and 
providential ruler of the universe. The concept of 
Deity, foreshadowed by religious ideas, now enters the 
realm of philosophical speculation. This gives rise to 
the theological problem, which furnishes the subject- 
matter of another sub-division of metaphysics, namely 
the philosophy of religion. 



GOD AND THE WORLD 187 

The concept of deity not only affects metaphysics and 
epistemology, but it has likewise a profound ethical 
significance. Sometimes the former and again the latter 
aspect of this concept is prominent, but they are most 
frequently combined. 

Every attempt at a solution of the cosmological prob- 
lem must reckon with the concept of deiiy, even if only 
to deny it. Since it has become a part of the recognized 
inventory of our philosophical concepts, by consequence 
of an evolution extending through thousands of years, 
it can no longer be completely ignored. 

Two solutions which are diametrically opposed to 
each other have been offered for the cosmologico-theo- 
logical problem. They are named after their respective 
governing principles, Mechanism and Teleology. 

The mechanical theory regards the total cosmic 
process as an unfolding of energies which inhere in 
matter itself. The composition of bodies and their 
orbits are determined by the most varied forms of attrac- 
tion and repulsion, centripetal and centrifugal force. 
This theory can likewise be applied to the explanation 
of the chemical processes, which are of such vast im- 
portance, even though it has not yet been possible to 
reduce all qualitative to quantitative differences. For 
the chemical properties likewise inhere in the substances 
themselves and are not imported from without. 

Ancient physical science rests almost exclusively upon 
the mechanical theory. It is also vigorously defended 
in the modern period by the exponents of materialism. 



i88 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

The attempt is even being made to reduce the processes 
of vital organisms to mechanics and chemistry, and a 
number of investigators utterly repudiate the assump- 
tion of a specific vital principle. 

The concept of Deity can be reconciled with the 
mechanical theory. It has, in fact, frequently been 
combined with it. In this case God is conceived as the 
active principle which produces order (Anaxagoras) , or 
He is the prime mover (Aristotle) who acts on matter 
which existed prior to himself. It is only the concep- 
tion of God as the Creator of the universe which is 
scarcely reconcilable with the mechanical theory. 

The mechanical theory, especially during the modern 
period, aims to eliminate the concept of purpose from 
the explanation of nature entirely. This is what brings 
it into conflict with the teleological theory. 

Teleology describes the theory which, emphasizing 
the evident adaptation of particular cosmic processes, 
especially of the various organs of the human body, 
assumes that the universe has been organized by a higher 
intelligence according to definite plans and purposes. 
Plato reproaches Anaxagoras with the charge that his 
"Nous" displayed nothing more than an activity towards 
order, but that it gave no account of the end to be served 
by the various arrangements. The teleological concep- 
tion regards God as the creator and providential ruler 
of the universe. 

This view receives its clearest expression in the Old 
Testament story of the creation. From this source it 



GOD AND THE WORLD 189 

has permeated the monotheistic religions of the West, 
forming the nucleus of the most important religious 
systems. We have thus been familiarly acquainted with 
this theory from early childhood. 

This form of teleology presupposes a personal, super- 
natural God. Because of its going beyond experience, 
it may also be called transcendental teleology. 

The modern period has produced still another form of 
teleology which conceives purpose as an inherent tend- 
ency in things themselves, especially in organisms. This 
immanent teleology is the conception which character- 
izes the so-called theory of evolution. 

This of course applies more particularly to organic 
nature. It assumes that all organisms are naturally 
endowed with the instinct of self-preservation both as 
it pertains to the individual and to the species. In 
obedience to this instinct the organisms develop in 
harmony with the conditions of life, to which they con- 
stantly better adapt themselves in the struggle for exis- 
tence. 

This theory, which was first proposed by Lamarck 
and defended by Goethe in some of its phases, was phil-. 
osophically formulated by Herbert Spencer, and it has 
found general acceptance among the educated classes 
through the labors of Charles Darwin {Origin of the 
Species, 1859). Darwin amplified the general theory 
by introducing the comprehensive hypothesis, that 
organisms, by the process of natural selection, transmit 
to their offspring the characters acquired in the struggle 



190 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

for existence, thus enabling them to increase their 
adaptability indefinitely. The doctrines of the Survival 
of the Fittest and Natural Selection constitute the 
essence of Darwinism so-called, which, however, is not 
identical with the idea of evolution in general. Hence, 
even though recent discoveries have shown that in a 
number of details the theories of Darwin are scientifically 
untenable, the fundamental thought, so enthusiastically 
and effectually defended by him, still continues to be of 
permanent value. 

The principle of immanent teleology is exceedingly 
valuable also in the explanation of psychic life and in 
the mental sciences generally. 

As the example of Darwin himself shows, the concept 
of Deity may likewise be harmonized with immanent 
teleology. It simply requires that we assume that God 
created the simplest vital forms, presumably protoplasma, 
and that every variety of organisms has gradually 
evolved therefrom according to the laws of evolution 
implanted within them by the Creator. 

The conception of God as a supernatural intelligence, 
endowed with omniscience and omnipotence is known as 
anthropomorphic Theism. Every theistic view must 
necessarily be tinged with anthropomorphism, simply 
because we can only conceive an intelligent being after 
human analogy. We can conceive our psychic powers 
increased to infinity, but they will still continue to be 
human powers. Theism, in its crude form, is the theory 
of all primitive races; in its refined form — and this is 



GOD AND THE WORLD 191 

what the name is generally intended to imply — it is the 
view of the prevailing monotheistic systems of religion. 

Pantheism differs from theism in this, namely, that 
according to the latter God and the universe are separate 
beings, according to the former they are one and the 
same. The divine element pervades the entire World- 
all, is present in every part, never distinct from things, 
but immanent in them. 

Anticipations of pantheism are discernible already in 
Xenophanes, clearly maintained by Giordano Bruno, and 
relentlessly and enthusiastically systematized by Baruch 
Spinoza. According to Spinoza, there is but one Sub- 
stance, which, as we have seen above, is God. This Sub- 
stance has two kinds of expression, or attributes, thought 
and extension. Every individual thing is a Mode of this 
single Substance, and, hence, participates in its divinity. 
The climax of wisdom consists in cheerful surrender to 
the All of which we are a part; and it is this absolute 
surrender which Spinoza calls divine love. This truly 
magnificent philosophical system made a profound im- 
pression on Goethe, who even in his youth, in Faust's 
religious dialogue with Gretchen, as well as after his 
genius had ripened, repeatedly gave it poetic expression : 

"Was war' ein Gott, der nur von aussen stiesse, 
Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen Hesse. 
Ihm ziehmt's, die Welt im Innern zu bewegen, 
Natur in sich, sich in Natur zu hegen, 
So dass, was in ihm lebt und webt und ist, 
Nie seine Kraft, nie seinen Geist vermisst." 

Besides pantheism still another conception of deity 



192 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

arose in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, to which the name of Deism has been applied. 
The representatives of this school (Cherbury, d. 1648. 
Toland, d. 1722. Collins, d. 1729) demand that reason 
shall likewise have a voice in religious matters. They 
reject irrational dogmas as well as the authority of tradi- 
tion. They proudly style themselves Freethinkers and 
advocate Natural Religion, meaning thereby a religion 
of pure reason. They regard God as the creator and 
director of the universe, but more especially as the 
source of the moral law. They hold that this concept of 
deity can be deduced from reason. Faith in God re- 
quires neither miracles nor revelation. The value of 
religion consists in the moral sentiments which it evokes. 
"Believe in God and do your duty," is the maxim of 
Deism. 

The desire to elaborate the traditional religious con- 
cept of deity philosophically was singularly active during 
the middle ages. The effort was first of all made to 
furnish a logical demonstration of the existence of deity 
on the basis of the concept, the teleology of the universe, 
and other logical arguments. But several of the School- 
men already (e.g.. Duns Scotus, 1265-1308) recognized 
the logical untenability of these arguments, and classi- 
fied the existence of God with the truths of revelation, 
i.e., such as cannot be established by the processes of 
reason. Modern philosophy has likewise devoted con- 
siderable attention to arguments of this kind, until Kant 
showed the existence of God to be a demand of the 



GOD AND THE WORLD 193 

practical reason, i.e., of the moral law, although 
theoretically undemonstrable. Since that time the con- 
cept of God has been construed as preeminently ethical. 

In our opinion, however, the importance of the con- 
cept of deity is not so much a matter of the foundation 
of the moral law, as of our theoretical view of the uni- 
verse. In order to make this clear, we refer once more 
to the function of judgment as involving fundamental 
apperception. Since the only method by which we can 
acquire mental possession of the content of things given 
in sense perception is by recasting them into the form 
which is adapted to our organism, and since we are 
compelled to conceive the content thus given as a poten- 
tial center and the expression of its inherent energy; 
moreover since this form has been attested by several 
thousand years of intellectual application, during which 
time it has served man in his successful intellectual con- 
quest of nature, it would therefore certainly seem 
justifiable to finally attempt to apply this form to the 
grand totality of the universe. 

But the moment this attempt is made, this cosmic 
totality at once appears as the handiwork of an infinite 
power, endowed with will, whose potential expression 
remains forever constant. Not until then does our con- 
ception of the universe attain the desired completion. 
This powerful will is the primary ground of matter and 
mind. The laws of nature are the laws of his will ; and, 
in the words of the Psalmist: ''My covenant will I not 
break, nor alter the thing which is gone out of my lips/* 
13 



194 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Thus, by applying the function of judgment, which 
has been verified in experience, to the totahty of the 
universe, we attain a comprehensive philosophy of the 
universe and of life, at once satisfying to our desire for 
knowledge and in which the concept of deity likewise 
finds its appropriate place. 

LITERATURE 

Fr. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materiallsmus. i Ed., 1866; 7 
Ed., 1902. (Eng. Trans.) 

Ed. V. Hartmann, Geschichte der Metaphysik. 2 vols., 1899 and 
igoo. 

Lotse, Mikrokosmus. 3 vols., 5 Ed., 1896. Eng. Trans, from 
4 Ed., 1885. 

Lotze, System der Philosophic. Part 2; Metaphysik, 1879; 2 
Ed., 1884. 

W. Wundt, System der Philosophic. 3 Ed., 1906. 

G. Th. Fechner, Ueber die physikalische und philosophische Ato- 
menlehre. 2 Ed., 1864. 

G. Th. Fechner, Zendavesta oder ; Ueber die Dinge des Himm.els 
und des Jenseits. 3 vols., 1851. 2 Ed., i vol., 1901. 

Ed. V. Hartmann, Die Philosophic des Unbewussten. 11 Ed., 
1904. 

G. Heymans, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik. 1905. 

Richard Avenarius, Kritik der reincn Erfahrung. 2 vols. 2 
Ed., 1909. (The English student will find a good outline 
of the theory of Avenarius in Mind of Oct., 1897. Trans.) 

Richard Avenarius, Der menschliche Weltbegriff. 1891, 2 Ed., 
1905. 

Richard Avenarius, Der Gegenstand der Psychologic. Three 
articles in the Vierteljahrschrift fuer wissenschaftliche Phil- 
osophic. 1894-95. (The Monism of Avenarius is most 
readily understood from these essays.) 

Josef Petzoldt, Einfuhrung in die Philosophic der reinen Erfah- 
rung. 2 vols., 1900 and 1905. 



GOD AND THE WORLD 195 

Ernst Mach, Die Analyse der Empfindungen. Especially 3 to 5 

Editions. 1902-06, (Eng. Trans, from first Ger. Ed.) 
Ernst Mach, Erkenntniss und Irrtum. 2 Ed., 1906. 
Ernst Mach, Die Principien der Warmelehre. 1896. 362-461. 
Ernst Mach, Popular-wissenschaftliche Vorlesungen. 3 Ed., 

1903, Lectures XII to XV. 
W. Ostwald, Vorlesungeniiber Natiirphilosophie. 3 Ed., 1905. 
M. Verzvorn, Naturwissenschaft und Weltanschauung, 1904. 
Rud. Eucken, Die Einheit des Geistes lebens im Bewusstsein und 

Tat der Menschheit, 1888. 
Rud. Eucken, Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung, 1907. 
Rud. Eucken, Geistige Stroemungen der Gegenwart. 4 Ed., 1908. 
Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual. 2 vols., 1902. 

(Contains a well thought out system of metaphysics.) 
Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, 1882. 
Deusen, The Elements of Metaphysics, 1894. Eng. Trans, by 

Duff. 
Fullerton, A System of Metaphysics, 1904. 
Hodgson, The Metaphysics of Experience, 1898. 
Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 1902. 
Ladd, A Theory of Reality, 1899. 
Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, 1905. 
Ormond, Foundations of Knowledge, 1900. 
James, Pragmatism, 1907. 



FIFTH DIVISION 
THE METHODS AND AIMS OF AESTHETICS 

35. The Concept and the Problem of Aesthetics 

Man's aesthetic nature rests upon a peculiar psychical 
principle which has been greatly differentiated and has 
become exceedingly complex in the course of the evolu- 
tion of our civilization. Its distinguishing character- 
istic consists in the fact that the mere contemplation 
of certain objects and processes of our environment, 
works of nature and works of art alike, gives rise to 
feelings of pleasure and pain, without at the same time 
exciting any passionate desires. Kant, who was the 
first to recognize this quality of aesthetic feeling, there- 
fore described it as "disinterested satisfaction." 

The aesthetic feelings however, almost invariably 
impel us to form judgments concerning aesthetic 
objects. We ascribe the predicates of these judgments, 
such as, beautiful, attractive, interesting, or homely, 
unattractive, monotonous, to the objects themselves, as 
attributes which belong to them objectively. We 
furthermore state these judgments in the universal form 
and we even very frequently defend our opinion against 
contrary views with considerable emphasis. 

196 



THE PROBLEM OF AESTHETICS 197 

Because of the important influence of aesthetic taste 
upon the Hfe of the individual as well as upon the gen- 
eral development of civilization, and furthermore, be- 
cause attention has thus been directed to new aspects 
of the soul and its activities, the problem demands 
scientific investigation. The subjective and the objec- 
tive conditions of aesthetic conduct must be carefully 
analysed. This constitutes the problem of aesthetics. 

The subjective conditions belong wholly to the depart- 
ment of psychology. The aesthetics of recent decades 
has been chiefly confined to psychological investiga- 
tions. The increased insight into the nature of aesthetic 
taste resulting from these investigations is by no means 
inconsiderable. 

To-day, for example, we know much better than we 
did thirty years ago what it is that we really experience 
when we are inspired and filled with joy by the con- 
templation of a painting, by the hearing of a symphony, 
or by the reading of a poem. Psychological aesthetics 
investigates both aesthetic pleasure and creative art, — 
the latter from the viewpoint of its inspiring impulse, 
so to speak. 

Science has by no means reached an agreement as yet 
concerning the aims, and even less concerning the 
methods, of investigating the objective conditions of 
aesthetic taste. Philosophical speculations concerning 
the nature of the beautiful, and concerning its cosmic 
significance, as conceived by Plato and Plotinus in 
antiquity, and by Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer 



198 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

in modern times, still continue to have some influence 
upon enthusiasts. But of far greater importance are 
the historical investigations into the origin and develop- 
ment of the various arts, and the studies in the history 
of culture which reveal how aesthetic taste has been 
disseminated and enriched and how the gradual educa- 
tion in the appreciation of art and the ever-increasing 
capacity to regard nature also from the aesthetic point 
of view has progressed. The subjective conditions of 
aesthetic taste must be studied psychologically, the 
objective conditions historically and sociologically. It 
may be that, after sufficient positive results have thus 
been gathered, some master mind will then be able to 
discover the germinal principles of aesthetics revealed 
in the universe, and thus produce a philosophy of the 
beautiful and of art. 

But we must never lose sight of the fundamental 
principle of all aesthetic taste. This consists in the fact, 
already stated, that we experience pure feelings of sat- 
isfaction which are wholly free from passionate desires. 
The fact of aesthetic taste is therefore at the same time 
a proof that feeling is a distinctly fundamental function 
of consciousness, which differs from the processes of 
representation and thought, on the one hand, and from 
those of desire and will on the other. Inasmuch, there- 
fore, as this pure feeling is never fully realized except 
in aesthetic taste, this furnishes the only means of 
understanding the nature and the sphere of pure feeling. 
The clearest and briefest way to define aesthetics, there- 



THE PROBLEM OF AESTHETICS i99 

fore, is to call it the philosophy of feeling, after the 
example of Heinrich von Stein. 

This definition of the concept of aesthetics at once 
describes its position in the system of philosophy and 
at the same time opens a rich field for psychological, 
historical and sociological investigations. The first and 
most important task is the psychological investigation 
of the aesthetic sense of satisfaction. We must come 
to a clear understanding of what it is that we really 
experience through aesthetic taste in the contemplation 
of art and of nature. We must especially distinguish 
aesthetic joy from other feelings of pleasure and try to 
ascertain the basis of this distinction. We must further- 
more endeavor to penetrate into the soul of the creative 
artist in order to appreciate the ideas and motives which 
control and inspire him. Neither are we permitted to 
confine our investigations to a single individual. 

The social factor plays a far more important part 
in aesthetics than is generally supposed. Our own 
aesthetic taste is largely influenced by fashion as well" 
as by other characteristics of the age, and the creative 
artist, in his own distinctive sphere, is perhaps the 
product of the popular taste, for which his work is 
intended, to a greater extent than either he himself or 
others are willing to admit. The sociological signifi- 
cance of art, recognized already by Plato and Aristotle ^ 
must be examined with much greater thoroughness. 

This leads to the relationship between aesthetics and 
ethics, which enables us to arrive at norms, and, without 



200 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

imposing any limitations upon the genius of the artist 
or the law of individual taste, to postulate a scale of 
objective aesthetic values. 

Aesthetics is therefore the philosophy of feeling and 
its task consists in the investigation of the psychological, 
sociological, historical, and finally, the cosmical and 
metaphysical conditions of aesthetic taste. 

36. The Development and the Schools of 
Aesthetics 

The term aesthetics, in the sense of a philosophy of 
the beautiful, was first used by Baumgarten (1714- 
1762). His work on Aesthetics, which appeared in 
1750- 1758, and intended to fill a gap in the Wolffian phil- 
osophy, resulted in developing aesthetics into a separate 
philosophic discipline. 

The word itself (from the Greek aisthanesthai=to 
perceive) really means the theory of sense perception 
and Kant still uses it in that sense. He even calls that 
part of the Critique of Pure Reason, which treats of the 
theory of sensibility, Transcendental Aesthetics. Baum- 
garten still retains the literal significance of the word 
to this extent, namely, that in his usage it describes 
beauty as the perfection of sensible cognition. In the 
Critique of Judgment Kant afterwards employed the 
expression thus introduced by Baumgarten in the sense 
in which it is generally used to-day. Consequently the 
word '^Aesthetics" has two wholly different meanings 
in Kant. In his theory of knowledge aesthetics means 



THE SCHOOLS OF AESTHETICS 201 

the doctrine of sensuous perception, whilst in his work 
on the judgment it describes the doctrine of pleasure 
as it is derived from the contemplation of the beautiful. 

The word is used in still another, somewhat broader, 
sense by Herbart (1776-1841). He includes the whole 
of practical philosophy under this term, i.e., everything 
which appertains to value- judgments. He thus com- 
bines the doctrine of morals and of the beautiful under 
the one general term, Aesthetics. But these variations 
in the use of the term have now been overcome and at 
present it is generally understood to mean the Philo- 
sophy of the Beautiful and of Art. 

Thus, whilst the name of Aesthetic is of com- 
paratively recent origin, its subject-matter, art and the 
beautiful, attracted the attention of philosophers com- 
paratively early. Plato devoted one of his dialogues 
{Hippias Major) to the discussion of the concept of the 
beautiful. In his other writings he also indulges in 
frequent allusions to the idea of the beautiful which he 
associates very closely with love. Aristotle outlined 
a theory of poetic art, particularly of tragedy, in his 
celebrated poetics; and Horace made frequent use of 
Aristotle in writing his Ars Poetica. Two profound 
philosophical treatises concerning Beauty, both of which 
are still worthy of serious consideration, have come 
down to us from Plotinus, the Neoplatonist. We also 
find occasional contributions to aesthetics in scholastic 
philosophy, but it is not until the eighteenth century, 
with its rich development of the life of sentiment, that 



202 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the scientific investigation of the sense of beauty reached 
its maturity. 

Shaftesbury, in England (1671-1713), Home and 
Burke in Scotland (1728-1797), the former by means 
of his aesthetic philosophy of morals, the latter through 
their psychological aesthetics, made large contributions 
to our knowledge of the respective psychic processes, 
and exerted a profound influence upon German phil- 
osophers and poets. Among the French writers on 
aesthetics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
Dubos in particular made valuable suggestions in his 
Reflexions Critiques (1791), which have only very 
recently met with the appreciation which they deserve. 
Dubos thinks that the pleasure of aesthetic taste is due 
to the fact that it furnishes the mind agreeable exercise. 
We shall return to this very important suggestion in our 
own presentation of aesthetic taste later on. 

Subsequently, after Winckelmann's attempt to dis- 
cover the ideal of beauty in ancient art, Lessing's effort 
to distinguish the specific task of poetry from that of 
painting and sculpture, and Herder's belief that he had 
found the original source of poetry in the depths of 
popular sentiment, Kant finally undertook to furnish a 
scientific foundation for aesthetics in his Critique of 
Judgment. 

The happy inspiration which led Kant to the investi- 
gation of the judgment of taste rather than the beau- 
tiful, and his contention, as correct as it is important, 
that our delight in the beautiful is a disinterested one, 



THE SCHOOLS OF AESTHETICS 203 

i.e., not attended by desires, still determines the content 
and tendency of philosophical aesthetics. 

The Kantian aesthetics was thoroughly elaborated by 
Schiller. It was Schiller's favorite theory that the 
appreciation of the beautiful is peculiar to man, and 
that it is the source of knowledge and morality as well 
as of culture generally. This idea appears already in 
"The Artists," a poem which was written before Schiller 
had become acquainted with the writings of Kant. 
But this view is untenable and, in the light of the 
modern theory of evolution, must be discarded. But 
the derivation of art from the play-instinct, as we find 
it explained in the letters on The Aesthetic Education 
of Man, is one of the most important and suggestive 
ideas which has been produced by aesthetics. It is only 
very recently that we have begun to properly appreciate 
the bearings of this theory and to develop the funda- 
mental thought of Schiller more fully. 

Hegel, Schelling and Schopenhauer have devoted 
considerable attention to aesthetics from the viewpoint 
of the metaphysics of Beauty and of Art. Hegel re- 
gards art as the lowest stage of the objectification of 
Absolute mind; religion and philosophy forming the 
higher stages. According to his view these three stages 
represent an evolving series of succession and differen- 
tiation, art during antiquity, religion in the middle ages, 
and philosophy in modern times. Hegel regards beauty, 
especially artistic beauty, as the radiance of the idea 
embodied in matter. This suggestion has been more 



204 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

fully elaborated in several directions. The aesthetic 
treatises of Fr. Fischer and Carriere are written in the 
Hegelian spirit. The works of the former still remain 
the most comprehensive and many-sided presentation of 
this discipline which we possess. Schelling regards 
the whole creation as a work of art, and according 
to Schopenhauer, art is the climax of all mental achieve- 
ment, because it is the expression of pure, unalloyed 
intellect completely superseding the blind and idiotic 
will-to-live. Schopenhauer regards music as the most 
splendid of all the arts. This is the art that furnishes 
the sublimest revelations of the things which are acces- 
sible to art alone. 

Herhart, in opposition to the theory which regards 
the ideal content of that which is represented as the 
source of aesthetic satisfaction, thinks that the nature 
of beauty consists only in certain forms and relations. 
This species of aesthetics, as the science of form, has 
been worked out by the Herbartian, Robert Zimmer- 
man, to whom we are also indebted for the first history 
of aesthetics. 

The theories which Vv^e have thus far considered 
have all followed the speculative method. But G. Th. 
Fechner, in his Preliminary Studies in Aesthetics, 
which appeared in 1876, introduced an entirely new 
method of treatment. For the older method which 
proceeds deductively from general principles, he would 
substitute induction from observed facts, and thus 
ascertain the laws of aesthetic pleasure empirically 



THE SCHOOLS OF AESTHETICS 205 

and by purely experimental methods. Fechne/s ex- 
tensive experiments, and his penetrating psychological 
analyses have resulted in many valuable discoveries 
besides greatly stimulating the spirit of exact inquiry. 
Fechner's distinction between the direct and the as- 
sociative factors in aesthetic judgment, is an exceed- 
ingly valuable discovery. Certain sense-impressions, 
such as simple saturated color effects, or color com- 
binations, sounds or tones, as well as certain forms 
and figures excite a direct or elementary pleasure. 
On the other hand, the larger paintings, statuary, 
and especially poetry, are aesthetically effective only 
indirectly as they excite ideas and feelings by 
association. 

Investigation into the laws of artistic creation and of 
aesthetic taste are still being assiduously pushed for- 
ward by means of experiment and analysis in the spirit 
of Fechner. 

Oswald Kuelpe read a brilliant and very instructive 
paper at the Psychological Congress held in Wiirzburg 
(1905), on the results and problems of experimental 
aesthetics, which has been published in the report of 
this Congress. The analysis of aesthetic taste has been 
materially advanced during recent years, particularly by 
Theodore Lipps, Konrad Lange, Johannes Volkelt, and 
Hugo Spitzer. By instituting a magazine devoted to 
aesthetics Max Dessoir has established a central organ 
which contains many valuable contributions. Among 
the new viewpoints which are particularly suggestive 



2q6 an introduction TO PHILOSOPHY 

we note the concept of "fellow-feeling"^ (Einfuhlung) 
introduced by Lipps, and of ''conscious self-illusion'^ 
introduced by Konrad Lange. Lipps starts with the 
presupposition that every aesthetic object represents a 
living being, and calls the psychic state, which we expe- 
rience when we project ourselves into the life of 
such an object, a ''fellow-feeling." (Einfiihlung) . Lipps 
discovers fellow-feeling (Einfiihlung) even in the con- 
ception of simple geometrical ornaments as well as in 
the contemplation of nature. He has applied this prin- 
ciple consistently and most suggestively to all the arts. 
Konrad Lange, on the other hand, finds the chief 
characteristic of aesthetic taste in the fact that we expe- 
rience a conscious self-illusion in the contemplation of 
works of art. We never forget that we have only a 
copy, and not the real object, before our eyes. Every 
work of art possesses two contrary elements, namely, 
one that enforces the illusion and one that corrects it, 
and aesthetic taste consists in this oscillation between 
phantom (Schein) and reality (Wirklichkeit) . It is 
impossible, in the constant oscillation of the feelings, to 
distinguish accurately between real observation and 
mere fancy. We shall now endeavor to give a brief 
sketch of the various tendencies and ideals of modern 
aesthetics. 

^ The concept Einfuhlung, here translated "fellow-feeling" is to 
express the complex process of individualizing an object and 
being absorbed in it, the act of reading a meaning into other 
beings and our consequent feeling of fellowship with them. 
Trans. 



THE SCHOOLS OF AESTHETICS 207 

Speculative aesthetics has not yet been superseded 
with anything hke the completeness with which this has 
taken place in the case of speculative psychology (see 
above p. 25 and p. 35), but in this discipline likewise the 
matter of absorbing interest is the experimental method 
of treatment. The subdivisions of Empirical Aesthetics 
are normative or technical and descriptive or analytical. 

Normative aesthetics establishes rules for the artist 
and standards for the critic. The artist's rules mostly 
appertain to the technical aspects of art and they are 
commonly known under the specific term ''technique/' 
These vary in the different arts both in respect to form 
and significance. 

Practical efficiency in the constructive arts, such as 
architecture, painting, and sculpture, requires a liberal 
preparation in the way of technical and scientific train- 
ing. The principles must be mastered before the con- 
structive task can be undertaken. The difficulties of 
technique frequently cause technical accuracy to be mis- 
taken for artistic finish. It is to be observed, therefore, 
that whilst technique is of vast importance it is at the 
same time very easily over-estimated. 

The technics of music likewise require thorough 
study which is at the same time exceedingly difficult. 
But here there is far more emphasis placed upon the 
specifically artistic, and the distinction between technical 
accuracy and musical merit is thus more strictly 
observed. 

Finally, in poetry technics is a matter of wholly sub- 



2o8 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

ordinate consideration. Language, the instrument of 
this art, is used by every one aHke. And, at least for 
drama, there is an advantage in being somewhat famiUar 
with the requirements of the stage. Clever technics 
alone are, however, no guarantee of dramatic success; 
although it cannot be denied that it is possible to com- 
pose acceptable drama with but little stage ability. 

We note therefore that technical aesthetics is of minor 
importance in poetry, but highly important in the plastic 
arts and in music. But, no matter what its practical 
importance may be, it never penetrates to the central 
principle of aesthetic problems. It deals with the 
external expressions rather than the motive principles 
of artistic production. 

Descriptive or analytic aesthetics, on the other hand, 
tries to explore this principle as far as it possibly can. 
It seeks to discover the conditions which inspire artistic 
productions on the one hand, and on the other hand it 
aims to explain how the finished product affects society. 
Its field of investigation includes the mind of the artist, 
the stage of culture, and the peculiar tastes of the period. 
Aesthetics thus largely resolves itself into psychology 
and history. As a matter of fact we even find that a 
combination of the psychological and historical methods 
are the most effective means of acquiring a satisfactory 
understanding of any piece of art. 

In addition to these distinctions which are based upon 
the methods and aims of aesthetics, there are certain 
tendencies in evidence among recent writers in which 



THE SCHOOLS OF AESTHETICS 209 

the theory of the specific sphere of art forms the divid- 
ing line. We refer to Idealism and its antithesis, Real- 
ism or Naturalism. 

According to aesthetic idealism the end and purpose 
of all art is to Hft mankind to higher spheres of ''purer 
reality" and to unfold the profounder depths of man's 
nature by the portrayal of the things which are thrilling 
in human experience; to the end that we shall feel up- 
lifted, purified, and at the same time revived for the 
common duties of life. This theory therefore demands 
the elimination of everything which is unchaste, vulgar, 
or even commonplace from artistic representation. 

Naturalism on the contrary contends that art should 
exhibit the world as it is ; that only the most accurate 
and painstaking consistency of representation is worthy 
of the artist. Even though there is much that is hid- 
eous and repulsive, it is by these very things that the 
artist will produce the most profound and effective 
results. Naturalism has not only produced creditable 
works of art, but it has likewise defended its theory 
with much energy and skill. 

Several new tendencies have arisen in recent years 
which strive towards a kind of synthesis of naturalism 
and idealism. But these efforts have not as yet met 
with much success. Symbolism in painting and in 
poetry tries to do more than merely portray what is 
objectively given. It aims to incorporate an element 
of mystery in its forms and words, which as a general 
thing is comprehensible only within the circle of the 
14 



210 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

initiated. Impressionism tries to reproduce the momen- 
tary impression of the artist with the greatest possible 
purity and completeness, which, however, frequently 
results in confusion and ambiguity. It may be said in 
a general way that there is a kind of Neo-romanticism 
manifesting itself in art which aims to mould and to 
deepen life through the instrumentality of art. 

In our opinion it will be impossible to determine the 
merits of the respective tendencies with any degree of 
scientific precision, without first placing aesthetics upon 
a genetic and biological basis, thus endeavoring to 
interpret beauty and art in their respective origins and 
in their significance for the preservation of life. We 
shall now undertake to sketch an outline of such a 
system of aesthetics. 

37. Genetic and Biological Aesthetics 

We have learned from Kant that the aesthetic judg- 
ment does not consist in referring "the idea to the 
object by an act of the understanding," but *'to the 
subject and the feeling of pleasure and pain." The 
judgment of taste, according to him, is not a cognitive 
judgment. It does not describe any quality of the object; 
but in it the subject experiences its own reaction upon 
the idea. 

The pleasure derived from the contemplation of the 
beautiful is, however, according to Kant, to be distin- 
guished from our enjoyment of the agreeable and from 
our delight in goodness. The agreeable, as well as the 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 211 

morally good, is Influenced by the faculty of desire, 
whilst the approval of the beautiful is a "disinterested" 
satisfaction, or a pure feeling, so to speak. Kant's 
investigations have transformed, in fact subjectivized 
aesthetics. It would seem that he has conclusively 
proved that the central problem of aesthetics must for- 
ever remain the effort to penetrate as far as possible 
into the nature of the aesthetic taste. 

Schiller's allusion to the analogy of play for the 
explanation of the nature of aesthetic taste, as pre- 
viously noted, marks an important step in advance. In 
Schiller's view, play is the activity of excess energies, 
i.e., such as are not absorbed in procuring the necessa- 
ries of life. Herbert Spencer interprets play similarly, 
whilst Lazarus, who is thinking more particularly of the 
sports of adults, explains play by referring it to our 
need of recreation. On the other hand, Karl Groos, 
who has made a thorough study of the games of young 
animals and of children, regards play as preparatory 
training for the serious duties of life. 

If we remember that in play the enjoyment comes 
from the activity itself, and not from any ulterior pur- 
pose to be accomplished by the act, we will be in posi- 
tion to harmonize these interpretations of play and apply 
them to the explanation of aesthetics. Whenever we 
undertake any serious pursuit we are conscious of a 
purpose to be served, a task to be performed. The 
idea of this purpose stimulates our efforts. The aim, 
constantly borne in mind, furnishes the impulse by 



212 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

which we surmount difficulties, the fortitude by which 
we endure inconveniences, such as naturally attend 
every undertaking. It is different, however, with play. 
Here pleasure results from the mere fact of keeping 
our aptitudes agreeably occupied. This delight in play, 
which proceeds from the exercise of physical and 
psychical energies, is only a special case of a general 
biologico-psychological law which has hitherto received 
but very little attention. 

There is a sense in which all the organs and functions 
which have been developed in man's whole psycho- 
physical organism during the process of evolution 
possess a natural tendency towards activity. This 
activity, objectively considered, is a demand, i.e., a con- 
dition of the preservation and growth of the human 
organism itself. It is a demand for the simple reason 
that organs and functions which find no occasion for 
exercise are in danger of atrophy. Members of the 
body which are not exercised for a long time become 
stiff, and, in case the inhibition of their functions is 
prolonged, they may even become permanently useless. 
Children, who become deaf during their third or fourth 
year, as a rule also lose their power of speech, because 
this function is no longer stimulated by the audible 
speech of others. This demand for the exercise of the 
various functions is soon reflected in consciousness, just 
as in the case of the other demands of the organism. 
This gives rise to a series of subjectively experienced 
longings which we shall call functional demands. As 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 213 

a matter of fact, it is true of every function that pro- 
longed inhibition is associated with pain, vigorous exer- 
cise with pleasure. The pleasure derived from play 
therefore is nothing more than the enjoyment resulting 
from the satisfaction of functional demands. 

The same is likewise true of aesthetic enjoyment. 
We therefore regard aesthetic enjoyment as a species 
of functional gratification, i.e., as the pleasure resulting 
from the exercise of various psychic functions.^ It is 
due to this circumstance, as Kant so happily and perti- 
nently observed, that pleasure of this kind does not 
excite desire. It is due to the same circumstance that 
aesthetic enjoyment is so nearly akin to the play im- 
pulse. This natural relationship, however, must not be 
regarded as identity. The functional enjoyment expe- 
rienced in play, is indeed similar to aesthetic pleasure, 
but it is not the same. Aesthetic enjoyment, in its 
higher forms, is associated with a class of psychical 
functions which never become active to any appreciable 
degree in play. 

The characteristic feature of aesthetic functional 
enjoyment is the fact that it is produced by the con- 
templation of objects and processes. By contemplation 
we do not simply mean such attentive looking and lis- 
tening as we commonly experience upon visiting art 
galleries, concerts or theatrical performances, but even 
those peculiar psychic states which accompany the read- 
ing of poetry. Aesthetic enjoyment is therefore a dis- 
^The Frenchman, Dubos, has expressed himself similarly. 



214 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 



kind of functional delight which is brought about 
by contemplation. 

Even sense-perceptions, especially those of sight and 
of hearing, but occasionally those of touch as well, are 
frequently accompanied by elementary aesthetic feel- 
ings. We find that simple colors, and in a still higher 
degree combinations of colors and complicated effects 
of light and shade, as presented for example in the 
rainbow or the starlit heavens, produce in us a high 
degree of aesthetic satisfaction. The aesthetic feelings 
produced by geometrical ornaments and other forms 
are still richer and more varied. The exercise of the 
function of sight is, in these cases, exceptionally pleasur- 
able. We do not, however, seek the source of satis- 
faction in ourselves, but in the object which furnishes 
the occasion for this pleasurable exercise, and we call 
such an object beautiful. The source of such an 
aesthetic judgment, however, so far as it is made inde- 
pendently and is not the mere thoughtless concurrence 
in the verdict of others, is never anything more than 
the functional enjoyment actually experienced. The 
qualities of the object externally present are, without 
exception, only the mediate cause of the aesthetic judg- 
ment. This is clearly shown in the case of fading 
sensitivity. An object which appears beautiful to us 
when seen once or twice, becomes indifferent when 
constantly in our presence. The object has not changed, 
but our functional enjoyment has become less sensitive. 

Among audible perceptions we find, in the first place. 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 215 

that simple tones, but more especially, rythmically ar- 
ranged series of tones and noises, produce elementary 
aesthetic effects. The pleasure in melody and in 
musical symphony, on the other hand, springs from the 
gratification of higher and more complex functional 
demands. Rythmical tone-series frequently lead us to 
perform rythmical motions. In these cases it is quite 
evident that it is the functional pleasure that produces 
the aesthetic satisfaction. This becomes apparent 
similarly in the aesthetic effect of tactual perception, as 
has recently been observed in the deaf-blind.^ In their 
case pleasure follows the tactual sensation of such ob- 
jects as lead them to the performance of agreeable and 
rythmically arranged tactual movements. 

Elementary aesthetic feelings therefore arise when 
our sense-perceptions satisfy our sensory functional 
demand in an agreeable manner and with a sufficient 
intensity. 

Aesthetic enjoyment, however, becomes incomparably 
more varied and rich, when the objects affecting us not 
only engage our senses agreeably, but our ideas and 
thoughts as well. A painting or piece of sculpture, 
yields us far greater and more enduring pleasure in 
proportion as we are able to understand and interpret 
its forms. The higher the degree to which the objects 
and events represented excite the activity of our mem- 
ory and imagination, the more they furnish food for 
thought, so much the more intense, so much the richer 

^Cf. p. 33. 



2i6 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

will be the aesthetic enjoyment, and so much the less 
easily will it relapse into indifference. We experience 
this aesthetic gratification of the functional demands of 
our intellect most unmistakably in the art of poetry. 
The words of the poet, as mere sense perceptions, are 
quite meaningless; they are effective only by means of 
the ideas, thoughts and feelings which they inspire 
within us. The so-called transparency of many a poem 
is certainly not brought about by the senses, but by the 
imagination. Grillparzer has strikingly remarked (XV. 
43 ed. Sauer'schen Ausgahe), that in poetry objectivity 
does not come from without, but that it really issues 
from within. Whenever we succeed in entering easily 
into the poet's thought, understand his meaning, and 
have our imagination quickened by his imagery, that 
alone is already sufficient to produce in us a high degree 
of aesthetic enjoyment. 

"Es lockt uns nach und nach, wir horen zu, 
Wir horen und wir glauben zu verstehn. 
Was wir verstehn, das konnen wir nicht tadeln 
Und so gewinnt uns dieses Lied zuletzt." 

The philosophical lyrics of Schiller, difficult passages 
in Goethe's Faust become aesthetically effective only 
after we have succeeded in grasping the poet's thought, 
reproducing it in our own minds and developing it to 
further conclusions. As long as this has not been at- 
tained, the functional demand of our intellect has been 
inhibited and the aesthetic effect is absent. We fre- 
quently experience a similar difficulty in studying the 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 217 

paintings of modern artists, when the maze of colors 
and figures prevents the discovery of the plan of the 
composition and the unraveling of the meaning of the 
whole. Such works of art frequently give a high degree 
of satisfaction to our sensuous functional demands, but 
the correlated inhibition of the functional pleasure of 
the intellect prevents the production of any lasting 
aesthetic effect. 

On the other hand, the sight of extensive manufac- 
turing establishments, machinery, ingenious inventions 
and other contrivances of technical skill, is prone to 
produce a high degree of aesthetic effect. This has 
been strikingly set forth by Josef Popper, The splendid 
achievements of mathematics likewise furnish aesthetic 
enjoyment, as Sophie Germain^ the French mathema- 
tician has very beautifully described it. In both these 
cases the aesthetic effect springs solely from the func- 
tional pleasure of the intellect. This functional pleasure 
of intellect forms the content of those psychical expe- 
riences which in ordinary life we are accustomed to 
describe by the term theoretical interest. Whatever 
occupies our intellect agreeably interests us, i.e., we 
find it interesting. 

But in recent years it is just this word "interesting" 
that we hear used so frequently in the case of aesthetic 
judgments. As a matter of fact we are even accus- 
tomed to make a distinction between the "beautiful" and 
the "interesting." The concept of aesthetic merit has 

^Cf, Jerusalem. Gedanken und Denker. 94 ff. 



2i8 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

become broader. It no longer merely comprehends the 
beautiful in the narrower sense, but the interesting as 
well, i.e., whatever furnishes the intellect functional 
pleasure. 

The functional pleasure of the senses and the intellect 
which we have thus far discussed has, however, only- 
acquainted us with the beginnings of aesthetic enjoy- 
ment, the approaches to the problem, so to speak. If 
we would discover the real secret of the exultation pro- 
duced by the beautiful in art and nature we must 
remember that emotion is likewise a fundamental func- 
tion of consciousness which craves exercise. Our 
organism really demands emotional excitement, and the 
satisfaction of this demand is frequently a pleasure of 
the most intense kind. Adapting the English term 
''emotion," the equivalent of "feeling," let us call this 
demand the functional demand of emotion. The 
peasant, who ploddingly follows the plow throughout 
the week, looks forward to a tilt with his comrades, at the 
end of the week. This quickens the circulation of his 
blood and he finds the excitement associated therewith 
quite beneficial. The demand of the Roman populace 
upon the emperors for bread and gladiatorial contests 
(panem et circenses) is famiHar to all ; bread to appease 
their hunger, contests to satisfy the functional demand 
of emotion. The profoundly analytic fable of Hans, 
who wished to be taught how to tremble with fear, 
clearly shows to what extent even pre-scientific 
psychology recognized the actual existence of this 
demand. 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 219 

Owing to the central character of all emotion, the 
functional pleasure of emotion penetrates psychic life 
much more profoundly than that of the senses and the 
intellect. In the case of the emotions the excitement is 
much more widely diffused, it penetrates much deeper 
and, as a consequence, it frequently produces effects 
which shock, and not infrequently permanently change, 
the entire organism. It is in this aspect of conscious- 
ness that we find the source of those psychical disposi- 
tions generally called "the passions," which at times 
operate with destructive violence, and again become the 
motive force of true greatness. 

We describe whatever discharges the functional en- 
joyment of the senses as agreeable or pleasant; what- 
ever engages the understanding agreeably, we call 
interesting. But language has developed the terms, 
fascination, fascinating, and charming, to express the 
processes and activities which are attended by the func- 
tional pleasure of emotion. Games of chance at high 
stakes, perilous mountain climbing, and such like, have 
a .peculiar fascination for many men. This is due to 
the excitement to which they give rise, and the func- 
tional pleasure of emotion to which it leads. 

This functional pleasure is therefore the source of the 
richest and most intense aesthetic enjoyment. We 
shall, first of all, endeavor to illustrate this by an 
example, using Schiller's well known poem, "The 
Diver." The thrilling recital of the story excites our 
imagination and furnishes food for thought. The 



220 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

functional pleasure of intellect is thus quickened. The 
poem produces an aesthetic effect even by this fact 
alone. But the profounder and more intense effect only 
begins after the fortunes of the daring youth arouse 
our sympathy ; when we plunge with him into the whirl- 
pool, experience with him all his terrors, aijd share his 
joys, as he successfully returns to the surface again. 
We listen to his story about the monsters of the deep 
with ever increasing interest, become indignant at the 
cruel sport of the king who forces him to repeat the 
performance; our sympathy with the king's daughter 
and her budding affection waxes warm, our agitation 
reaches its climax as we read the closing line: "The 
waves bring back the youth no more!" The torrent of 
emotions to which we may surrender ourselves without 
restraint and without regard to the reality of our environ- 
ment, the experience of such purely human emotions 
which could rarely be realized In ordinary life; all these 
combine to produce a wide variety of functional pleasure 
of great intensity, and it is just this kind of functional 
pleasure of emotion that constitutes real aesthetic enjoy- 
ment. 

The destinies of Antigone, Hamlet, Macbeth, Othello, 
King Lear, Maria Stuart, Wallenstein, Faust and 
Gretchen, and many other characters, familiar to us in 
the dramas of the world's literature, are to even a higher 
degree calculated to discharge intense emotions. At the 
theater the functional pleasures af sense perception and 
of intellect cooperate with those of emotion, modifying 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 221 

and intensifying the whole, though at times, perhaps 
spoiling the effect. But the essential element after all 
is always to be found in our personal sympathy with the 
characters, the functional pleasure of emotion, which is 
produced in us by an intelligent appreciation of the 
artist's product. 

Paintings and sculpture likewise tend to awaken the 
functional pleasure of emotion in the beholder, provided 
he succeeds in correctly interpreting the facial expres- 
sion, the bodily attitude, the grouping of the figures, and 
a fellow-feeling (Einfuhlung) with the artistic compo- 
sition. Whatever facilitates a comprehension of the 
meaning underlying the representation greatly facilitates 
the fellow-feeling (Einfuhlung), whilst severely compli- 
cated motives, remote from the range of our ideas, fail 
to produce the functional pleasure of emotion. 

It is universally conceded that, among the various arts, 
music produces the most intense emotional effect. This 
is due to the circumstance that in the case of music, our 
emotions are affected directly by the sensuous percep- 
tions of tones, without any intermediation on the part of 
the intellect. The really musical effect will, therefore, 
be produced with greater purity and effectiveness by the 
so-called "absolute" music, without text accompaniment. 
Individuals, however, whose inclination and talent for 
music is less marked will be more readily and deeply 
affected by songs, the words of which are familiar to the 
understanding. In the musical drama of our own day, 
as developed by the genius of Richard Wagner, all three 



222 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

of these species of functional pleasure, the sensuous, the 
intellectual, and the emotional are effectually stimulated. 
The consequent aesthetic satisfaction is therefore pecu- 
liarly intense and lasting. To be sure it not infrequently 
occurs, in the case of these compositions, that the sen- 
suous interpretation of the tone sequences is not imme- 
diately successful; or perhaps, that the text, which is 
frequently difficult, is not promptly understood. This 
inhibits the sensuous and the intellectual functions and 
thus prevents the development of the functional pleasure 
of emotion. But if we overcome the difficulties of inter- 
pretation by repeated attendance upon the performances, 
the total impression becomes proportionately stronger, 
and, owing to the well-nigh inexhaustible wealth of 
motives presented, it is not apt ever again to relapse into 
indifference. 

It is evident therefore that aesthetic satisfaction of 
every description is a species of functional pleasure, and, 
as such, is closely related to play. The effect of aesthetic 
functional pleasure, however, is quite different and more 
profound than play. We are in the presence of a work 
of art, or some natural scenery, which has given rise to 
aesthetic functional pleasure. The object really exists, 
we perceive it with our senses, we recognize in it the 
source of our joy, we attribute our sense of pleasure and 
exaltation to it. Then, by virtue of fundamental apper- 
ception, we discover that our joy is the effect, the poten- 
tial expression produced by the object before us. In this 
manner aesthetic judgments are the outgrowth of func- 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 223 

tional pleasure. It is not necessary to assume a specific 
psychic faculty, a ''faculty of aesthetic judgment," as 
Kant does, for the explanation of these judgments. 
Fundamental apperception is amply sufficient to explain 
the origin of such judgments. In aesthetic satisfaction 
we feel agreeably moved, interestedly engaged, deeply 
agitated; in brief, our state of mind is equally remote 
from desire and volition; it is a purely affective state. 
Hence it is but natural that we should locate the source 
of our pleasure outside ourselves rather than within, 
and there is exactly where we find it, namely, in the 
artistic production which affects us. We therefore 
describe the object, which discharges our aesthetic func- 
tional pleasure, as noted previously, in accordance with 
the kind of functional pleasure which it produces, as 
agreeable, pleasant, interesting, fascinating or charming. 
The most general predicate, however, which we attribute 
to objects which affect us aesthetically, is that of beauty. 
We call everything beautiful, in the broadest sense, which 
tends to discharge aesthetic functional pleasure. 

It follows, as a matter of course, from this theory of 
aesthetic pleasure that aesthetic judgments must neces- 
sarily be widely diverse. The attitudes towards the 
various species of functional pleasure show a wide variety 
in the evolutionary processes among different individuals. 
We can readily understand, therefore, why one and the 
same object should not be adapted to produce the same 
kind and the same degree of functional pleasure in all 
spectators alike. Even the same human being is not at 



224 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

all times equally receptive to aesthetic impressions, just 
because his functional demands do not remain constantly 
the same. There are works of art, nevertheless, which 
have been characterized as beautiful for hundreds, even 
thousands of years and by people of widely diversi- 
fied characters. Sophocles' King Oedipus, which pro- 
duced profound aesthetic effects when rendered in the 
original in Athens and other Greek cities twenty-three 
centuries ago, is to-day played upon the modern stage in 
translation, in the presence of audiences whose state of 
culture must certainly differ widely from that of the 
original Athenian audiences. And yet this performance, 
even now, profoundly stirs thousands of its spectators. 
This fact would seem to justify the conclusion, that the 
drama possesses objective properties which are capable 
of producing profound aesthetic functional pleasure. 
The same is true of much ancient Grecian architecture 
and sculpture, as well as of many paintings produced by 
the old Italian and Dutch schools. We are justified in 
ascribing objective beauty to these productions of art 
because it is understood that we mean those properties 
which tend to discharge functional pleasure in a multi- 
tude of individuals. The discovery of these conditions 
must certainly present a tempting field of scientific 
inquiry, and one which is by no means unpromising. 
Objective beauty, however, is by no means identical with 
absolute beauty. The latter is, in view of the thoroughly 
relative character of the concept of beauty, a wholly 
meaningless term. 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 225 

The term beauty, however, in addition to its broader 
significance discussed above, possesses still another, nar- 
rower meaning. Whenever we call an object beautiful, 
and do so with complete conviction, I am tempted to say, 
whole-heartedly, we do not merely mean that it meets 
with our approval. We experience a sense of gratitude 
towards the object which we call beautiful in this nar- 
rower sense, for the satisfaction which it affords us; a 
kind of affection, which, whenever it attains a high 
degree of intensity, we might even call love. Every one 
of us, no doubt, affectionately treasures in his heart a 
number of forms, creations of certain artists, which he 
dearly cherishes. We esteem them among our most 
precious possessions, and we are disposed to zealously 
guard and defend them against derisive criticism. The 
artist who understands how to inspire such love for his 
creations has attained the height of aesthetic effect. We 
thus discover a new element in functional pleasure, the 
very element by which aesthetic enjoyment is most 
clearly distinguished from play. 

The intimate relation of love and beauty has long been 
recognized and frequently discussed. The usual inter- 
pretation of their relation regards (objectively existent) 
beauty as the cause, and love as the effect. But more 
exact investigation reveals the fact that this interpreta- 
tion does not entirely accord with the facts. The beauty 
of woman, no doubt, exerts a peculiar charm which may 
inspire love. It is certain also that in antiquity the 
beauty of boys frequently excited love in men. But the 



226 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

reverse can likewise be the case. Men and things, by 
means of which we find our condition improved, and 
which awaken within us a feehng of affection and love, 
become increasingly beautiful in our eyes by virtue of 
these emotions. Beauty is not only the cause, it is perhaps 
more frequently the effect of love. Beauty radiates from 
the inmost depths of our soul upon the objects of our affec- 
tion and continually surrounds them with new charms. 

Any one who will give attention to the facts can verify 
the beautifying power of love from his own experience. 
The mother regards the child which she loves as beauti- 
ful, even though it appears very ill-favored to others. The 
awkward style of a book, which for some reason or 
other has become a favorite with us, frequently acquires 
a peculiar charm. Schopenhauer's enthusiasm for the 
Latin translation of the Upanishads, made from a Per- 
sian version by Anquetil dii Perron, and absolutely devoid 
of literary taste, is a remarkable example of this beauti- 
fying power of love. The development of our appre- 
ciation of nature, however, furnishes the clearest proof 
of the correctness of our contention. In antiquity it was 
the loveliness of the summer landscape, offering pleas- 
antly shaded walks and resting places in the meadows and 
on the banks of murmuring brooks, that excited admira- 
tion. Man learned to appreciate the sublime beauties of 
Alpine scenery only after he had become somewhat 
wearied of culture and gladly retreated to the solitude 
of the mountains. In brief, man found nature beautiful 
only after he had learned to love her. 



GENETIC ANiD BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 227 

Whenever a work of art excites functional pleasure of 
sufBcient variety and intensity to move our heart to 
cherish its forms, it is clothed with a new and peculiar 
beauty. A beauty that is filled with life irradiates from 
this love and is reflected back again upon the artistic 
creation itself. It is this beauty, which is born of love, 
that we call the true, and veritable beauty which fills the 
heart with gladness. The works of art, which we call 
beautiful in this sense remain with us throughout our 
whole life. They enrich our very soul. They increase 
our happiness. Such creations of art penetrate into the 
inmost depth of our personality, and there is no better 
index to a man's character than the works of art which, 
in this narrower sense, he regards beautiful. 

By way of brief and general definition we may there- 
fore say that aesthetic pleasure is functional enjoyment 
produced by contemplation. Each one of the three 
species which we have discussed is capable of yielding 
aesthetic enjoyment independently. But the gratifica- 
tion becomes richer and more varied, as well as rnore 
intense and thrilling when the functional pleasures of the 
senses, intellect and emotions are combined. Their com- 
binations vary for the different arts. Sculpture and 
painting, first of all, affect the senses and excite our feel- 
ings through the understanding. Poetry begins with the 
functional delight of the intellect and inspires the emo- 
tions through the agency of the intellect. Whereupon 
the emotions excite the imagination to the production of 
intuitional imagery, as Grillparzer has described it in the 



228 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

passage quoted above (p. 216). In the case of music the 
functional dehght of the senses passes over, perhaps with 
the assistance of kinesthetic (movement) sensations, 
immediately into pronounced emotional effects. This 
emotional effect, or the functional delight of emotion, 
always forms the central principle of aesthetic gratifica- 
tion. Whenever the functional delight of emotion does 
not arise, the aesthetic gratification remains more or less 
superficial. It lacks the warmth of life. But whenever 
the functional delight of emotion is produced, the emo- 
tion of love described above may follow in its train, from 
which a new beauty, throbbing with life, is reflected back 
upon the artist's production. 

Aesthetic functional delight therefore differs from 
other species of functional pleasure, e.g., from play, by 
the mere fact that it is capable of producing effects which 
penetrate the deepest recesses of human nature. But 
there is still another important characteristic which dis- 
tinguishes aesthetic gratification from play. Aesthetic 
gratification, of every description, as we have seen, gives 
rise to aesthetic judgments. Those who have had the 
pleasant experiences form the judgments, in the firm 
conviction of their objective correctness. I regard what- 
ever pleases me as beautiful, i.e., I affirm, by my judg- 
ment, that the object which I am contemplating is the 
source, the potential center, whence I derive my gratifica- 
tion. Careful introspection and comparison with the 
experiences of other people, however, finally convinces 
us that the beauty of the object is constituted wholly by 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 229 

our subjective states of pleasure. But it would never- 
theless be an error if we should entirely eliminate the 
objective factor from aesthetic judgments. For, at all 
events, aesthetic functional delight always depends upon 
some objective stimulus. As we have seen there are 
works of art which have produced aesthetic functional 
delight in vast numbers of people and in different ages 
of the world. These productions must therefore possess 
certain properties, objectively definable, from which the 
aesthetic effects proceed. It is the duty of scientific 
aesthetics therefore to study not only the subjective but 
the objective conditions of aesthetic gratification as well. 
And the importance attaching to these objective proper- 
ties of the masterpieces of art becomes still greater 
through the fact that it is from them that creative artists 
learn by what means they may expect to produce 
aesthetic effects. 

This brings us to the second problem of aesthetics, 
namely, the discovery of the laws governing artistic crea- 
tion, and the reduction of these laws to practical rules 
and standards. Because of the fact that artistic genius 
presents such wide diversity as to make it impossible to 
establish more than a few general rules, we shall have to 
treat the questions under this head very briefly. The 
larger share of the problem here contemplated must be 
given over to the technics of the several arts. 

Creative art in general is the outgrowth of a native 
dramatic and constructive impulse which is peculiar to 
the artist. In so far as the pleasure of the artist lies in 



230 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the fact of creation itself, i.e., in the functional activity, 
this creation is likewise closely allied to play. But art 
soon passes beyond this stage. As soon as culture is 
developed to such an extent that many feel the need of 
aesthetic gratification, then the mere satisfaction result- 
ing from the exercise of the creative impulse, which is 
purely individual and exists for the artist alone, can no 
longer satisfy. His vocation is to please others and thus 
to increase the happiness of mankind. His activity 
thencefofth ceases to be mere play. It rather becomes 
serious social service, which has profound significance 
for the development of culture in general. 

"Der menschengeist in sonnigern Bezirken 
Will nicht nur tatig sein, er will bewirken." 

But productivity demands more from the artist than 
mere blind surrender to his creative impulse. He re- 
quires education. He is obliged to acquire the technics 
of his art which are the result of long experience and 
often exceedingly difficult. He feels obliged, and even 
compelled, to study the great masters in his department, 
in order to familiarize himself with the means which 
ordinarily succeed in exciting functional delight among 
the lovers of art. The public, for which his works are 
intended, likewise comes within the horizon of his 
thought. 

However, owing to the very fact that an acquaintance 
with the public for which the works were prepared is an 
important element in the understanding of the majority 
of artistic masterpieces, the artist's labor becomes a 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 231 

factor which belongs to the general history of culture. 
It is customary, therefore, at present, to interpret the 
masters of bygone ages through the spirit of the age 
in which they lived. A history of aesthetics has thus 
been developed, which has illuminated many problems, 
removed a number of misconceptions, and contributed 
much towards a more intimate acquaintance with artists 
and poets. Sometimes, of course, the appreciation for 
the universally human, for the permanent in art, is 
obscured by an excessive one-sidedness in maintaining 
the historical point of view. We mean by this that the 
artist does not produce merely for his own people and 
age alone. As Thucydides remarked concerning his 
history, so the truly great artist may claim for the crea- 
tions of his imagination, that they are a legacy bequeathed 
to eternity ( Kr^fia is del ) and not a mere act flitting 
across the stage (dywvia-fia e/c tov Trapax/o^/xa). 

An artist of this type does not simply excite an evanes- 
cent functional delight, he also understands how to 
awaken in our hearts an abiding love for the forms which 
he has created. And this love, as previously observed, 
irradiates a vital, emotional warmth and spiritual beauty 
which are reflected back again upon its object. It is the 
artist's highest ambition to beget this emotional response. 

At its beginning, therefore, artistic productivity is a 
kind of play, in the form of exercise of the creative im- 
pulse, and in the course of the evolution of culture it 
eventually becomes serious social service, which has for 
its object the increase of human happiness. In its high- 



232 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

est degree of perfection, however, artistic creation is a 
species of wooing. It is when we respond to the artist's 
wooing that his work appears beautiful to us in the truest 
and highest sense of the term. Homer woos for the sake 
of Achilles and Odysseus, Raphael on behalf of the divine 
Madonna, Shakespeare not alone for the philosophical 
Danish princes and the ill-fated King Lear, but even for 
Falstaff, that incarnation of meanness, whose splendid 
humor, however, brings him closer to our own hearts. 

Success in exciting our functional delight and in 
awakening our love, requires that the artist be imbued 
with that creative spirit which will enable him, as it were, 
to breathe into his forms the breath of life. It is the 
common ambition of all artists to portray living reality 
faithfully. But it is living reality among the men and 
things of our environment, that which is vital in the 
present day events as well as in the course of history that 
quickens life within us, and that leads us to correspond- 
ing reactions. The living reality is nothing more than 
that which is characteristic in things, that which makes 
them what they are and gives them their meaning, and 
that is what is typical about them. The idea of the 
typical, as I have shown in another place,^ has originated 
directly from the demands of life. That which is biolog- 
ically important in the nature of things forces us to con- 
centrate our attention upon itself, and in this manner 
that which is typical in a number of things of a similar 
nature is combined into a single idea. We recognize the 

^Lehrbuch der Psychologic. 4 Ed., p. 97 ff. 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 233 

type of each separate thing and regulate our actions 
accordingly. The artist, however, in a much higher 
degree than other men, must possess the ability to dis- 
cern and represent that which is typical in individuals. 
We always regard the creations of the artist as types, 
even though they produce in us the impression of real 
personages. The character of Gretchen, in Goethe's 
Faust, is brought out so conspicuously, with all her indi- 
viduality, that we could almost write her biography. She 
nevertheless represents the typical maiden in our mind, 
— one who is affectionately devoted to her lover, and 
finally forsaken. We strip King Lear of his royal robes 
and nothing remains but the father who values adulation 
more highly than Cordelia's, *Tove, and be silent." And 
it is just because every father has in him an element of 
resemblance to King Lear, that the Shakespearian drama 
never loses its effectiveness. 

The extent to which the typical constitutes the essence 
of artistic representation is most apparent in cases where 
the subject portrayed is an object which in reality exists 
but once, such as an historical character, a definite land- 
scape, or some individual taken from the environment of 
the artist. For even in the portrayal of individuality, if 
he would produce aesthetic effect, the artist must dis- 
cover the typical element, the characteristic, that which 
is really vital to that particular object, and bring it to 
full expression. 

The typical element, which is peculiar to every artis- 
tic production, associates art with the cognitive func- 



234 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

tion and with science, in a way which is quite unique. 
The typical idea, as we have seen in Section 2^, is the 
antecedent of the abstract concept in the course of the 
evolution of knowledge. Consequently, since art is 
naturally adapted to evoke typical ideas, which, together, 
with complete, lifelike perspicuity, at the same time also 
exhibit the character of representativeness and of uni- 
versality, it frequently happens that artistic construction 
assumes the task of promulgating scientific knowledge, 
ordinarily expressed by concepts, in graphic representa- 
tions. Thus art transforms the abstract concept of 
science into a visible image, surcharged with emotional 
warmth and actuality, which has frequently been de- 
scribed by the ambiguous term, "idea." The Platonic 
Ideas are nothing more than concepts which the artistic 
mind of that profound and ingenious thinker embodied 
in intuitive thought. This explains how Flaio could be- 
lieve in the independent existence of these artistic images 
of thought, and could ascribe to them the dignity of being 
the efficient prototypes of things.^ Hegel's theory that 
beauty is to be defined as ''the manifestation of the idea to 
the senses," (Werke, X. i, 141.), and again, that the beau- 
tiful, as the vehicle of the idea, is identical with the true, 
likewise becomes intelligible, if we simply recall the 
typical character of every artistic exhibition. It appears 
to me, however, that Schiller's method of comprehending 

*When Natorp, in his work concerning the Platonic doctrine 
of ideas, regards the idea as law, it appears to me that he 
ignores the aesthetic and artistic sub-soil of the Platonic doctrine. 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 235 

the relation of science and art as resting upon the typical 
ideas, is at once the most profound and the most lucid 
ever conceived ; and this, notwithstanding the fact that 
his suggestion that the sense of beauty marks the begin- 
ning of the cognitive impulse is untenable (see above, 
Section ^6). Artistic imagination frequently anticipates 
science, as if by divination, and thus prepares the way 
for further systematic investigation : 

"Eh' vor des Denkers Geist der kiihne 
Begriff des ew'gen Raumes stand, 
Wer sah hinauf zur Sternenbiihne 
Der ihn nicht ahnend schon empfand?" 

However, after science, pursuing her own course, has 
discovered the secrets of nature and explored the laws of 
nature's processes by means of laborious investigation 
and severe thinking, it again becomes the business of the 
artist to crown the achievements of science and give them 
their finishing touch. It devolves upon art by means of 
its images to put life into the dry formulas and lifeless 
concepts of science, in order that the masses of mankind 
may perceive abstract truth with concrete perspicuity, 
and thus be able to make it their real possession. 

"Was in des Wissens Land Entdecker nur ersiegen, 
Entdecken sie, ersiegen sie fiir euch. 
Der Schatze, die der Denker aufgehaiifet, 
Wird er in euern Armen erst sich f reun, 
Wenn seine Wissenschaft, der Schonheit zugereifet, 
Zum Kunstwerk wird geadelt sein." 

Art, however, has always maintained a still more inti- 
mate relation with religion. In Greek antiquity, no less 



236 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

than during the middle ages and in modern times, art has 
placed its love-inspiring power at the service of religion. 
The Zeus of Phidias, the Moses of Michael Angela, the 
many magnificent cathedrals, Raphael's Madonnas and 
Leonardo da Vinci's Last Supper, are the most sublime, 
as well as the most fervent appeals to affection on behalf 
of the ideals of religious faith. Art, however, by the 
very fact that it inspires pure, disinterested joy, lifts us 
above commonplace moods, and elevates our hearts to 
worshipful reverence and genuine piety. This explains 
why music plays such a prominent part in religious 
worship. 

The relation between aesthetics and ethics, or, to put 
it more accurately, between art and morality, on the other 
hand, although frequently discussed, is not quite so clear. 

When we speak of the refining influence of art, there 
is a certain degree of justification for it, as we shall 
presently see; but this by no means implies that art is 
obliged to portray virtue as beautiful, and vice as hideous. 
The artist aims to comprehend the principles of life and 
activity in nature and in human relations, and to portray 
them faithfully. It is when he succeeds in catching the 
really human spirit that his production becomes most 
truly interesting. The truly great artist can portray 
coarse physical strength, brutal passion, yea, even sordid 
selfishness, in such a manner that his descriptions quicken 
within us the most vivid functional delight. The poet 
never needs to concern himself about the judgment which 
popular opinion passes on his characters. Pedantic re- 



GENETIC AN(D BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 237 

gard for criticism is very apt to deprive his production 
of its artistic merit. Shakespeare's Richard the Third, 
and Falstaff even more so, furnish clear proof that 
aesthetic gratification is entirely independent of ethical 
value-judgments. Aristotle's misunderstood doctrine of 
tragic guilt, has far too long obscured the real source of 
pleasure in tragic subjects. Art can never exert its re- 
fining influence by preaching morality in any form 
whatsoever. 

Art and morality are nevertheless, most intimately 
related. Aesthetic gratification is pure, unselfish joy, 
unmixed with desire. The artist, by furnishing oppor- 
tunity for the experience of such unadulterated joy, 
temporarily wafts us away from the egoistic impulses of 
our common life and lifts us for awhile into sublimer 
spheres. So long as we are held by the artist's spell, the 
purely human holds complete mastery in our souls. The 
mean and contemptible finds no place in our hearts. We 
have grown to maturity, and discover ourselves on the 
way towards spiritual freedom. This liberating and 
purifying influence which characterizes all true art must 
gradually elevate those whom it reaches to higher levels. 
Frequent occasion to enjoy the masterpieces of art 
teaches us to scorn the pleasures which pander to the 
coarser instincts. The artistic education of youth, which 
is at present so strongly recommended, and justifiably so, 
is on this account of vast importance for the moral devel- 
opment of future generations. Furnishing youth with 
opportunities of enjoying the masterpieces not only intro- 



238 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

duces them to a rich fountain of unsullied happiness, but 
at the same time safeguards them against ruinous dissi- 
pations. Interest, unde quis gaiideat, is St. Augustine's 
striking way of putting it. It is by no means a matter 
of indifference from what source we derive our pleasures. 
Art, however, furnishes sources of joy. 

"Die seine Gier nicht in sein Leben reisst, 
Die im Genusse nicht verscheiden." 

The ennobling influence of art is therefore not brought 
about by moral exhortation, but rather by the fact that 
it purifies our pleasures and enlarges our sympathies for 
everything human. 

We have defined aesthetics as the philosophy of feel- 
ing (Section 35). But we find that the purest feelings 
proceed from functional activity, since they are without 
influence on the desires. It is therefore the business of 
the philosophy of feeling to describe the significance of 
pure feeling for the psychic life of the individual and for 
the culture of the race in general. It should, however, 
give due attention to the objects which are disposed to 
produce these pure feelings. Our genetic and biologic 
method of treatment has shown how aesthetic gratifica- 
tion, conceived as functional pleasure, has been evolved 
from functional demands. This functional pleasure 
eventually gives rise to a tender affection for the creations 
of the artist, a love which, in conjunction with functional 
delight, is the source of beauty. The aesthetic judg- 
ments produced by this feeling contain an objective as 
well as a subjective factor, the study of which forms an 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 239 

important element in the problem of aesthetics. The 
creative activity of the artist, in its essential character- 
istics, likewise becomes clearer by our method of treat- 
ment. We have thus exhibited the aims of aesthetic 
science. We have likewise indicated the methods by 
which we may hope, through earnest effort, to attain a 
philosophy of feeling, by which both the aesthetically 
percipient subject and the aesthetically suggestive object 
will be accorded their respective places and receive due 
recognition in the Universe — in a universe of which 
man is but an insignificant atom, but an atom in which 
there dwells a yearning to comprehend, to admire, and 
to love the whole of which he forms a part. 

LITERATURE 

Fr. Fischer, Aesthetik. 3 vols. 1846-58, (Hegelian in spirit; 

very rich in keen observations.) 
R. Zimmermann, Aesthetik. 2 vols., 1858 ff. (The first volume 

contains a history of Aesthetics ; the second a system of 

Aesthetics on an Herbartian basis.) 
G. Th. Fechner, Vorschule der Aesthetik. 2 Ed., 1897. 
/. Volkelt, Aesthetische Zeitfragen. 1894. 

Aesthetik des Tragischen. 1896, 2 Ed., 1906. 

System der Aesthetik. Vol. I, 1905. Vol. II, 1910. 
K. Groos, Der aesthetische Genuss. 1902. 

Die Spiele der Tiere. 1896, 2 Ed., 1907. Eng. Trans. 

Die Spiele der Menschen. 1899. Eng. Trans. 
H. V. Stein, Die Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik. 1886. 

Vorlesungen ueber Aesthetik. 1897. 
H. Cohen, Kant's Begriindung der Aesthetik. 1889. 
Jonas Cohn, Allgemeine Aesthetik, 1901. 
Th. Lipps, Aesthetik, Psychologic des Schonen und der Kunst. 

I Vol,; Grundlegung der Aesthetik, 1903. 



240 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

11 Vol.; Die aesthetische Betrachtung und die bildende 
Kunst, 1906. 

Benedetto Croce, Aesthetik als Wissenschaft des Ausdrucks, 1905. 
(Contains a noteworthy history of aesthetics.) 

Max Dessoir, Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, 1906. 

Konrad Lange, Das Wesen der Kunst. 2 Ed., 1907. 

W. Wundt, Volkerpsychologie. Vol. II, Part i. Mythus und 
Religion, 1905. (Contains a very thorough psychological 
analysis of imagination and an evolutional history of art.) 

Wilhelm Scherer, Poetik, 1888. (Incomplete, but rich in valu- 
able suggestions.) 

W, Dilthey, Die Einbildungskraft des Dichters. Bausteine fur 
eine Poetik, 1887. Published in Philosophische Aufsatze 
zum 50-jahrigen Doktor-jubilaum Eduard Zellers. 

A. V. Berger, Dramaturgische Vortrage, 1890. 

Zur Katharsisfrage in Th. Gomperz' Uebersetzung der Poetik 
des Aristotles, 1897. 

IM". Burckhard, Aesthetik und Socialwissenschaft, 1895. (This 
work combines art with evolutional theory and the life of 
love for others.) 

Josef Popper, Die technische Fortscritte nach ihrer aesthetischen 
und kulturellen Bedeutung, 1886, 

Otto Busch, Naturgeschichte der Kunst, 1877. (Evolutional.) 

Hugo Spitzer, Herm. Hettner's kunstphilosophische Anfange und 
Literaraesthetik, Untersuchungen zur Theorie und Geschichte 
der Aesthetik. Vol. I, 1903. (Contains an abundance of fine 
interpretations.) 

Th. A. Meyer, Das Stilgesetz der Poesie, 1901. (Contains strik- 
ing observations concerning non-intuitional ideas and their 
aesthetic effect.) 



SIXTH DIVISION 

ETHICS AND SOCIOLOGY 

38. The Subject-matter and the Problem 
OF Ethics 

The subject-matter of ethics or moral philosophy con- 
sists of human actions in so far as they are subject to 
moral judgment. The subject of moral judgment, how- 
ever, is not the objective deportment, but its inspiring 
motive, the attitude of will and the personal disposition 
which it reveals. It were quite correct therefore to 
define ethics as the philosophy of volition. 

The problem of ethics is composite. We must first of 
all ascertain the psychological laws according to which 
moral judgments upon the action of others as well as 
upon our own, i.e., the laws of approval or disapproval 
actually take place. The investigation into the origin 
and development of the moral judgment, such as we here 
have in mind, really furnishes the preliminary founda- 
tion for a scientific system of ethics. This problem is 
psychological on the one hand, and historical on the other. 
The attainment of a psychological foundation of ethical 
theory requires an accurate psychological analysis of all 
that transpires within us whenever we subject our own 
16 241 



242 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

actions as well as those of others to moral judgment. 
This inquiry must conform to the general aim and 
method of psychology as described in earlier sections. It 
must be pursued, not only analytically, but genetically 
and biologically as well. The origin of the moral judg- 
ment, and the moral sentiment which forms its basis, as 
well as the influences of these processes upon the pres- 
ervation of the individual and the race must be explained. 

Even the superficial observer cannot fail to be im- 
pressed by the fact that one and the same act is judged 
very differently at different periods and by different peo- 
ples. It frequently happens that the very thing which is 
highly esteemed and greatly admired in one period, is 
condemned in another. And it is likewise obvious that 
the differences of degree of moral disapproval are of vast 
significance. Scientific ethics is thus confronted by a 
task which is exceedingly difficult and tedious; namely, 
to trace the moral judgment through its evolution from 
the lowest stages of culture in order, if possible, to ascer- 
tain the laws of its development. 

When the previous edition of this book appeared there 
were only a very few preparatory works on the evolution 
of ethics in existence. This division of the subject has 
since then been placed upon a more secure foundation, 
by the elaborate treatise of Edzvard Westermarck : Origin 
and Development of Moral Ideas. The moral judgment, 
especially among primitive races, is described and illus- 
trated in this work by an extraordinary array of facts. 
He also endeavors to show the process by which these 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS 243 

judgments have been modified by the civiHzed races. 
This division of the work, however, still requires supple- 
mentary investigation. He has, however, laid the foun- 
dation for further investigations in this direction also. 

The next problem of ethics, which is generally regarded 
as the most important, can be approached with prospect 
of success, only after we possess sufficient material which 
has been collected and prepared by psychological and 
historical investigation. For, it must be remembered 
that ethics is also expected to formulate rules of human 
conduct. These rules are to become the governing prin- 
ciples of our actions, and they are to guide us in our deci- 
sions, especially in the frequent cases of a conflict of 
duties. But above all else, these norms are to be regula- 
tive in the education of youth. It is in this sphere that 
they can be most readily employed with salutary effect, 
and thus contribute to moral progress. This normative 
function of ethics was cultivated much earlier and with 
much greater industry than the theoretico-historical 
inquiry. 

Hence ethics, or moral philosophy, also called practical 
philosophy, is the philosophy of volition. Its task con- 
sists in investigating the laws of moral judgment and 
the formulation of norms for moral conduct. 

39. The Development of Ethics 

Speculation concerning the material universe is much 
older than the reflection upon the nature of man and his 
spiritual life. The development of ethics, therefore, like- 



244 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

wise came later than metaphysics. It is true indeed that 
moral exhortations and rules of life are found already 
in early poetry and in proverbial aphorisms, but these 
only reveal the beginnings of moral consciousness, and 
in no sense any systematic reflection on the subject. 

A number of ethical propositions, ascribed to the 
Atomist, Democritus, have been handed down to us ; but 
even these are either of doubtful authenticity, or lacking 
in unity and coherence. This much, however, is certain, 
namely, that there was much discussion of ethical prob- 
lems in the Athens of the fifth century B.C., and especially 
that an attitude of general skepticism towards the tradi- 
tional norms prevailed. 

Socrates (469-399), the founder of scientific ethics 
came from this circle of thinkers. As Cicero remarks, 
Socrates brought philosophy back from heaven to earth. 
He regarded reflection upon moral problems as the only 
inquiry worthy of philosophy. According to his doctrine 
the essence of morality consists in clear insight into the 
nature of the right. Whoever possesses the requisite 
insight necessarily conforms his actions accordingly; 
whoever acts otherwise has not yet attained to complete 
clearness of insight. This insight is acquired by logical 
investigation of the concepts of goodness, beauty, justice, 
piety, etc. The result of such investigation furnishes the 
philosopher with absolute certainty, which thus renders 
him wholly independent of the authority of tradition and 
of popular opinion. Socrates maintained this absolute 
independence unswervingly and for this cause suffered 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS 245 

a martyr's death. This gave his doctrine a tremendous 
impulse and its influence continues even to the present 
day. 

Antisthenes, 2l disciple of Socrates, and the founder of 
the so-called School of Cynics, whose most famous repre- 
sentative is Diogenes, regards freedom from want as the 
essence of moral independence. The Stoics, who sprang 
from the Cynics, on the other hand, seek after Socratic 
independence by means of rational control of the affec- 
tions. According to the theory of the Stoics, the Sage 
cheerfully acquiesces in the course of nature, because, in 
any event matters cannot be improved; and it is this 
cheerful acquiescence that distinguishes the wise man 
from the fool, for the fool vainly strives against nature 
and in this very striving loses his peace of mind. Stoic 
ethics had a profound influence upon Christianity and 
thus helped to perpetuate the eflicacy of Socratic thought 
even to our own times. 

Aristippus, another disciple of Socrates, on the other 
hand, discovers the secret of Socratic independence in 
that cheerful disposition of soul which refuses to be 
troubled either by passion or the vicissitudes of fortune. 
This doctrine as it was further developed by Epicurus, 
found numerous adherents in Graeco-Roman antiquity. 

Despite the great importance of knowledge for moral- 
ity, Socrates certainly exaggerated it. Aristotle recog- 
nized this one-sided exaggeration and insisted that 
strength of will and habit are likewise of vast importance 
for morality. He regards virtue as a volitional tendency 



246 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

which is acquired by habit. Aristotle, furthermore, gave 
expression to the very important principle, that happiness 
does not consist in the mere passive indulgence of pleas- 
ure, but in the rational activity of the soul. 

Plato, who is Socrates' most famous disciple, was the 
first to attempt a metaphysical foundation for ethics. 
The idea of the good, which Plato frequently identifies 
with Deity, is the ultimate purpose of all Being; and it 
is to the Good alone, at the same time, that Being owes 
its actual reality and meaning. Still more important, in 
Platonic ethics, is the principle that justice, the quintes- 
sence of all the virtues, attains its perfection in the state 
alone. His ideal of the state, outlined in harmony with 
this thought, emphasizes the social character of ethics 
and contains moral requirements which preserve their 
practical significance even to the present time. 

The presupposition, assumed as self-evident, that the 
end of morality is the happiness (Eudaemonia) of the 
individual is common to all the ethical doctrines of 
antiquity. Upon this basis, ethics is nothing more than 
a theory of values and its only problem is to discover the 
means of happiness. This theory is called Eudaemonism. 

Christianity, above all else, extended the influence of 
the fundamental principles of the Old Testament into 
wider circles. Thus Judaistic ethics rests upon two 
fundamental duties: namely, love towards God and love 
towards our fellowmen. Love towards God requires 
cheerful and unqualified obedience to the divine com- 
mands and unreserved surrender to His will. Love for 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS 247 

our fellowmen calls for justice, benevolence, kindness 
and active charity towards our neighbor and even to our 
enemy. Christianity places still greater emphasis upon 
the duty of love, and extends it so as to include all man- 
kind. All mankind are children of God, and therefore, 
brethren. By this extension of the duty of love to all 
men, Christianity breaks down the national barriers of 
Judaism and gives to the world that sublime idea which 
is still so far from being fully reahzed, namely, that of 
universal brotherhood, — the idea of a truly humane obli- 
gation of love comprehending all mankind. 

Christianity adds to this doctrine of universal brother- 
hood, the belief in a future life anticipated in the Orphic 
mysteries of the Greeks (after the sixth century b.c), 
of which the Judaism of the Old Testament contained 
but faint traces. The Christians of the first centuries 
regarded this life merely as a preparation for the true 
life after death ; when the soul, delivered from the dross 
of the flesh, shall dwell in the presence of God. The 
hope of a future life offered a welcome consolation to 
the multitudes of the poor and oppressed in the Roman 
Empire. The new doctrine spread with remarkable 
rapidity among these classes. According to Christ's own 
teaching, this doctrine bore no relation whatever to 
renunciation of the world and asceticism. True, He 
taught His disciples to pay slight regard to earthly goods, 
but He was far from regarding self-torture as especially 
meritorious. On the contrary His sermons are sur- 
charged with the joy of life in all its fulness and reality. 



248 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

The doctrine of universal human depravity came into 
prominence somewhat later. This gave rise to the 
attempt to subdue the flesh by fasting and self-castigation. 
Even if it accomplished nothing more, the hope of a 
future life greatly increased man's capacity of self- 
sacrifice ; and the importance which it attached to ascetic 
practices defined the duty of self-control much more 
clearly and emphatically. 

The doctrine of grace, however, had the opposite effect. 
This doctrine, originating during the first centuries, was 
systematically elaborated by St. Augustine (354-430). 
The power of the church, the sole dispenser of grace, 
increased enormously through the declaration of man's 
total inability to attain salvation by his own power. It 
appeared more important to the Christian to provide for 
the salvation of his soul through the observance of 
external ceremonies than through moral purification of 
heart. 

The independence of the moral consciousness eventu- 
ally asserted itself and finally prevailed. During the 
middle ages Abelard endeavored to develop a system of 
ethics independent of religious dogma. The Reformation 
finds the source of human happiness within the human 
heart and insists upon justification by faith. This faith 
is indeed likewise referred to the gifts of grace in later 
Protestantism. But the intellectual movement which 
made morality an inner principle of human nature, and, 
abandoning the attempt to discover the moral principle 
in external relations, striving rather to base it on human 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS 249 

reason independent of tradition, could no longer be 
restrained. 

During the modern period the largest contributions to 
our understanding of the nature and characteristics of 
morality have been made by the English through their 
thorough investigation of ethical problems. Locke, 
Hobbes and Shaftesbury, in the seventeenth century, and 
the Scotchmen, Hutcheson, Hume and Smith in the 
eighteenth, have rendered invaluable services in this line. 
They have greatly increased our knowledge of the psy- 
chology of moral judgment by a penetrating analysis, 
thoroughly examined the problem concerning the source 
of morality, emphasized the social character of morality, 
i.e., its relation to the common welfare, and most vigor- 
ously defended the independent validity of ethical norms, 
irrespective of religious dogmas. 

During the seventeenth century the followers of 
Descartes, in France, tried to produce a metaphysics of 
ethics. The most noteworthy of these attempts was 
that made by Malebranche. In the eighteenth century 
the philosophy of the enlightenment, on the contrary, 
with English thought, especially Locke, as their starting 
point, endeavored to establish the moral laws upon an 
empirical basis. Their method was to deduce the moral 
motives from egoistic impulses. This harmonized with 
the philosophy of materialism. 

Spinoza has given ethics a unique metaphysical basis. 
Man attains the highest degree of happiness and perfec- 
tion of soul through a love towards God which is founded 



250 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

on knowledge. Furthermore, since God and the uni~ 
verse are one and the same, according to Spinoza's 
pantheistic world-theory, this love of God means nothing 
more to him than unreserved surrender to the All, the 
intelligent subjection of the individual to universal law. 
The frequently quoted 19th proposition of the fifth book 
of Spinoza's ethics reads as follows : ''He who loves God, 
cannot expect that God should love him in return." 
Whilst this involves absolute self-abnegation on the one 
hand, it is at the same time the possession of the most 
profound spiritual joy, positive and thoroughly optimistic 
on the other. Spinoza's ethics as previously observed, 
exerted a profound influence upon Herder, Goethe, Schel- 
ling and Hegel. It is really a cosmological ethics, which, 
however, takes no account of the social factor, i.e., the 
creation of new ethical ideas through constant fellow- 
ship and association. 

Kant took a new departure. In his Critique of Prac- 
tical Reason (1788), he applied the same deductive 
method to the moral law which he had previously applied 
to the fundamental forms of the understanding and 
sensibility when investigating the theory of knowledge 
(v. ante p. 6y.). Kant maintains that the moral law is 
an innate principle of the soul which is valid independ- 
ently of all experience. He calls this moral law, which 
can only be of a general and formal nature, the categor- 
ical imperative. It enjoins us "to act as though the 
maxim of our action were destined by the force of our 
will to become a universal law of nature." On the other 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS 251 

hand, however, in a different formulation of his categor- 
ical imperative, Kant insisted with much emphasis and 
enthusiasm, that moral ends not only take account of 
humanity as a whole, but that each individual human 
being must likewise be regarded as an end in himself. 
"Act so as to treat humanity, in thyself or in any other, 
as an end always, and never as a means only." {Kant, 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, IV, 2yy der 
Hartenstein's edition). The principle which he thus 
introduced into ethics is of vast importance, and it has 
not been fully appreciated until recently. Our actions 
are free and moral only when our will is subordinated to 
this law. This subordination, however, should be a log- 
ical subsumption, so to speak, wholly free from all senti- 
mentality. Otherwise our action is dictated by inclina- 
tion and not from a sense of duty. 

Ever since Kant, this antithesis between inclination and 
duty has been the determining principle in moral judg- 
ment. In spite of his sharp severance of these two 
motives, a logical division which cannot be carried 
through either theoretically or practically, with such 
absolute rigidity as it implies, Kanfs ethics retains an 
element of sublime grandeur throughout. 

Fichte develops the idea of the absolute independence 
of ethical obligation, its complete freedom from tradi- 
tional authority resting solely upon the innate moral 
law, with a sublimity which surpasses even Kant. Fichte 
regards the individual conscience as the absolute and 
infallible judge of good and evil. Moral activity is the 



252 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

specific duty of every rational being. This duty consists 
in spontaneous self-deliverance and freedom from every- 
thing which is irrational. 

Contrary to these theories, which regard our own 
conscience as the foundation of morality, Hegel attributes 
moral conduct to the influence of objective mind. Sub- 
jective conscience may err in its estimation of good and 
evil. Morality is objectified in the family, in society and 
in the state. This objectified morality is a real power, 
enthroned above subjective conscience, and authorita- 
tively binding upon the individual. But even morality, 
as the phenomenal form of objective mind, is not by 
nature unchangeable and permanent. Each political 
organization has but a limited share in the objectivation 
of the idea of moral freedom. 

If we strip these Hegelian theories of their metaphys- 
ical vesture, we discover several very important, per- 
manent truths; namely, the super-individual ( — i.e., the 
social — ) character of ethical obligations, their authorita- 
tive objectivation in the state, and the theory of constant 
growth. Recent ethics has once more appropriated every 
one of these principles, without, however, always fully 
acknowledging its indebtedness to Hegel. 

The English philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, is the 
founder of so-called Utilitarianism, to the more careful 
consideration of which we shall return a little later. This 
theory starts from the idea of practical utility and con- 
stantly applies its principles to positive legislation. 

We shall pass over the psychological and metaphysical 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS 253 

solutions of the ethical problem, as presented in the works 
of Beneke, Herbart and Schopenhauer, and direct our 
attention to evolutionary ethics; i.e., the trend of thought 
which is characterized by the influence of the Darwinian 
theory of evolution. 

According to Spencer and Darwin, it is practically 
impossible to investigate any portion of mental life other- 
wise than in its historical evolution and in its biological 
consequences. Carneri was the first to apply this prin- 
ciple to the science of ethics, whilst Herbert Spencer 
thoroughly elaborated it in his Principles of Ethics. 
All recent systems of ethics are more or less evolutional, 
or they at least define their attitude to these principles. 
The fundamental rule of the evolutional principle is that 
moral action must be construed as a portion of actual life 
and be interpreted as a condition for the preservation of 
the individual and the race. 

Friedrich Nietzsche took pride in describing himself as 
an anti-moralist. This placed him under the suspicion 
of wishing to destroy moral philosophy and ethics en- 
tirely. He must, however, be regarded as an evolutionary 
moralist. Nietzsche opposes the exaggeration of self- 
abnegation and ascetism with a violence of language and 
power of thought that sweeps everything before it. The 
very pretense that such discipline is necessary in order 
to break the human spirit in order that it may become 
moral is paralyzing to positive moral energy. Nietzsche 
insists on a broader and higher development of mankind. 
To this end he would heighten the pleasure of living. 



254 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

and regards the inclinations, which are positive, spontan- 
eous and conducive to higher vitaHty, as alone valuable. 
If we make allowance for Nietzsche's rhetorically indi- 
vidualistic lack of consideration for others, we at once 
discover the sound principle contained in his ethical 
theories. Nietzsche has once more revived and enthu- 
siastically developed in greater detail, a doctrine which 
was first suggested by Spinoza and further elaborated by 
Schiller. He insists upon substituting an ethics of joy 
for the traditional ethics of sorrow ; an ethics of vigorous 
activity for the former ethics of enervating renunciation. 
We shall have occasion to make use of his theory in our 
own genetico-biological explanation of ethics later on. 

40. The Problem of the Freedom of the Will 

Inasmuch as every moral action proceeds from con- 
scious volition, the problem of the freedom, or the deter- 
mination, of the will is a preliminary ethical inquiry which 
cannot be avoided. 

Two solutions of this problem, which are diametrically 
opposed to each other, have been proposed. iVccording 
to the first solution, our will is free and renders its deci- 
sions entirely by its own power. We, i.e., our wills, 
make choice between the motives influencing the will, in 
entire independence of any external agency. The will 
is never governed nor determined by causes, but is itself 
the sole cause of our final choices. This theory is known 
as Indeterminism, 

The second theory, on the contrary, holds that our 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL 255 

volitions are simply links in the chain of events making 
up the total world process, and therefore subject to the 
law of causality like everything else. An incident, the 
causes of which are not fully contained in its antecedent 
processes, is absolutely unthinkable. The postulate of 
an uncaused incident contradicts all the principles of 
scientific investigation. Our volitions are the product 
of our organization, which is completely determined by 
heredity, training, tradition, and destiny. An absolute 
intelligence, capable of comprehending the total course 
of our development in all its details, would necessarily 
be in position to predict our decisions in each separate 
case, with the same precision and certainty as that with 
which our astronomers compute the occurrence of an 
eclipse. This school is known under the name of 
Determinism. 

Indeterminism is supported by an appeal to the psycho- 
logical fact that before every choice we have the distinct 
feeling of alternative possibilities; whilst after a choice 
has been made, we invariably feel that we might have 
acted dififerently. Indeterminism, furthermore, insists 
upon the ethical argument, namely, that we can be held 
morally accountable for our actions only in case they are 
the result of our own, unconstrained volition. 

Determinism appeals to the universality of the law of 
causation, the interdependence of our physical and 
psychical organization, and finally, to the uniformity of 
human actions, — a uniformity which has at least a certain 
degree of statistical evidence in its favor, whenever a 



256 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

sufficient number of individuals are taken into account. 

Determinism seemed to have so completely gained the 
ascendency during the course of the centuries that many 
psychologists and philosophers regarded the question as 
settled. The opinion seemed to prevail that every 
scientific thinker must necessarily be a determinist. But 
indeterminism has recently found enthusiastic exponents 
in William James, Heinrich Gomperz and Karl Joel. The 
metaphysical problem of the freedom of the will is, con- 
sequently, in full sway again. 

The difficulty of this problem, which has engaged the 
attention of the profoundest thinkers in the past, and still 
continues to do so, will be materially reduced by a more 
accurate definition of the term "Freedom." Freedom in 
the metaphysical sense, implies something which is "out- 
side the law of causality," whilst, in the psychological 
sense on the other hand, "freedom" signifies the absence 
"of the feeling of external or internal constraint." 

Volitional activity, in so far as it is the object of 
immediate experience and, consequently, like all other 
experience, subject to the law of causality, cannot be 
regarded as "free" in the metaphysical sense of the term. 
But it is all the more certain, on the other hand, that the 
attribute of freedom in the psychological sense does apply 
to our volitional acts. This will become still more 
apparent from the following consideration. 

What we call our "Ego," our personality, is, strictly 
speaking, nothing more than the actually existing com- 
plex of our psychical experiences. Every volitional act, 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL 257 

therefore, which results from this total complex is expe- 
rienced by us as the spontaneous choice of our own per- 
sonality. However, when an idea or an emotion attains 
sufficient power to inhibit the activity of the other psychic 
energies, then our action yields '*to an irresistible com- 
pulsion/' As a matter of fact, indeed, jurisprudence also 
makes the presumption of accountability in all cases 
where the agent has complete possession of his mental 
powers and is therefore in position to appreciate the 
scope and significance of his act. 

Freedom of choice increases in direct proportion to the 
richness of this complex which we call the Ego. The 
more varied the relations in which the idea of an action 
about to be executed may be seen to stand, the greater 
the number of forces contributing to our decision, the 
more will the decision itself create the impression of being 
an act of deliberate choice. The proposition, "Education 
confers liberty," therefore contains a profound psycho- 
logical truth. 

Every act, therefore, which proceeds from the total 
synthesis of our psychical experience, is our own individ- 
ual act. We feel it to be such and are likewise pre- 
pared, because of this feeling, to accept its consequences. 
Since we decide that the deed shall take place, we at the 
same time decide its consequences. This disposes of the 
matter then, at least so far as ethics is concerned. Every 
one is morally bound to assume the responsibility for 
whatever he has done while in complete possession of his 
mental powers, without regard to whether the will is 
17 



258 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

metaphysically free or determined. But whenever the 
mental powers fall below the normal standard, respon- 
sibility, both legal and moral, ceases. 

41. The Problems and Schools of Ethics 

The foremost question among the purely ethical prob- 
lems pertains to the origin of morality. Two different 
answers to this question have been offered. Nativism 
teaches that morality is an innate disposition of the 
human soul. Notwithstanding the fact that certain cus- 
toms meet with popular favor in one age and are frowned 
upon in another, all human beings do make distinctions 
between the morally good and evil. The ethics of Kant 
is a brilliant example of pure nativism. According to 
his theory, even the moral law is innate. Fichte's theory 
likewise belongs to this class. He regards the decisions 
of conscience as infallible. Empiricism, on the other 
hand, denies all innate principles and holds that moral 
consciousness is a product of evolution. The latter view 
is at present the more prevalent. 

The end of moral action, according to the ancient 
moralists, as previously observed, is the happiness of 
the individual. The guiding principle of this school 
is Eudaemonism. The English philosopher, Jeremy 
Bentham (1748-1832), on the contrary, developed a 
theory, widely accepted both in England and on the con- 
tinent, which regards the general benefit to the com- 
munity, or the greatest good to the greatest number, as 
the end of moral action. This school is known under 



PROBLEMS AND SCHOOLS OF ETHICS 259 

the name of Utilitarianism. There is still another school 
of moralists that regards morality as an end in itself, or 
that the goal of moral endeavor is the perfection of 
mankind, the realization of his destiny. Because of the 
fact that this school finds the end of moral effort in ideals 
rather than in existing realities it may be described as 
Ethical Idealism. Christian ethics, so far as it pertains 
to the realization of the Kingdom of God, is religious 
Idealism^ so far as it rests upon final awards in a future 
life, it is transcendental Eudaemonism. 

One class of thinkers derives the moral impulse from 
Egotism, whilst another finds it in a primary sense of 
sympathy, which enables us to share the pleasure and 
sorrows of our fellowmen. This school has been given 
the name of Altruism, a term which has been coined by 
A. Comte {alter — the other one). The moral principles 
of antiquity, for example, are egotistic as likewise those 
of the French Enlightenment (especially Helvetius). 
Adam Smith, on the other hand, endeavors to explain the 
moral feelings altruistically by referring them to sympa- 
thy, and Schopenhauer, still more strictly, by referring 
them to pity. Kant and Fichte are likewise strongly 
altrustic. Modern evolutionary ethics assumes an inter- 
mediate position, by showing that the altruistic feelings 
which are unquestionably primary at the same time 
involve the egoistic principle. 

There are two schools distinguishable also on the basis 
of the norms and sanctions of moral conduct. The one 
discovers the ground and authority of moral precepts 



26o AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

within our own nature (autonomous ethics), the other 
locates them in some external law (heteronomous ethics). 
Autonomous ethics regards the decision of reason or of 
conscience as sovereign. This school is still further sub- 
divided into reflective and emotional ethics, according as 
it considers the process of choice as preponderantly an 
act of cognition or of feeling. Socrates and Kant are 
both autonomists, but of the reflective type. Shaftes- 
bury, Adam Smith and Schopenhauer likewise belong to 
the autonomist school, but they are all emotionalists. 
Heteronomous ethics finds the basis of the moral law in 
an authority, which is separate from and independent of 
the individual. Such authority may be ascribed either 
to religion, or to the Church, or even to the state. This 
then permits of still another distinction, namely, between 
religious and political heteronomy. 

Besides these problems there still remains the question 
concerning the relation of morality to religion and to law; 
finally also concerning the relations of the individual to 
the family, to the community and to humanity as a 
whole. Our attitude to each of these problems and 
schools, just as we found it to be the case in the treatment 
of epistemology and aesthetics, will be considerably sim- 
plified by the genetic and biological explanation. 

42. Genetic and Biological Ethics 

There are two psychological facts at the basis of the 
moral life which are wholly distinct from each other. 
The first is the fact that we pass moral judgment upon 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL ETHICS 261 

the conduct of others. This judgment oscillates between 
the extremes of commendation and condemnation, with 
an almost infinite variety of intermediate degrees. The 
second is the moral feeling which we experience within 
our own minds, both before and after our volitional 
choices. Previous to the choice, this emotion is charac- 
terized by a keen rivalry of ideas and impulses which 
frequently resolves itself into vacillation, the embarrassed 
state of halting between alternatives; after the choice by 
moral satisfaction or by remorse, within which again 
there is every shade of intensity. The psychical disposi- 
tion to this moral emotion constitutes what is generally 
known as conscience. Hence the moral judgment on 
the one hand and conscience on the other, furnish the 
psychological basis of the moral life. It is quite evident 
that these two fundamental psychical facts bear a vital 
relation to each other, but they are never identical. It 
seems advisable, therefore, to examine each of them 
separately. 

Moral judgment is a special case of the phenomenon 
of evaluation. Every moral judgment is an evaluation, 
but not every evaluation is a moral judgment. It is to be 
regretted that the psychological and historical evolution 
of evaluation has not yet been scientifically investigated 
with sufficient thoroughness. We are nevertheless in- 
clined to believe that approximately the following phases 
of its growth may be accepted. 

An evaluation of the deeds of others is a psychological 
process of considerable complexity, the analysis of which 



262 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

is rather difficult. For example, whenever we watch a 
skilful acrobat performing some difficult feat with great 
dexterity and assurance, we are as a rule gratified, i.e., 
we experience feelings of pleasure. These feelings of 
pleasure may, in the last analysis, proceed from the in- 
voluntary, sympathetic movements of our own body to 
which we are excited by the sight of the performances. 
We have a similar experience whenever we witness a 
rare demonstration of strength on the part of an athelete. 
We lift, as it were, the heavy weight with him, and we 
rejoice in his success. But since we are simply specta- 
tors, and only imitate the movements actually performed 
by the athlete ; — that is to say, we do not actually per- 
form but only take note ; — naturally, therefore, we do not 
feel the actual strain ; the weight does not press upon us, 
hence our enjoyment at another's success is thus indeed 
less intense, but all the more pure in its quality, because 
unmixed with the feelings of pain which attend the 
actual performance of the movements. From the effort 
witnessed in the athlete, we infer that the performance 
of the task requires great physical strength. It is this 
great physical strength then that we really admire. It 
is highly probable that the most primitive form of the 
evaluation of the deeds of others rests upon admiration 
for their physical prowess. We have no direct interest 
in the demonstration, considered by itself, beyond the 
physical strength which it expresses. Our happiness in 
no wise depends on whether the heavy iron ball is lifted 
or not. 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL ETHICS 2^z 

Homer's Iliad introduces a number of such cases of 
evaluation. Diomedes picks up a rock which, as the poet 
tells us, ''no two men, such as we find to-day, would be 
able to lift, but this hero, unaided and alone, tossed it 
about quite playfully/' Pair odes goes to battle bearing 
the arms of Achilles, save the spear, for no one of all the 
Greeks, save Achilles alone, was able to handle this. In 
each of these cases, the poet wishes to excite the admira- 
tion of his hearers for the physical prowess of his hero. 

Even the Odyssey already discloses a more highly 
developed form of evaluation. In the ninth book of this 
epic he introduces the giant Polyphemus and we hear the 
recital of this monster's demonstrations of amazing 
strength. But Odysseus finally proves his superiority to 
the Cyclop by his cunning, which leads us to appreciate 
the power of mind revealed in artful ruse and stratagem. 
In this case, at least a part of our satisfaction is due to 
the achievement of mind, because we feel that Polyphe- 
mus is reaping deserved retribution for having devoured 
six of Odysseus' companions. The poet as well as his 
readers at any rate admire Odysseus for his shrewdness. 

We may, therefore, regard the appreciation of intellec- 
tual prowess as a second phase in the evolution of the 
evaluation of the deeds of others. The fact that this in- 
tellectual strength, this sagacity, is shown in trickery and 
deceit, in falsehood and fraud, makes no difference; a 
circumstance which clearly shows that this kind of eval- 
uation contains none of the elements of morality. 

There is still a third phase in the evolution of the 



264 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

evaluation which rests upon power alone without regard 
to the results which it produces. The Hindu sages tell 
of penitents ''fasting for a thousand years and standing 
upon one foot all the while." "Gods and men" the legend 
continues, ''are quite paralyzed with admiration for the 
power of endurance which these penitents possess." In 
these cases, it is the power of will, manifested in the 
repression of the natural vital functions, that excites 
admiration. No one has the slightest interest in the 
achievement as such. This is therefore another case of 
the evaluation of strength. 

We are therefore justified in saying that what we 
admire in the deeds of others is, above all else, the 
strength which their deeds reveal. First in order, it is 
the strength of the body, then of the intellect, and finally 
also of the will, that excites admiration. The moral ele- 
ment is wholly lacking in every one of these evaluations. 
This becomes a factor only after the achievement itself, 
in addition to the power which it manifests, becomes an 
object of appreciation. The appreciation of mere power 
is still evident even to-day, but at present we are more 
concerned about the effect than formerly, and this essen- 
tially modifies practically every evaluation of power. 

The resulting effect may, at first, excite our aesthetic 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction and thus become the sub- 
ject of aesthetic evaluation. However, just as soon as 
the consequences affect the general welfare of society, 
of which the agent is a member, just as soon as this gen- 
eral welfare is palpably advanced or disturbed by the deed. 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL ETHICS 265 

in that moment it becomes a matter of moral evaluation, 
i.e., the act is then either approved or disapproved in the 
moral sense. When Diomedes slays an enemy with a 
heavy rock, the lifting and even the throwing of which 
is admired in itself as an extraordinary demonstration of 
strength, his countrymen nevertheless regard his act as 
beneficial to their community and hence likewise ascribe 
a degree of moral approbation to it. We may therefore 
define moral judgment as the evaluation of an act in its 
social significance. 

Moral judgment bears a social . character from its very 
inception. It is therefore a participating factor in the social 
evolution of the race. This conclusion is also in harmony 
with the investigations of Edward Westermarck cited 
above, who regards society as the birthplace of moral ideas. 

As long as the crowd follows its leader almost instinc- 
tively, as long as the life of the individual, fettered by 
religion and custom, is still quite destitute of independent 
thought and feeling, the deed, the act, the success alone, 
remains the subject of moral judgment. Under these 
circumstances there is no discrimination between murder 
and homicide. The act is atoned for without regard to 
its perpetrator. Whoever, for example, has offended the 
household gods by an act of impiety thereby brings the 
divine wrath upon the whole tribe and is thus the cause 
of social harm to the community as a whole. The deed 
demands expiation, but there is no concern as to whether 
the act was done intentionally or whether it was due to 
an accident or sheer thoughtlessness. 



266 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

But, with the evolution of a richer culture, the division 
of labor and other agencies, personalities arise whose in- 
tellectual life differentiates itself from that of the com- 
munity, who assert their individuality in distinction from 
the popular will as expressed in religion and custom. 
They challenge the authority of tradition and consciously 
realize that they are distinct potential centers within the 
community. It then depends very largely upon the will 
of the individual as to what attitude he shall assume 
towards the tribe. The common welfare is conditioned 
upon the individual's purpose to foster or to exploit their 
interests. Thus the general disposition becomes of 
greater social significance than the particular act. Ac- 
cordingly disposition becomes the subject of moral judg- 
ment more and more exclusively. At present we regard 
a psychical disposition as moral when it serves as a con- 
stant incitement to actions calculated to promote the com- 
mon welfare, or at least such as will not bring harm to 
the community. 

Despite this fact, however, even at present success still 
forms an important factor in moral judgment. The 
blessings which the community has actually realized still 
influence our judgments far more effectively than mere 
good intentions. An important problem for future ethical 
inquiry will be to ascertain, by accurate analysis of moral 
sentiment, the significance of success in moral judgment. 

The success and the real object of human actions lose 
their importance in moral evaluation in proportion as 
moral judgment directs its attention to inner motives. 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL ETHICS 267 

We are coming more and more to regard volitional atti- 
tude as the sole criterion of morality. And the evidence 
of distinctively volitional activity is most clearly present 
in cases where the will opposes and suppresses our natural 
inclinations and passions. This self-control was formerly 
regarded as the real object of moral growth, and as 
meritorious in itself and its own sufficient purpose. As 
a matter of fact this still continues in large measure to be 
the case even yet. This theory is supported on the one 
hand by an appeal to the ethics of primitive Christianity, 
resting upon asceticism and retirement from the world, 
and, on the other, by an appeal to the tremendous growth 
of individuality and the exalted appreciation of person- 
ality. The pious Christian aspires to happiness in a 
future life through the suppression of fleshly desires and 
self-denial ; the self-conscious individual, moreover, proud 
of his own strength, hopes to accomplish his own com- 
plete deliverance from every vestige of coercion both 
external and internal by his own efforts. 

Goethe, the greatest individualist who ever lived, 
expresses this sentiment as follows : 

"Von der Gewalt, die alle Wesen bindet, 
Befreit der Mensch sich, der sich iiberwindet." 

In opposition to this view, however, genetico-biological 
ethics is obliged to strongly emphasize that self-denial is 
only a means of discipline, which whilst it should indeed 
be diligently practised, should never be proposed as an 
end in itself. Cheerful devotion to the general welfare 



268 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

of society is socially of greater value than self-denial and 
hence it occupies a correspondingly higher ethical plane. 
Inasmuch as it is natural for man to find pleasure in the 
vigorous exercise of his native capacities, it is therefore 
vastly more important to develop this functional pleasure 
and direct it into proper channels, than to regard its sup- 
pression as meritorious. Thus considered, Nietzsche is 
largely correct in his opposition to asceticism and self- 
denial. Self-denial, considered as an end in itself, tends 
to paralyze moral effort, whilst cheerful devotion to 
social problems tends to increase the moral powers. 

Conscience has been examined more frequently and 
more thoroughly than the nature of the moral judgment, 
but the theories concerning its origin are still at variance. 
The fact that religious ideas are very frequently matters 
of conscience, has given prevalence to the opinion that 
at least the source of the sense of moral obligation is to 
be found in religion. This view, however, is in conflict 
with the fact, now thoroughly established, that religious 
ideas and feelings, as they appear in the rude stages of 
development among primitive races, have nothing what- 
ever in common with morality.^ The savage is inspired 

^Leopold von Schroeder has recently entered the lists against 
this theory as it has hitherto been held by the comparative relig- 
ionists. In an essay on The Nature and Origin of Religion, Its 
Sources and its Growth (published in the compilation of Con- 
tributions to the further Development of the Christian Religion, 
1905* PP- 1-39). he undertook to prove that a belief in a beneficent 
Supreme Being is also quite widespread among primitive races. 
Schroeder is confident of having discovered a new source of 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL ETHICS 269 

with awe in the presence of the Demon to whom he 
ascribes the force of nature which has excited his wonder 
and dread. He endeavors to propitiate the deity in order 
to escape his wrath. The motive which determines his 
actions are purely selfish. It is only at a later stage that 
the religious ideas and feelings are purified by means of 
a developed moral sentiment. The gods, originally con- 
ceived of as nothing more than forces of nature, which 
may be either friendly or hostile, or perhaps as the souls 
of the departed, are at a later stage elevated to the posi- 
tion of guardians of the moral order of the universe. 
But conscience, as well as the moral judgment, springs 
from social elements, i.e., our choices are influenced by 
the thought that our actions meet with approval or dis- 
approval on the part of the other members of our family, 
sex, or state. 

It is probable that, during the tribal period, conscience 
amounts to nothing more than a sense of obligation to 
the will of the community, as it finds expression in relig- 
ion and custom. But just as soon as the advancing cul- 
ture raises the individual above the tribe ; just as soon as 
independent thought and reflection receive recognition, 
even against tradition, conscience immediately rises to 
a state of independence and power. 

The universal will is actuated by the welfare of the 
community; but it by no means follows that the leaders, 

religion, one in which the ethical element is evident from the 
beginning. Cf. Jerusalem Gadanken und Denker, pp. 178 and 
282. 



270 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

at any given time, are qualified to select the proper means 
to this end. It is likewise inevitable that institutions 
which were once useful and even necessary, should, in 
the course of time, become superfluous and even harmful. 
The man of broad culture and independent thought 
eventually discovers that the universal will, as expressed 
in its accredited institutions and laws, is detrimental to 
the welfare of the community, instead of being service- 
able. But since the authority of tradition, notwithstand- 
ing its harmfulness, is always a factor of considerable 
importance and tends to survive tenaciously, numerous 
conflicts arise which, in turn, stimulate reflection concern- 
ing moral obligation and thus contribute to the enrich- 
ment of moral life. 

The individual eventually presumes, by virtue of native 
insight, to decide between right and wrong independently. 
He criticizes the moral authority of the traditions, includ- 
ing religious and political institutions. This supremacy 
of the reason in moral questions as advocated especially 
by Socrates, finally gives rise to the opinion that there is 
an absolute good, independent of its effect upon general 
welfare. This, however, is certainly an error. The 
ultimate ground upon which anything is considered good 
can, after all, never be anything else than the fact that, 
by its agency humanity is benefited, and life made richer 
and happier. 

But conscience assumes two forms during the course 
of its development. These were first distinguished by 
Paulsen. The demands which the universal will, ex- 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL ETHICS 271 

pressed in the forms of prevailing custom, religion and 
law, makes upon the individual are reflected in the soul of 
the individual in the form of social conscience. This term 
implies the sum of those psychical dispositions which pre- 
vent every individual from bringing harm to the com- 
munity through the neglect of social requirements. The 
idea of prospective reproach and the possibility of punish- 
ment at the hands of society, forms an additional integral 
element of the moral consciousness. The total obliga- 
tions imposed upon the individual by society may be 
epitomized in the concept of humanity (in the sense of 
duty to mankind in general). Our social conscience 
requires us to discharge our duty to humanity. The 
claims of humanity and the individual inventives growing 
out of them are the expression of the dependence of the 
individual upon society. The organs to which society 
entrusts its conservation are concerned, as a rule, to 
impress this dependence effectually upon its members in 
order to maintain its existing status and protect itself 
against the encroachment of individuals and the short- 
comings of the disloyal. Humanity and the social con- 
science constitute the conservative element in moral 
evolution. 

However, in addition to this, there is still another form 
of moral consciousness making for progress and higher 
things which we may call the individual conscience. 
After man has risen above the crowd and developed the 
sense of individuality, he is no longer satisfied with 
merely meeting social demands and guarding himself 



272 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

against reproach and punishment. He aspires to the 
development of his capacities; he imposes obligations 
upon himself; he follows ideals and is not satisfied with 
himself until he is fully conscious of having done his 
best. At this stage fully developed personality acquires 
an intrinsic value, which the individual conscience re- 
quires us to guard with jealous care. 

Socrates is a brilliant example of the spirit of an 
exceptionally well developed individual conscience. He 
not only scrupulously discharged all his duties as an 
Athenian citizen, but likewise imposed upon himself the 
task of awakening and sharpening the moral conscious- 
ness of his fellow-citizens. When finally arraigned for 
these efforts, he scorned pleading for the mercy of the 
court and fleeing from prison. He preserved the dignity 
of his individuality and died for it. It frequently hap- 
pens that social requirements conflict with the individual 
conscience and depreciate the dignity of personality. 
Superior intellects challenge such demands and thus con- 
tribute to a higher development and refinement of moral 
consciousness. The increased consideration shown in the 
treatment of insolvent creditors is an evider^^ce of a 
quickened sense of appreciation for personal self-respect. 
Personal obligation and personal self-respect, the social 
and the individual conscience, cooperate in impressing 
the sense of social responsibility upon every individual, 
and at the same time magnifying the intrinsic value of 
personality, thus exalting the sphere of social duty 
through the consciousness of its dignity. It will devolve 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL ETHICS 273 

upon some future ethical system, to which the author of 
this work hopes to make some contribution during the 
coming years, to develop more fully this principle of the 
cooperation of personal obligation and personal self- 
respect. 

Aristotle was the first to announce the profound doc- 
trine that happiness rests upon exercise. Modern Psy- 
chology fully verifies this conclusion. Human happiness 
does not consist in mere passive indulgence, but solely 
and alone, in the successful exercise of one's own powers. 
Nowhere, however, can the individual find more vigorous 
or more fruitful exercise for his powers, nowhere can he 
find a larger field of opportunity for this purpose than in 
the efforts which serve to promote the general welfare. 

This splendid ambition is common to Eudaemonism, 
Utilitarianism and Ethical Idealism, and the distinctions 
between the schools is thus obliterated. The genetico- 
biological view likewise harmonizes egoism and altruism, 
just because the effort for the general welfare coincides 
with the happiness of the individual. 

As respects the question concerning the origin of 
morality our view leads to a decisive evolutionism, since, 
indeed, morality appears as the highest product of 
evolution. 

On the question of the authority of the moral norms, 
we likewise attain a reconciliation of antitheses. The 
moral law is autonomous from the viewpoint of human- 
ity in general, heteronomous from the viewpoint of the 
individual. The social whole is the authority to which 
18 



274 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the individual is, as it were, forced to yield, in order that 
he may then spontaneously regard himself as one of its 
members and find his own happiness in its service. 

In the matter of the relation between morality and 
religion, the genetico-biological theory shows conclusively 
that morality arose independent of religion and that the 
authority for its claims are wholly independent of relig- 
ious dogma. An act is not moral because it is well-pleas- 
ing to God, but it is well-pleasing to God because it is 
moral. This proposition has not only been defended by 
Plato in the dialogue with Euthyphro, but its correctness 
has likewise been conceded by such orthodox theologians 
as Thomas Aquinas. 

The most intimate relation between religion and moral- 
ity has nevertheless existed through long periods of time. 
The moral norms, originating in social needs, are con- 
strued as religious duties and thus receive a consoling 
warmth which cold reason could never give them. And 
even at present there is splendid opportunity for religion 
to make itself felt most beneficently in the line of social 
service. Nevertheless, religion owes its purification from 
crude anthropomorphism and egoism to moral consider- 
ations and sentiments alone. 

But religion does not merely consist in a body of pre- 
cepts. It is, in a much higher sense, a theory of the 
universe and of life. But as such it must take account 
of ethics in so far as ethical norms presuppose the belief 
in the perfectibility of the human race. This belief may, 
of course, be derived from experience, but in order to 



GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL ETHICS 275 

have the stability v/hich it requires it must proceed from 
a consistent theory of the universe. But such a theory 
requires, as we have shown at the end of Section 34, the 
postulate of a powerful will, which is to be regarded as 
the ultimate source of both natural and moral law. 

The genetico-biological method of investigation like- 
wise offers the possibility of discovering principles which 
will reveal the ideals and purposes of human effort and 
which at the same time simplify decision in doubtful 
cases. 

The terms family, community, state and humanity, 
express the narrower and the wider spheres of moral 
activity. Both the community and the state rest upon the 
family. Cordial family life is an indispensable condi- 
tion to the prosperity of the state. It becomes obliga- 
tory, therefore, to cultivate the sentiment of solidarity 
in the family and to provide for the welfare of its mem- 
bers. It not infrequently happens that the interests of 
the state demand the renunciation of family ties. Pub- 
lic servants such as soldiers and state officials must not 
permit their anxiety for wife and children to interfere 
with the full discharge of their official duties. The 
duties of patriotism, generally speaking, contain obliga- 
tions which are superior to domestic duties. 

The matter of discriminating between the obligations 
to the state and to posterity in general presents a problem 
of far greater difficulty. The tremendous development 
of individuality has evolved the concept of personal self- 
respect and has impressed upon us its corresponding 



276 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

duties. But it is to be feared that the day is still distant 
when these duties will have become so deeply implanted 
in human nature, as to form the invariable rules of action, 
both in the case of war between civilized nations and in 
the intercourse of civilized nations with the less cultivated 
races. 

As society is at present constituted, at any rate, we can 
only speak of a compromise between the morality of war 
and the morality of peace. 

The possibility of full compliance with moral obliga- 
tions, however, does not only depend upon the good will 
of the individual, but In large measure, likewise, upon 
the social order in which he lives. It becomes the duty 
of scientific ethics, therefore, to examine the social order 
with a view to discovering to what extent it renders the 
discharge of ethical obligations possible, i.e., in other 
words, to what extent the social order is adapted to the 
true conditions of life. With this problem, however, 
ethics passes over Into the theory of the evolution of 
human society, or Sociology. 

43. Sociology and the Philosophy of History 

Sociology, although not as yet universally accredited, 
is the youngest of the philosophical sciences. Its subject 
matter Is man considered as a social being, or more accu- 
rately expressed, the social group in its organized unity. 
This group is more than, and at the same time something 
different from the sum of the individuals constituting it. 
Every such group Is a species of community, i.e., it has 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 277 

common traditions, ideals and struggles. It appears as 
a linguistic and historical community in the form of race 
or of nationality ; as a political community in the form of 
the state ; as community of interests in the form of guilds, 
corporations and associations ; as community of faith and 
sentiment in the form of the religious congregation, and 
finally as community of culture in the concept of human- 
ity. The social group exerts a powerful influence upon 
each of its members by furnishing inspiration, imposing 
checks or removing hindrances. The development and 
status of the individual, his imagination and reflection, 
his feeling and conduct, are largely determined by the 
group. The group is constantly serving in the capacity 
of a creative genius and fashioning artist in this respect. 
Wundfs brilliant conception of creative synthesis in 
mental development is most clearly and vividly manifest 
in the social group. The association of individuals gives 
rise to something new, super-personal, which governs 
the individual but is in turn reciprocally modified and 
strengthened through the efforts of the individual. Thus 
sociology addresses itself to the exceedingly difficult 
task — of examining the reciprocal relations of society and 
the individual in the various spheres of life — a task, how- 
ever which promises correspondingly rich results. 

Although the concept and the name of this discipline 
was only formulated about the middle of the nineteenth 
century by the French philosopher Auguste Comte, its 
subject matter engaged the attention of philosophers long 
before that time. Plato described the ethical purport of 



278 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the state as he conceived it in his two ideals of the state, 
the second of which, especially, is elaborated even to the 
smallest detail. This is the armory from which the 
champions of social righteousness even to-day still love 
to draw their ammunition. Aristotle, with rare acumen, 
made a critical study of all the existing forms of political 
organization of his age. He regards the state as a prod- 
uct of nature. The fundamental thought from which he 
starts, namely, that man is by nature a social being, still 
forms the basis of all sociological investigations. 

Owing to the predominance of theological problems, 
the middle ages had very little taste for sociological in- 
vestigations. The renaissance and modern philosophy, 
on the contrary, have devoted much attention to these 
matters. Hugo Grotius, in his theory of natural law, 
laid the foundations for a philosophy of law which has 
since then been assiduously cultivated. This discipline, 
however, is no longer regarded as a separate branch of 
study, but is properly referred to the department of 
sociology. 

Thomas Hobbes regards the state as an institution 
devised by man for the purpose of mutual protection. 
He is therefore the author of the social contract theory 
which prevailed for a long time. Rousseau likewise 
regards the state as an artificial contract, but insists that 
its terms should be characterized by liberty and equal- 
ity. His theory became the watchword of the French 
revolution. 

The nineteenth century has returned to the Aristotelian 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 279 

conception, namely, that the state is a product of nature. 
It has endeavored to comprehend the state from the 
viewpoint of its historical evolution. Augiiste Comte, 
who, as we have observed, formulated the concept and 
name of sociology, undertook to investigate and formu- 
late the laws of social evolution after the same manner 
as the laws of nature. According to him, sociology 
forms the crown of his system of positive philosophy. 
In the graduated series of the sciences, beginning with 
mathematics, and advancing thence to astronomy, physics, 
chemistry and biology, sociology forms the last and high- 
est member. The organic theory of the state, outlined 
already by Plato, has been more fully developed through 
the evolutionary theory. It has, however, frequently 
suffered from unwarranted exaggeration. According to 
this theory, the state is a higher organism which, pre- 
sumably, develops according to laws which are similar 
to those of individual development. SchaeiUe has 
elaborated this theory in his treatise on The Structure 
and Life of the Social Body, in which he has carried the 
analogy much too far. 

Herbert Spencer in his Principles of Sociology, has 
attempted a theory of social evolution upon a strictly 
genetico-historical basis. He builds upon a broad empir- 
ical foundation drawn from rich ethnographical material. 
The state is evolved from more primitive forms of society 
according to the general laws of development as postu- 
lated by Spencer. There is a constant tendency on the 
part of the state towards increase in extent and at the 



28o AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

same time towards greater stability. In this process of 
growth the same process of differentiation takes place 
among the members of the state, i.e., its population, which 
Spencer has shown to prevail in the development of 
organisms generally. The constituent parts, at first 
homogeneous and indefinite, become increasingly heter- 
ogeneous, with a parallel tendency to greater definiteness 
on the part of each. Owing to the division of labor the 
interests and characters of men undergo constant differ- 
entiation and are at the same time more rigidly circum- 
scribed and more sharply defined. These parts at the 
same time become proportionately more dependent upon 
the whole, which for this reason likewise becomes cor- 
respondingly more stable. Spencer, however, always 
regards the individual as in a certain sense an end in him- 
self who must never be debased to the level of a mere 
servant of the state. The ideal state would be one in 
which the individual serves the general welfare by fol- 
lowing his own private interests. 

A more concrete theory of the origin and nature of 
the state, one which is at the same time more in accord 
with the actual facts of historical development, has 
recently been propounded by Ludwig Giimplowicz. This 
theory has likewise been defended and more fully devel- 
oped by Franz Oppenheimer. According to this theory 
the state is "a. social institution which is imposed by a 
victorious social group upon those whom it has con- 
quered with the single object of regulating the authority 
of the former over the latter and guarding against 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 281 

internal rebellion and external assault. Rulership, 
furthermore, has no further purpose than the economic 
exploitation of the conquered by the conquerors." (Franz 
Oppenheimer. Der Staat. p. 8. ff.). We must acknowl- 
edge that the majority of states actually in existence have 
arisen after this manner, and that the economic and the 
social differentiation within the state is more readily 
explained upon the basis of this theory. But this at all 
events, does not answer the ultimate question of sociology, 
because the victorious, as well as the conquered group, 
already manifests a species of social organization in which 
social differentiation is certainly not wholly wanting. But 
we must nevertheless concede that this concrete theory, 
supported by a formidable array of historical facts, has 
a decided advantage over the vague organic theory and 
the unhistorical social contract theory. 

Modern ethnology, the comparative history of religion 
and rf law, political economy and the history of econo- 
mics, so zealously fostered in recent years, furnish 
sociology a constantly growing wealth of material ; whilst 
the present-day movements for social reform serve to 
greatly intensify the interest in sociological investiga- 
tions. But the very abundance of material renders a 
comprehensive grasp of the whole exceedingly difficult, 
and partisan political views frequently obscure scientific 
objectivity. Sociology, consequently, is still in a state 
of ferment and it will require much special investigation 
and profound intellectual labor in order to secure authen- 
tic results. 



282 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

One thing, however, is already certain. Wherever we 
meet with man, whether historically or geographically, 
nowhere and at no time do we find him living in isola- 
tion. At all times and in all places he lives in social 
union with others of his species. The lower we descend 
in the scale of civilization, the more strictly do we find the 
individual controlled by custom, and the independence 
which he enjoys is correspondingly less. It is only during 
the course of cultural evolution that individuality ulti- 
mately asserts itself. Spencer is quite right when he 
says: society precedes individuality ("Society is prior to 
man"). Independent personality, thinking for itself, with 
its own distinctive emotional life and freedom of choice, 
is an acquisition of the social evolution of civilization, 
and we may at the same time add, one of its most precious 
acquisitions. 

The individual may ultimately come to recognize the 
truth that the noblest occupation which can engage his 
personality, and the one which will at the same time 
bring him the largest measure of happiness, consists in 
devoting his energies to the service of the community. 
But man, once he is delivered from his serfdom, will 
nevermore consent to become the slave and bondsman of 
society. The conditions which are favorable to progress 
carefully foster individuality rather than suppress it, and 
the only rational aim of a wise social policy is to inspire 
in the individual the spirit of social service. 

The philosophy of history is closely related to soci- 
ology. It attempts to discover the guiding principles and 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 283 

ultimate ideals of historical evolution. Herder, in his 
"Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind," 
regarded humanity as the ideal goal towards which his- 
torical development is moving. Humanity involves the 
perfect development of the specifically human faculties, 
and thus it becomes an end in itself. The character of 
the eighteenth century, individualistic on the one hand, 
cosmopolitan on the other, receives its historico-philoso- 
phical expression in the work of Herder. 

Hegel, in his theory of objective mind, aimed to con- 
strue history in a most imposing manner as the progres- 
sive unfolding of the consciousness of liberty. His expo- 
sition does equal justice to individual liberty and to the 
obligation of the individual to the state. Despite his 
numerous chronological errors, Hegel's conception of 
history still remains the most brilliant attempt to formu- 
late a unitary theory of historical development. As is 
well known, both the modern materialism of Feuerbach 
and the socialism of Lasalle and Karl Marx are out- 
growths of the Hegelian school. The economic theory 
of history which has now become a dogma of the social 
democratic party was originated by Karl Marx. Ac- 
cording to this theory the entire past historical develop- 
ment can only be properly understood from the view- 
point of economics. The economic needs and the various 
forms assumed by the productive industries and the dis- 
tribution of commodities are the fundamental motive 
forces of history. Religious and moral sentiments, to- 
gether with other "ideological factors," are only apparent 



284 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

and superficial symptoms. The true causes of all revolu- 
tions as of all great historical movements have always 
been of a purely economic nature. 

The economic interpretation of history, sometimes also 
called the materialistic theory, is of vast importance as a 
method of investigation. We may still expect large con- 
tributions to a correct understanding of history from it. 
But as a philosophy of history it is much too narrow, and 
its failure to accord with the facts is notorious. 

The philosophy of history has the same end in view as 
sociology. It is, therefore, a happy suggestion on the 
part of Paul Barth to unite both disciplines into one 
(The Philosophy of History as Sociology.). For such a 
system of sociology as this there are profound and 
important problems in reserve. It will have to show to 
what extent the psychic life of the individual is influenced 
by social life, i.e., by the universal will. It will perhaps 
appear that this influence is vastly greater than any one 
at present imagines. The social factor in the evolution 
of knowledge, discussed in Section 27, will then become 
manifest in its full significance and efficacy. We shall 
discover that further progress in psychology and epis- 
temology will depend upon the recognition of this factor. 
Sociology will no doubt likewise furnish new data for 
aesthetics, the most individualistic of all the philosophic 
disciplines. There is no doubt but that the public, for 
which an artistic production is designed, frequently guides 
the efforts of the artist even though he may be unaware 
of it, and, hence, it is certain also that the aesthetic judg- 



PEDAGOGY 285 

ment of the individual is invariably affected by popular 
taste. It is quite generally admitted even at present, that 
Ethics can only be treated from the sociological point of 
view. This will become still more evident as Sociology 
advances. 

With this accomplished, our entire theory of the uni- 
verse and of life will appear to be a product of social 
evolution; an evolution, moreover, whose most impor- 
tant result is the creation of personalities which are both 
independent in intellect and worthy of liberty. The 
Sociology of the future promises therefore to be more 
than a mere philosophical discipline, but rather a disci- 
pline that might well become the foundation of all 
philosophy. 

44. Pedagogy 

The theory of education or pedagogy is closely related 
to the problems of philosophy, particularly with psychol- 
ogy on the one hand and with ethics and sociology on 
the other. This explains why the fundamental theories 
of this discipline are generally due to thinkers who have 
devoted much time and attention to philosophical prob- 
lems. The task of education, domestic as well as public, 
is of such signal importance, both for the state and for 
mankind in general, that the viewpoints from which its 
ideals and methods are determined can never be too high. 

The end and purpose of education can ultimately be 
determined only by ethics and sociology, the disciplines 
which are devoted to the investigation of moral problems 



286 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

and the relation of the individual to society. However, 
if this end is to be reaHzed, a careful study of the child 
mind is indispensable to the educator. This also requires 
adequate psychological training. A thorough philosoph- 
ical education is, therefore, indispensable to any one who 
would assume the exceedingly responsible office of a pub- 
lic educator or teacher. At any rate, a far more adequate 
philosophical preparation should be provided for teachers 
than is the case at present. 

However, the philosophical principles of pedagogy 
are by no means sufficient for the adequate preparation 
of the teacher. The art of teaching, like every other 
art, can only be acquired by systematic practice. Pro- 
vision for this must come chiefly from the practical expe- 
rience of the profession in addition to the philosophical 
training. 

It is undoubtedly true, as shown by the history of 
pedagogy, that the intellectual trend of the age determines 
the principles which must govern the education of its 
youth. Thus, the present age very properly demands a 
social pedagogy very different from the individualistic 
pedagogy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
which regarded the well-rounded development of the 
individual as the chief end of education. By social 
pedagogy we mean a pedagogy whose single aim from 
its very beginning, is to instill the social spirit into the 
rising generation, and to implant the sentiment of social 
responsibility in the pupils as early and as effectively as 
possible. 



PEDAGOGY 287 

Thus there arises a point of contact between philosophy 
and Pedagogy which has hitherto been neglected. 

Philosophy, in its own behalf, requires the constant 
support of educational theory in order to effect its own 
proper influence. Theories of the universe and of life, 
such as the philosophers elaborate, fail to produce such 
reconstructive effect upon mature minds, as the philos- 
opher desires and expects even though they may follow 
the course of the argument and assent to its conclusions. 
Popular convictions and ethical principles, as a rule, retain 
a greater influence upon life, even for the philosopher 
himself, than his own philosophical system. It is only 
after these philosophical theories have become the basis 
of general education that their proposed theories are 
assimilated and acquire practical significance. 

LITERATURE 

ETHICS 

Friedrich Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik in der neueren Philosophic. 
2 vols., 1882-89, Vol. I, in 2 Ed., 1906. 

Theobald Ziegler, Geschichte der Christlichen Ethik, 1886. 

C. Ernst Luthardt, Geschichte der Christlichen Ethik, 2 vols., 
Vol. I in Eng. Trans. 

H. Sidgwick, History of Ethics. 

Leopold Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Griechen, 1882. 

Wilhelm Wundt, Ethik, 3 Ed., 1903. (A splendid exposition of 
the universal will.) Eng. Trans, from second Ger. Ed. 

Edward Westermarck, Origin and Development of Moral Ideas. 
2 vols., 1906-1908. (Ger. Trans.) (Indispensable to the in- 
vestigator on account of its exceptionally rich collection of 
facts, carefully gathered and systematically arranged, and at 
the same time quite comprehensible and very instructive for 
the laity.) 



288 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Freidrich Paulsen, System der Ethik. 2 vols., 7 Ed., 1906. (Pop- 
ular treatment.) Eng. Trans, from the fourth Ger. Ed. 

Harold Ho ff ding, Ethik, 2 Ed., 1901. 

G. V. Gizycki, Moralphilosophie, 1888. (Written from the Util- 
itarian point of view.) 

August Doring, Philosophische Giiterlehre, 1888. (An exceed- 
ingly suggestive treatment, based upon the concept of neces- 
sity.) 

Johannes Unold, Grundlegung fiir cine moderne praktisch- 
ethische Lebensanschauung, 1896. 

H. Cohen, Ethik des reinen Willens, 1905. 

R. Goldscheid, Zur Ethik des Gesamtwillens, igo2. Entwick- 
elungswerttheorie, Entwickelungsokonomie, Menschenokon- 
omie, 1908. (Emphasizes the economic value of man and 
thus develops the theory of the value of personality m,ost 
suggestively.) 

Th. Lipps, Ethische Grundfragen, 1899. 

H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 6 Ed., 1901. 

G. Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, 1892-93. 

/. C. Kreihig, Psychologische Grundlegung eines System der 
Werttheorie, 1902. 

Paul Ree, Die Entstehung des Gewissens, 1885. 

Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Ethics. 

Heinrich Gompers, Das Problem der Willensfreiheit, 1907. 
(Brilliant defense of indeterminism together with valuable 
contributions to the history of the problem.) 

Karl Joel, Der freie Wille. (A development of the problem in 
the form of a dialogue, 1908.) 

/. Seth, Ethical Principles. 10 Ed., 1908. (A splendid develop- 
ment of the theory of self-realization.) 

G. T. Ladd, Philosophy of Conduct, 1902. 

/, M. Baldwin, Social and Ethical Interpretations. 4 Ed., 1906. 

SOCIOLOGY 

Albert SchaeMe, Bau und Leben des socialen Korpers. 4 vols., 

1878, 2 Ed., 2 vols., 1896. 
Ludwig Gumplowicz, Grundriss der Soziologie. 2 Ed., 1905. 



PEDAGOGY 289 

Franz Oppenheimer, Der Staat, 1908. (Vols, 14 and 15 of the 
series Die Gesellschaft.) 

Anton Menger, Neue Staatslehre, 1903. 

Paul V. hilienfeld, Gedanken uber die Sozialwissenschaft der 
Zukunft. 5 vols., Natur und Staat. Contributions to a 
theory of society on the basis of natural science, 1903, 1904. 

G. Tarde, The Laws of Imitation. Social Laws. 

Durkheim, La division du travail social. 2 Ed., 1901. 

Lester Ward, Pure Sociology, 1903. 

Lewis H. Morgan, Die Urgesellschaft. 2 Ed., 1908. 

Ludwig Stein, Die soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophic. 2 
Ed., 1903. 

An der Wende des Jahrhunderts. Versuch einer Kultur- 
philosophie. Der soziale Optimismus, 1905. 

Paul Barth, Die Philosophic der Geschichte als Sociologie, 1897. 

Herbert Spencer, Introduction to the Study of Sociology. Prin- 
ciples of Sociology, 3 vols. 

/. H. W. Stuckenherg, Sociology, the Science of Human So- 
ciety. 2 vols,, 1903. 

F. Giddings, The principles of Sociology, 1896. 

G. Simmel, Uber die soziale Differenzierung, 1891. 

Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie. 2 Ed., 1905. 
Soziologie, 1908. 

R. Eisler, Soziologie, 1903. (A clear and comprehensive state- 
ment of the facts and problems on the basis of voluntaristic 
psychology.) 

7. Q. Dealy, Sociology. (An excellent presentation of the practi- 
cal side. Trans.) 

PEDAGOGY 

Otto Willmann, Didaktik als Bildungslehre. 2 vols., 2 Ed., 1894. 
A. Doring, System der Padagogik, im Umriss, 1894. 
W. Rein, Enzyklopadisches Handbuch der Padagogik, 1895 ff- 
Karl V. Raumer, Geschichte der Padagogik. 5 Ed., 1880. 
Paul Natorp, Sozialpadagogik. 2 Ed., 1904. 

Abhandlungen zur Socialpadagogik, 1907. 
Jules Payot, Die Erziehung des Willens. 2 Ed., 1903. 

Sammlung von Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der padagog- 

19 



290 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

ischen Psychologic und Physiologic. 8 vols. Compiled and 
published by Th. Ziehen H. Schiller and Th. Ziegler. 

Paulsen, Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts. 2 Ed., 1895. 

E. Meumann, Vorlesungen zur Einfiihrung in die experimentelle 
Padagogik. 2 vols,, 1908. 

Monroe, History of Education, 1905. 

Home, Psychological Principles of Education, 1906. 

Thorndike, Educational Psychology, 1903. 

Hall, Adolescence, 2 vols,, 1904. 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 

In the discussion of the various philosophical prob- 
lems, we have repeatedly indicated the methods of 
thought which best correspond with the present scientific 
attitude ; methods which in our opinion, are the only ones 
adapted to accomplish the desired ends. The attentive 
reader has no doubt discovered long before this that these 
proposed solutions of philosophical problems involve 
theories which are grounded in ultimate principles. It 
seems advisable, therefore, by way of resume, to state 
these theories clearly and to deduce from them the prob- 
lem which, in the judgment of the author, philosophy 
should assume. 

The first and most general demand which we make of 
philosophy is this, namely, that it be both empirical and 
scientific. The philosophical structure must rest upon a 
firm foundation if we would indulge the hope that any- 
one will take up his abode in it. We demand, to adapt 
a phrase from Fechner, a philosophy built up from the 
foundation instead of one which is suspended from the 
clouds like the speculative philosophy of former days. 
But it must at the same time remain what Descartes 
attempted and Kant actually succeeded in making it, a 
philosophy from within and not, as materialists would 

291 



293 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

have it, a philosophy from without. The facts of our 
psychic Hfe which possess immediate certainty will have 
to be examined separately and alone. The historical, 
and particularly the ethnographical, investigations of 
modern times have revealed the presence of intellectual 
energies which will likely forever remain inaccessible to 
psychological explanation. The universal will of a race, 
crystallized in language, custom, and religion, cannot be 
interpreted otherwise than psychologically. A universal 
brain is nowhere to be found ; but the reality of the uni- 
versal will is clearly revealed in its tremendous effects 
upon the will of the individual. 

We have been taught by natural science that we must, 
first of all, establish our facts. But we must for this very 
reason be on our guard lest we neglect, as of secondary 
importance, the facts of our psychic life, which are 
immediately certain. In the effort to reduce the world- 
process to a single principle of explanation, in itself 
perfectly justifiable, we must beware of obliterating the 
distinctive peculiarities of various groups of phenomena 
which are wholly unlike. Physical and psychical proc- 
esses forever remain incomparable. The only thing 
which is common to both is the concept of becoming, in 
itself absolutely empty and devoid of all content. Who- 
ever contends therefore that only matter or only mind is 
real, does violence to one series of facts, and to say the 
least, ceases to be empirical. 

There is a second demand closely related to the fore- 
going upon which the present age is very insistent. It 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 293 

insists that philosophy must return to the theory of the 
unreflective mind, i.e., to the theory of sound common 
sense. 

Sound common sense accepts the testimony of sense 
perception; it is convinced that what we see, hear and 
touch actually exists, and also that it exists even when no 
one perceives it. But philosophy likewise arrives at this 
conclusion after the efforts of reflective thought have for 
several thousand years examined our cognitive faculties, 
having passed through periods of the most radical skep- 
ticism and the most searching criticism. Sense percep- 
tion, after all, so far as physical processes are concerned, 
remains the most original and primary source of truth 
even for the philosopher. 

Sound common sense regards the psychic processes as 
wholly unique, different from everything physical, with- 
out ever questioning, however, or denying their constant 
and intimate reciprocal relation. Every one knows that 
the state of the weather affects our moods, and that our 
hands frequently tremble when we are under excitement. 
And the philosopher must finally acknowledge that this 
is the limit of our wisdom. Despite all our efforts it has 
been impossible to reconcile such utterly incompatible 
processes as those presented in the so-called external per- 
ceptions on the one hand, and those which take place in 
our own consciousness on the other. Even the philoso- 
pher, if he would not do violence to the most evident 
and well established facts, will have to recognize two dis- 
tinct series of processes. And we have found that the 



294 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

interaction between psychical and physical processes, 
which has for ages appeared utterly incomprehensible 
(see p. i8i), consists of our immediate experience of 
causality, the prototype of all causation, the source of all 
our judgments and of all our interpretations of nature. 

But even if the results of .philosophical reflection do 
lead back to the views of the unreflective mind, the labor 
of the philosophers has by no means therefore been in 
vain. We return to sound common sense, but we return 
richer and wiser than we were before we entered upon 
the analysis of our experience. Just as our power of 
vision has been increased by the telescope and the micro- 
scope, so have analysis and experiment furnished us with 
a species of psychical microscope by the aid of which we 
have discovered processes in our psychic life which long 
remained unknown or unobserved. But just as the 
optical microscope has not revealed any new qualities of 
sense, but still limits our vision to colors and forms, so 
likewise the psychical microscope has not brought any 
new psychic elements to light, but only enabled us to 
differentiate those already known with greater precision, 
and to study their effects to better advantage. Further- 
more, the discernment of the limitations of our knowl- 
edge by no means compels us, as critical idealism pre- 
sumes, to surrender all hope of any knowledge of reality. 
It rather reveals the folly of attempting the impossible. 
But within the limits of the attainable the human mind 
may again have confidence in its own powers. It may 
confidently believe that the judgments, verified by the 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 295 

realization of the predictions to which they gave rise, 
are the actual symbols of processes occurring independ- 
ently of ourselves. 

For this very reason, the sound common sense to which, 
according to our opinion, philosophy should return is not 
that against which Kant so justly protested in the familiar 
passage of the Prolegomena (Vol. 4, p. 7 of the Harten- 
stein edition; Eng. Trans., Bohn's Library, p. 5). We 
do not mean "the appeal to the verdict of the multitude ; 
a clamor before which the philosopher blushes and the 
popular witling scornfully triumphs." Our discussion 
of the problems has made it clear that we are not seeking 
to evade the deep places in abstract thought. On the 
contrary we aim to explore the depths with our utmost 
zeal and energy. But we rejoice in having vanquished 
doubt and intemperate criticism by this very penetration, 
— we have once more restored confidence in the cognitive 
capacity both of our senses and of our understanding. 
We expect, as a matter of course, that our return to 
sound common sense thus matured shall render our phil- 
osophy more comprehensible and increase its efficiency. 
We can never believe that, in philosophy, clearness and 
profundity are irreconcilable opposites. We rather ex- 
pect a regeneration of philosophy from a combination 
of these two. 

The formal demands which the present age imposes 
upon an effective philosophy are, that it should be empir- 
ical and strictly scientific in its nature and method, and 
that it return to sound common sense. And these de- 



296 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

mands have been fully vindicated. Our discussion of 
the particular problems has likewise shown certain com- 
mon characteristics of content in the respective disci- 
plines. It is in these characteristics indeed that the 
course of development taken by both the natural and 
mental sciences during the nineteenth century reveals 
its influence upon the philosophic method of interpreta- 
tion; or, in the judgment of the author, it should at least 
do so. 

Briefly stated, the points of view secured for phil- 
osophy by means of this influence are the genetic, the 
biological and the social methods of studying psychical 
processes. 

As applied to psychology, the genetic method leads us 
to inquire after the origin and development of the various 
psychical elements. It no longer suffices to ascertain 
analytically the constituent elements presented in the 
actual complexes of psychic life. We wish also to know 
how and whence they arise. Scientists have long re- 
garded representation and thought, the processes most 
readily accessible to introspection, as the primary states 
of consciousness, feeling and volition as secondary. Now 
at length increasing numbers of them begin to perceive 
that in all probability the reverse is more nearly correct. 
The feelings of pleasure and pain and the correlated 
impulses to movement seem to be the beginning of all 
psychic life, and, according to all appearances, it is from 
these that perception and thought have evolved. The 
voluntaristic psychology, of recent origin, which, as 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 297 

previously observed (p. 2^7) is constantly gaining new 
adherents, must therefore be regarded as one of the 
fruits of the genetic method. 

When applied to epistemology the genetic method 
reveals the fact that neither sensualism nor intellectual- 
ism furnishes an adequate explanation of the origin of 
cognition. It is only by the cooperation of receptive 
sense perception with the constructive and synthetic 
function of the understanding, that we are able to form 
judgments which we describe as true, and which can be 
verified by the realization of the predictions based upon 
them. But above all else, genetic epistemology has 
revealed the origin and the fundamental significance of 
the function of judgment in which the activity of what 
we have called fundamental apperception expresses itself. 
Self-interest, originating in biological motives, impels us 
to direct our attention to the objects of our environment. 
It is just because this is the case that we cannot avoid 
applying to these processes the fundamental appercep- 
tion previously described (p. 107), by virtue of which we 
cast every process into the following formula: Object — 
function; potential center — ^potential expression. 

The genetic method of interpretation likewise furnishes 
a clear explanation of the actual importance of language 
in the acquisition of knowledge, and at the same time 
protects us against ascribing either too great or too 
slight an influence to this agency. 

In aesthetics the genetic method directs us to functional 
delight as the source of aesthetic pleasure. It has been 



298 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

shown that the functional delight of the senses, intellect, 
and emotion, are three distinct sources of aesthetic pleas- 
ure, which, however, frequently produce a cumulative 
effect. We have also discovered that the highest form 
of aesthetic emotion arises from a species of love for the 
constructions of the artist, a love which reflects a new 
quality of beauty upon the artistic production itself. We 
have seen how the function of aesthetic judgment has 
evolved from the functional delight in which the objec- 
tive factor has equal importance with the subjective 
factor. We have followed the artistic function genetic- 
ally from play, through social service to the consumma- 
tion of its perfection in its appeal to our affections. 

In ethics the genetic method has thus far disclosed a 
number of important results. The comprehensive inves- 
tigations of Westermarck have given an empirical basis 
for tl ^ explanation of the origin of ethical principles 
particularly in respect to the primitive races. Within 
the period of recorded history Westermarck's investiga- 
tions have still to be considerably supplemented and 
extended. But he has made a most promising beginning 
even in this department. Such a foundation will pre- 
pare the way for the construction of a truly scientific 
system of ethics, which will satisfy the demands of the 
developed moral consciousness, without losing itself in 
Utopian speculations. 

Sociology, the youngest of the philosophical disci- 
plines, adopted the genetic method from its very 
beginning. It is to this circumstance that it likewise 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 299 

owes its rapid development and extraordinary success. 

The methods of biology, as shown above (p. 87), are 
most intimately related to the genetic method. The 
former begins with the assumption that human psychic 
life is closely identified with the vital processes of the 
organism, and that the immanent purpose of this psychic 
life is nothing less than the preservation and improve- 
ment, — that is, the enrichment — of the life of the indivi- 
dual as well as of the race. 

The biological method, therefore, finds its most fruit- 
ful application in the department of psychology. The 
whole theory of psychic life has been radically modified 
by it. Especially does this view enable us to reduce the 
chaotic mass of vital emotions and instincts to order and 
system far more readily. These phenomena can thus be 
classified much more comprehensively. The office of 
our cognitive functions, the origin of the concepts, the 
phenomena of imagination and of interest are likewise 
comprehended in the complex of vital processes with a 
resulting gain in clearness and intelligibility. 

Construing the cognitive impulse as an element of the 
universal impulse of self-preservation, also materially 
simplifies our attitude to the problems of critical episte- 
mology. From this point of view in particular the 
theory of critical idealism, which refuses to recognize 
anything except the contents of consciousness, appears 
untenable for biological reasons alone. That is, if we 
should apply this doctrine seriously and make it the basis 
of thought and action, it would necessarily lead to the 



300 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

subversion of our cognitive faculty and complete mental 
confusion. A world theory which is at once irrefutable 
and at the same time incredible can never gain complete 
control of our mind. Its inherent contradiction will 
eventually become intolerable to any one who takes it 
seriously. Scientists, professing critical idealism, usually 
go no further than to make a courteous bow, and then 
continue their investigations just as if the world after 
all existed as a reality independent of consciousness. 
Rokitansky once remarked, and Meynert concurs in this 
judgment, that there is absolutely no sense in assuming 
the existence of the world after the brain is gone, because 
our world picture is the product of the brain. They 
both intend this as a positive declaration for idealism, 
but they seem to forget entirely that in this very state- 
ment they accord extra-mental existence to the brain, 
which shall nevertheless be conceived as nothing more 
than my idea. 

We have previously shown that idealism is by no 
means unanswerable, and that this theory, considered 
from the biological viewpoint, is to be regarded as an 
hypertrophy of the cognitive impulse, which requires 
reduction in the interest of sound intellectual functions. 
The ultimate object of knowledge is after all the pres- 
ervation and improvement of life. We must adjust 
ourselves to the universe ; we must understand what ele- 
ments to appropriate from our environment or we must 
perish. The increasing richness of the meaning of life, 
the growing difficulty of meeting its larger demands, 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 301 

imposes upon science proportionately severer tasks be- 
cause of the extension of knowledge and the larger con- 
trol over nature which this demands. The principle of 
the division of labor, therefore, demands that a large 
number of men devote themselves exclusively to scientific 
research. These men will certainly not regard the con- 
sciousness that their efforts are directed to the discovery 
of truth with a view to increasing the welfare and happi- 
ness of mankind as humiliating or debasing. 

In aesthetics the biological method has revealed the 
principle of functional demands. Aesthetic pleasure 
actively engages those psychic energies which are less 
frequently drawn upon in the ordinary routine of every 
day life. It enriches the spiritual life by satisfying the 
needs of both our intellectual and emotional functions. 
If the purpose of knowledge is to make man more 
powerful, then indeed to art belongs the glorious task of 
increasing his happiness. Artists thus become real bene- 
factors of mankind. It is art, in fact that makes man 
truly human in the full sense of the term. 

As applied to ethics the biological method shows that 
morality is a condition which the social life of mankind 
presupposes. We perceive how the moral sentiments 
of approbation and reproach do not take their rise from 
an aprioristic "thou shalt," nor yet from the fear of 
supernatural powers, but from the natural constitution 
of the race, which is social from its very beginning. 
These sentiments subsequently purify and elevate the 
religious ideas and emotions. However, as individual- 



302 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

ity, i.e., personality, gradually differentiates from the 
primitive herding disposition with increasing definiteness, 
the protection of this personality becomes a require- 
ment, and, in the further progress of evolution, a moral 
necessity. Morality thus acquires a large measure of 
individualistic importance in addition to its social sig- 
nificance, — the preservation and development of person- 
ality becomes a categorical imperative growing out of 
the dignity of man. Hence the preservation of society 
and the protection of the dignity of personality becomes 
the guiding principles of moral evolution. We owe the 
discovery of these principles and their clear definition to 
the biological method alone. 

The biological method of inquiry is not confined to the 
evolution of the individual. It likewise embraces the life 
of the species. This naturally leads to the third demand 
which we proposed for the treatment of philosophical 
problems as regards their content. I mean the doctrine 
of sociality. The philosophy of our generation cannot 
afford to ignore this doctrine. 

The study of psychology imperatively demands the 
appreciation and constant recognition of the fact that 
the psychic life of the individual is conditioned and influ- 
enced in every phase of its development, and in all of its 
elements, by the social environment, the milieu. Mem- 
bers of a social organism by nativity, we are molded 
and fashioned by society from our earliest infancy. 
Scientific and religious ideas, moral and aesthetic con- 
victions are instilled into our minds by the power of their 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 303 

external authority. These affect us in such a way that 
we are mostly unaware of their influence. This social 
factor has as yet by no means been sufficiently recog- 
nized in psychology. We may reasonably expect great 
progress in our knowledge of the laws governing human 
psychic life, as the rich materials furnished us by eth- 
nology, the history of religion and of custom are properly 
utilized and assimilated by the general body of our 
knowledge. 

Due regard for the social factor is likewise of excep- 
tional importance in epistemology. It is utterly impos- 
sible, for example, to understand how religious ideas 
receive their confirmation except by the cooperation of 
the social factor. Error and truth are alike the result of 
the totality of human effort. Even stately reason, 
proudly presuming to solve the riddle of the universe by 
its own powers, without regard to previous efforts, ignor- 
ing the labors of others and spurning their aid, is shown 
to have been materially modified by contemporary 
thought and environment; and this even in the case of 
those who are apparently the most original thinkers. 
The task remains for posterity to trace out the social 
factor in the development of human knowledge through 
the millenniums of reflective thought and to show clearly 
what portion of our intellectual possessions is an inheri-- 
tance from past ages and what we have acquired our- 
selves. This task is beset with profound difficulties, but 
it nevertheless promises rich returns. 

The social element is in evidence even in aesthetics 



304 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

where the opportunity for originality is practically un- 
limited. The general public, the popular taste and the 
existing state of culture, leave their impress upon artistic 
production as well as upon aesthetic appreciation despite 
our individuality. 

But above all in ethics, the social point of view is of 
fundamental importance. In this discipline everything, 
the origin, the development, the ideals to be realized, is 
so thoroughly permeated with social elements that many 
thinkers are disposed to classify ethics simply as a sub- 
division of general sociology. Notwithstanding this, 
however, there is still a large measure of deep-rooted 
prejudice against it and there still remains much to be 
done before the strictly social nature of moral obliga- 
tion will find general acceptance. Even the individual 
obligation of maintaining one's self-respect contains a 
social element. The individual, having struggled up- 
wards from serfdom to the distinction of personal indi- 
viduality, never ceases to be a member of the social body. 
If he would preserve the dignity of personality, acquired 
with so much difficulty, he is at once obliged to devote 
a large share of the powers engendered by his struggle 
for liberty to the service of the social whole again. 

It is thus evident, furthermore, that sociology, which 
has assumed the task of investigating the laws of social 
life, will in the not distant future have to be made the 
basis of the philosophy of mind. It will then become 
more and more evident that independent and influential 
personalities have been developed solely by the process 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 305 

of social differentiation, and that these superior person- 
alities in turn increase the total spiritual possessions of 
mankind by means of constant interaction. It is not 
enough that sociology simply explains the force of social 
obligation. It must also account for the spirit of indi- 
vidual liberty and independence, and indicate how the 
present stage of development has been effected through 
the cooperation of the social and the individual factors. 
This may perhaps also result in points of view which will 
enable disenthralled personality to discover principles 
which will lead to still higher development. 

Supported by such principles as these and equipped 
with such methods, philosophy finds courage to under- 
take its old task once more, namely, to furnish a theory 
of the universe. It has been the aim of philosophy from 
its very beginning to note the unity in variety and to dis- 
cover the inherent relation of all things. This increased 
power and profounder insight furnishes inspiration to 
approach the old problem once more with renewed cour- 
age and zeal. 

The unity and strict coherence of the inorganic world 
seem to have made a much deeper impression on the 
eighteenth century than on our own. When Immanuel 
Kant, completely captivated by Newton's sublime system 
of thought, exclaims, in his Natural History of the 
Heavens: "Give me matter and I will construct a uni- 
verse," this proud confidence contains an element which 
is uplifting and grand. If we remember furthermore 
that his hypothesis of the origin of the heavenly bodies 
20 



306 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

still prevails even to-day, we at once perceive that the 
view which attempts to comprehend the whole neither 
neglects nor denies the actual constitution of the 
individual. 

Now, since spectrum analysis has revealed the ele- 
ments constituting the sun's mass ; since chemistry has 
disclosed not only the elements, but likewise the inner 
structure of the majority of bodies and defined the dis- 
tribution of the molecules by means of its constitutive 
formulas; finally, since biochemical investigations have 
profoundly illuminated the mechanical and chemical 
processes which constitute organic Hfe; we begin to 
understand the reason for the many recent attempts to 
impress the unity and coherence of the processes of 
nature upon the general consciousness of mankind by 
the combination of these results into a philosophy of 
nature. 

It devolves upon the metaphysics of the future to 
apply the methods which have been verified in the inves- 
tigation of particular problems and thus construct a 
comprehensive theory of the whole. Metaphysics, 
therefore, is not banished for all time. It still remains 
the center towards which philosophy forever strives and 
around which all other philosophical disciplines are but 
tributaries. 

Scientific metaphysics must of course not demand the 
impossible. Its postulates must be formulated in har- 
mony with approved methods and it must be possible to 
construe and systematize the result consistently. In this 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 307 

sense I have endeavored, by the application of the prin- 
ciple of the function of judgment, verified in the sphere 
of empirical science, to construe the whole process of 
becoming, the physical as well as the psychical, as the 
potential expression of a powerful will, who has given 
the laws according to which the world process transpires 
and, in the words of the Psalmist : these laws he will not 
break. 

A concept of deity so conceived furnishes a climiax to 
our theory of the universe such as the unity of our con- 
sciousness demands. This is not a postulate of the prac- 
tical reason as was the case with Kant, but of the 
theoretical reason. We thus apply the form in which 
pure reason conceives and construes the various separate 
processes of the world to the universe as a whole, i.e., to 
the totality of the world-process. The concept of deity 
is thus conceived somewhat as a subject whose predicate 
is the total world-process, but at the same time also as 
substance, the nature of which does not consist in 
unchanging permanence, but, as Leibnitz understood it, 
in the constant expression of its inherent energy. We 
must postulate this as the eternally vital source of every 
physical and psychical process, and the investigation of 
the laws of this divine will furnishes the sublime prob- 
lem of all science. An exception to the laws as estab- 
lished from eternity would of course be incompatible 
with this concept. 

It may perhaps be possible by this means to harmcnize 
philosophy with pure religion and thus exalt particular 



308 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

facts "to that universal consecration where transcendent 
harmonies pervade the whole." At any rate the aim of 
all philosophy must forever remain the effort to construct 
a consistent world-theory, to perpetuate, in enduring 
thought, the elusive forms of transitory phenomena. 



TOPICAL INDEX 



Acquired characters, 190. 

Activism, 184. 

Activistic theory of the concept of 
truth, 112, 117. 

Aesthetic activity, 196 ff; enjoy- 
ment, 197 f ; judgment, 196, 
223 f, 229. 

Aesthetics, 19, 196 ff, 298, 301, 
303 f ; double significance of the 
term, 200; historical, 231; the 
social factor in, 284, 302; direct 
and associative factor in, 205. 

Agreement of the judgment with 
the process adjudged, 117 f. 

Allegorical interpretation of Gre- 
cian myths and of O. T., 9. 

Altruism, 259, 273. 

Analysis, The judgment as, 128. 

Analytics, Aristotle's name for 
Logic, 47. 

Animate and inanimate, 136, 147 f. 

Animism, 151. 

Anthropomorphic interpretation of 
natural processes, 107, 115; the- 
ism, 190. 

Antipathy of philosophy for relig- 
ious tradition, 8. 

Apperception, 106 ff ; transcenden- 
tal unity of, according to Kant, 
107 f ; fundamental, 108, 175 f, 
193. 223, 297. 

Apriori, (antecedent to experi- 
ence), 69, 121, 123. 

Art, 197, 200; according to Hegel 
and Schopenhauer, 203 f ; as play, 
230 f; as social service, 230; as 
tribute of love, 232; and science, 
234; and religion, 236; and mor- 
ality, 236. 



Artistic creation, 215, 229. 

Asceticism, 247 f, 253, 267. 

Associates, the consciousness of, as 
argument against idealism, 80. 

Associative factor in aesthetics, the 
205. 

Atom, 124, 151, 185 f. 

Attraction and attractive, 219, 223. 

Attributes regarded as separate ob- 
jects of thought, 113. 

Authority in religion, 8; in ethics, 
260, 273 f. 

Autonomous ethics, 260, 273. 

Beautiful and beauty, 200, 214; and 
love, 201, 225, objective beauty, 
224, 229. 

Biology and the biological method 
in psychology, 35, 122, 167, 299; 
in epistemology, 104, iii, 116, 
122, 299. 

Body, the, as the prison of the 
soul, 92; distinguished from the 
soul, 136; as the vehicle of per- 
sonality, 137. 

Brain, the, as the physiological 
condition of psychical phenomena, 
38; in the theory of materialism, 
141; as system C in the theory 
of Avenarius, 170; and soul, 148. 

Categorical imperative, 250. 

Categories, 67, 93 f, 123. 

Causality, and the concept, 94, 124, 
255 ff; elimination of the concept, 
169 f; volitional activity as the 
primitive form of the concept of, 
181; not limited to natural proc- 
esses, 181 ff. 



309 



310 



TOPICAL INDEX 



Causa sui, 138. 

Centralized organization of man, 
132, 175. 

Certainty, objective and subjective 
41 f. 

Character, 241, 266. 

Christ, 247. 

Christianity, ethics of, 246 f, 259. 

Confidence in the power of intel- 
lect, 7, 58, 250, 

Commonplace, the, inquisitiveness 
concerning, as the beginning of 
philosophy, 4. 

Common sense, 83, 293. 

Concept in logic, 44; origin of, iii, 
113- 

Conceptual judgments, 114. 

Conscience, 261, 268, 

Consciousness recognized in others 
as refutation of idealism, 80; the 
content of, as the only existent 
reality, 70-80; total, as idealistic 
hypothesis, 82. 

Consequence as the subject of moral 
judgment, 265 f. 

Contract theory as explaining the 
state, 278. 

Conviction and faith, 130. 

Copernican world-theory, tj, 92. 

Copies, ideas and judgments as, 63. 

Cosmological argument of material- 
ism, 143, 147; problem, 185 flf. 

Creation of new psychic energy, 147, 

182, 2TJ. 

Criterion of truth, 87, 102, 119; 

objective and intersubjective, 119. 
Criticism, 58, 60. 
Criticism of knowledge, 58, 64, 

6s ff, 299, 



Deaf-mute and blind, 33. 

Deism, 192. 

Determinism, 255. 

Differentiation in psychical develop- 
ment, no. 

Diomedes as an example in moral 
judgment, 263, 265. 



Discharge, 145. 

Disposition, 241, 266. 

"Diver, The," (Schiller's poem), 
219. 

Division of labor, 280, 301. 

Dogmatism, 58. 

Dualism, 137, 140, 176 f. 

Duplicating the universe, from the 
viewpoint of idealism, 70; accord- 
ing to Avenarius, 170. 

Duty vs. inclination, 251. 

Economic arrangment of experience, 
14, 90, 126, 138, 169; of the 
constitution of society, 283. 

Economy of thought, 51. 

Ecstacy, g6. 

Efficiency and energy as the subject 
of evaluation, 263. 

Ego-concept, 168, 256. 

Egoism, 259, 273. 

"Einfiihlung," 206. 

Empiricism, radical, 184; in ethics, 
258. 

Empiriocriticism, 167. 

Energy, concept and constancy of, 
138, 142, 14s f ; applicable only to 
physical and chemical processes, 
146; and efficiency as the sub- 
ject of evaluation, 263; as uni- 
form concept for all natural proc- 
cesses, 160, 181; creation of 
psychic, 146, 182. 

Esse — percipi, 75 f. 

Ethics, 17 f, 205 ff, 298, 301, 304; 
evolutional, 253; in pedagogy, 
285 f ; sociological character of, 
285. 

Ethnic psychology and social psy- 
chology, 34. 

Eudaemonism, 246, 258 f, 273. 

Evaluation, psychological analysis 
of, 262; of intellectual prowess, 
263; of physical prowess, 262; of 
service, 264; of volitional power, 
264. 

Evolution, the theory of, 165; its 
significance for ethics, 253, 258,273, 



TOPICAL INDEX 



311 



Evolutionism, 165 ff. 

Existence, 68; the concept of, 131. 

Experiment in psychology, 28, 31, 
in aesthetics, 205. 

Extra-mental (extra mentem — out- 
side of consciousness), 69 f, 79. 

Fact, cult of, 13. 

Faith, belief, 130. 

Family, the, in its moral aspect, 
275. 

Feeling and will as primary forms 
of the activity of consciousness, 
37, 159. 

Feeling, pure in aesthetic taste, 
196, 218, 238; philosophy of, 19, 
199, 238. 

Form and matter, 22, 123. 

Freedom, Metaphysical and psycho- 
logical conception of, 256. 

Function and functional depend- 
ence, 119, 169. 

Functional demands, 104, 212 f, 
301; sensual, 212 f; intellectual, 
213; emotional, 214 f. 

Functional pleasure, 212 f, 298; its 
various kinds and their co-opera- 
tion, 228. 

Genetic explanation of psychic life, 
33, 122 f ; and biological episte- 
mology, 102 if. 

God or matter as first cause, a 
problem of vast practical im- 
portance, 100; as the only sub- 
stance, 157; and the world, 185; 
and the function of judgment, 
192, 307; concept of, 186 if.; his 
love, 246 f.; proofs of the exist- 
ence of, 192. 

Grace, in the Christian religion, 
248. 

Grammar, 51 f. 

Greek philosophy, the dominant in- 
fluence of, in the development of 
Western thought, 6. 

Gretchen in Goethe's Faust, 233. 



Group, the, as the subject of soci- 
ology, 276 f. 

Happiness as resting on activity, 

246, 273. 
Heavens, apparent motion of, tt. 
Heidelberg philosophical congress 

(1908), lOI. 
Heteronomous ethics, 260, 273. 
Historical method in aesthetics, 

208, 231. 
History, philosophy of, 15, 276 f, 

283. 
History of philosophy, 20 fl. 
Homer, the deities of, criticised by 

Xenophanes, 9, 154. 
Human group, 265, 269 f ; dignity, 

272, 275, 302, 304; love, 247; 

obligation, 271 
Humanity, 283. 

Hypertrophy of the cognitive im- 
pulse, 83, 300. 

Idea, 88; neither true nor false, 
IIS f, 129. 

Idea, the Platonic, 7, 58, 149, 156, 
233 f ; the, as the artificial form of 
the "typical idea," 234; of the 
good as the metaphysical basis of 
ethics, 246. 

Idealism, epistemological, 69, ^(^, 
83; aesthetic, 209; ethical, 259, 
273; metaphysical — spiritualism, 
138. 

Ideality of the objective world, 21, 
71, 76, 79 f ; and reality of the 
objective world makes no differ- 
ence in practice, 100. 

Ideological moments, 29. 

Illusion in aesthetics, 206. 

Immanent, 69. 

Immortality, the belief in, in Chris- 
tianity, 95, 247. 

Impressionism, 210. 

Inanimate and animate, 136, 147 f. 

Inclination vs. duty, 251. 

Indeterminism, 254. 

Individual conscience, zii» 



312 



TOPICAL INDEX 



Individual and individuality, see 
personality. 

Individualistic character of phil- 
osophy, 8. 

Induction, 48. 

Intellectualism, 88, 91 f, 149, 297. 

Intellectualistic psychology, 37, 159. 

Interaction between organism and 
environment, 125, 128; between 
body and soul, 177 f, 293. 

Interest and interesting, 217, 223. 

Interpretation and evaluation of 
sense impressions, loi f, 116 f. 

Interval between interpretation and 
verification, 117. 

"Introjection," 170. 

Intuitive character of poetry, 216, 
227 f. 

Ionia (on the West Coast of Asia 
Minor), as the birthplace of Greek 
philosophy, 6. 

Isagogics (Introduction) of Por- 
phyry, Boethius' Latin translation 
of, as the text-book of logic in 
the Middle Ages, 47. 

Judaism, the ethics of, 247. 

Judgment, Function of, as the lin- 
guistic formulation of fundamen- 
tal apperception, 112 f, 297; evo- 
lution and significance of, 113 f; 
and the concept of deity, 192 f, 
306 f. 

Judgment in logic, 43 f ; anticipatory 
element in, 102, 117; aesthetic, 
196, 223; as fundamental form of 
cognition, 104 ff; as function of 
the adjudged process, 119; inde- 
pendent and traditional, 128 f. 

Knowledge as means to an end, 102; 
as belief, 129; criticism of, 58, 
64, 86, 299; for the sake of 
knowing, 104 f ; genetic and bio- 
logical theory of, 103 ff, 297, 300; 
hypertrophy of the — impulse, 83 ; 
intuitive, 97; ordinary meaning 
of, 62; objective and subjective 



factors in, 66; oiigin and develop- 
ment of, 64, 102 f ; and self-pres- 
ervation, 82 f, 104 f, 132; possi- 
bility and limits of^ 64; problem 
of, 62 ff ; theory of, 50, 62 ff, 
86-133. 

Language and logic, 52; as social 
factor, 88, 114; evolution of, 112; 
significance of, in cognition, 297. 

Law, philosophy of, 278. 

Law of processes, 12; formulated 
in conceptual judgments, 114 f; 
uniformity of phenomena as the 
sole object of scientific investiga- 
tion, 70, 74 f. 

Lear, King, 233. 

Life, the aim of science and phil- 
osophy to foster, 2 f , 15 f. 

Logic, 17, 39-56. 

Logos, the, 164. 

Love and beauty, 201, 225 f, 231 f. 

Loyalty not an empty delusion, 
132. 

Materialism and religion, 10 f; as 
metaphysical theory, 137, 139 ff; 
according to Avenarius, 170 f ; 
in psycho-physical parallelism, 
179. 

Mathematics as system of apriori 
truths, 10; and physics under- 
stood without knowledge of the 
historical development, 21; as 
support of sensualism, 90; con- 
vincing force of M — judgments, 
120. 

Matter and form, 22, 123. 

Matter or God as first cause, a prob- 
lem of vast practical significance, 
100; and mind, controversy be- 
tween, 139 f. 

Mechanical argument of material- 
ism, 142, 14s f. 

Mechanical theory of the universe, 
187 f. 

Metaphysics, explanation of the 



TOPICAL INDEX 



313 



term, 18; its problems, 133, 
135 ff. 306. 

Methods of psychology, 29 flf; intro- 
spective, 29 f ; experimental, 31 f; 
genetic and biological, 33 f; com- 
bination of experiment and intro- 
spection, 36; investigation as the 
subject of logic, 45 f. 

Monism, 137; of substance, 138, 
154; of becoming, 139, 163 f. 

Monotheism of Plato and Aris- 
totle, 9. 

Moral adjustment, 241 f, 249 f, 
261 f. 

Morality and art, 236; and relig- 
ion, 260, 268, 274. 

Moral law, Kants' theory, 251; 
Fichte's theory, 252. 

Moral philosophy, see ethics. 

Moral rules of life, 243; inde- 
pendent of the moral conscious- 
ness, 244, 248; motives, 259; 
norms and sanctions, 259, 273; 
purpose of, 258, 273; social char- 
acter of, 249; the nature of, Soc- 
rates' theory, 244. 

Motive, 241, 254. 

Muscular sensations, 32. 

Music, 204, 221, 228. 

Mysteries of the Orphic sects, 95. 

Mysticism, 95 ff. 

Nativism in ethics, 258. 

Naturalism, 209. 

Natural rights, 278. 

Natural science methods in the 
mental sciences, 13. 

Natural scientists, the, and critical 
epistemology, 299 f. 

Nature, the love of, 226; philos- 
ophy of, 14 f, 160, 185 f, 306. 

Negation — the negative particle, 118. 

Neo-romanticism, 210. 

Norms of action, 243, 274; of ar- 
tistic creation, 229. 

Number, concepts of, 126 f, 169. 

Objective factor, the, in cognition, 
66. 



Occasionalists, 178. 

Odysseus as example of moral 
adjudgment, 263. 

Oedipus, King, (Tragedy of Sopho- 
cles), as example of objective 
beauty, 224. 

Oida ( o LOa — I know) as example 
of vulgar sensualism, 89. 

Ontogenesis and ontogenetic, 34. 

Ontology, 18, 19, 133, 13s ff. 

Organic life on the earth, 143; the- 
ory of the state, 279. 

Organon, the name given to the 
whole of Aristotle's logical writ- 
ings, 47. 

Painting, of modern artists, 217; 
and sculpture as the source of the 
functional pleasure of emotion, 
221. 

Pantheism, 191, 250. 

Pedagogy, 20, 285 f. 

Perception as the result of funda- 
mental apperception, no f, 123. 

Perception, judgment of, 114. 

Personality, 256, 266, 272, 280, 282, 
302, 304. 

Phantasy in philosophy, 16 f. 

Phenomenalism, 69 f. 

Philosophy as the queen of the sci- 
ences, I, II f; as theory of the 
universe, i f, 305; and pedagogy, 
286 f ; individualistic and critical, 
8; divisions of, 17; history of, 
20 f ; must be empirical and sci- 
entific, 291; must return to com- 
mon sense, 293; the activistic task 
of, 184. 

Phlogiston, 131. 

Phylogenesis and phylogenetic, 34. 

Physical and psychical, 173 f. 

Physics as a department of phil- 
osophy, 18; and mathematics un- 
derstood without their respective 
histories, 21. 

Physiology and psychology, 37 f. 

Play, 203, 211. 

Pluralism, 137 f, 139, 184. 



314 



TOPICAL INDEX 



Polarity, 159. 

Positivism, 70. 

Pragmatism, 98 f, 139, 184. 

Predicate and the predicate term, 
112 f. 

Pre-established harmony, 178. 

Principial-coordination, 170, 

Process, concept of, 138; psy- 
chical phenomena as mere, 25, 33, 
144 f; without substrate, 144 f; 
laws of, 12. 

Propaedeutic, 20, 54. 

Property, the theory of, as the sub- 
ject-matter of ethics, 246. 

Proposition, the, as the linguistic 
expression of judgment, 112. 

Psychical microscope, 294. 

Psychical nature and psychical sub- 
stance, 22; denied by materialism, 
141 f ; problem of, waived by 
psychology, 143 f. 

Psychical phenomenon, its distinct- 
ive character, 25, 33, 144 f, 152 f, 
170, 178; and physical regarded 
as similar, 38, 183, 292 f ; biolog- 
ical interpretation, 35, 122, 165 f, 
299; genetic interpretation of, 
33 f, 122, 296; social interpreta- 
tion, 302. 

Psychological origin of philosophy, 
3f. 

Psychology, 20, 25, 41, 296, 299, 
302; and physiology, 37 f; and 
philosophy, 39 f ; identified with 
physiology of the brain, 141; in 
aesthetics, 197 f. 

Psycho-physical parallelism, 179. 

Public, the, as a factor in creative 
art, 230. 

Question, the, 128 f. 

Rationalism, 87 f. 

Reaction, truth as tendency to, 117. 

Realism, naive, 65 f, 70, 83, 135; 
critical, 70 f, 83 f, 133. 

Reason, Kant's theory of, 93. 

Redemption, the demand for, ac- 
cording to the Orphics, 95. 



Relations regarded as independent 
objects of thought, 113. 

Religion and philosophy, 7 ff, 307; 
as elemental in the human mind, 
11; and art, 235 f; and morality, 
260; philosophy of, 186; science 
of comparative, 11; social and 
authoritative, 8; refined by phil- 
osophy, II. 

Responsibility, 255, 257. 

Righteousness, 246. 

Root-terms, 112. 

Routine labor, the obligation of 
philosophy to elevate, 2. 

Satisfaction, "Disinterested," 202, 
211. 

Science, the common aim of, 16; 
originated from practical necessi- 
ties, 103 f ; and art, 236. 

Sciences, the special, and philos- 
ophy, II f; as the economic ar- 
rangement of experience, 14, 90, 
138, 169. 

Secundi Petri, 48 n. 

Self-mastery, 253, 267. 

Semblance and appearance, "^6. 

Sensation, no. 

Sense perceptions, their chaotic 
character, 103; as the source of 
truth, 293. 

Sensibility and understanding ac- 
cording to Kant, 87. 

Senses, the specific energy of, 74. 

Sensualism, 88 f, 297. 

Skepticism, 58 ff. 

Social authority of religious dogmas, 
8; character of ethics, 249, 252 
304; conscience, 271; factor in 
aesthetic appreciation and in art 
199; factor in the development of 
cognition, 88, 114, 284, 303; fac 
tor in the life of the individual 
151; factor in psychology, 302 f. 

Social-psychology and ethnic psy 
chology, 34. 

Society, regulations of, as the con 
dition of morality, 276. 



TOPICAL INDEX 



315 



Sociology, 20, 276 f, 304. 

Spiritism, 97, 150. 

Spiritualism, 138, 149 f. 

Spontaneity, the, of mind in the 
judgment, 116. 

State, the, as moral authority, 276; 
as the subject of sociology, 278. 

Stick immersed in water, 77. 

Subjective factor in cognition, 66. 

Subject, the, of the judgment, 112; 
and substance, 123. 

Substance, 94, 123; elimination of, 
from the natural sciences^ 153, 
163; theory of the universe, 170; 
God as the only, 157; the monism 
of, 154 f ; not adapted to the 
explanation of psychical processes, 
152 f. 

Substrate, processes without, 145. 

Succession and causal connection, 
125 f- 

Symbolism, 209. 

Symbols, ideas and judgments as, 63. 

Synthesis, the judgment as, 128; 
creative, 147, 277. 

System, the philosophical as express- 
ing the mental content of the 
period, 22. 

Technical language of philosophy, 
23. 

Technique in art, 207, 230. 

Teleology, 187 ff 

Teleology of the biological functions, 
169 f. 

Terminology, 23. 

Theism, 190. 

Theological problem, the, 185, 186, 
190 f. 

Theology, natural and revealed, 10. 

Theory of the universe, a uniform 
and consistent, as the aim of 
philosophy, i f ; as the product of 
the scientific and artistic labor of 
philosophers, 9 f , 16; philosophy 
as, I, 305; philosophical, as direc- 
tive of human conduct, 2 f ; prac- 
tical, 71. 



Thing-in-itself, 68, 78. 

Thing in distinction from its at- 
tributes, 123. 

Thought as directive of action, 99; 
as a vital factor, 99 f ; economy, 
51; of language, 114; instrument 
of, 6, 9, II, 22, 94, 113, 127, 
161, 170. 

Touch, sense of, apparent objec- 
tivity of its data, 41, 67, 74, 77; 
aesthetic effect of, 214. 

Transcendent, 69. 

Transcendental, 69. 

Truth, 16; as a tendency to react, 
117; as relation, 118 f, 128; cri- 
terion of, 87, 102, 119; in thought, 
67; origin and development, 115; 
the pragmatic theory of, 100; 
theoretical as anticipatory store- 
house, 102. 

Typical ideas, iii, 232. 

Typical, the, in aesthetics, 233. 

Understanding and sensibility, 
Kant's theory, 87; as law-giver, 
93 ; as creator, 93 f. 

Uniformity, see law. 

Unity, philosophic desire for, 2; 
14, 305. 

Utilitarianism, 252, 259, 273. 

Vital emotion as contradicting the 
ideality of the universe, 79 f; as 
the beginning of psychical devel- 
opment,. 110. 

Vital processes, 146. 

Volitional impulse as the control- 
ling mass of apperception, 106 f. 

Voluntaristic psychology, 37, 297. 

Will, the freedom of the, 254; the 
individual, as opposed to the gen- 
eral will, 266; the general, 20, 
266, 269 f, 271, 292; and feeling 
as primitive forms of the activity 
of consciousness, 37, 159. 

Wonder as the beginning and mo- 
tive impulse of philosophy, 4, 104. 

World-process, 165. 

World-theory, philosophy as, i, 305. 



INDEX OF AUTHORS 



Abelard, 248. 

Anaxagoras, 140, 186, 188. 

Anquetil du Perron, 226. 

Antisthenes, 245. 

Anzengruber, 172. 

Aristippus, 245. 

Aristotle, 3, 9, 12, 17, 18, 22, 27, 
33, 46 f, SI, 87, IIS. I77» 182, 
188, 199, 201, 237, 240, 245 f, 
273, 278. 

Atomists, 86, 185 f. 

Augustine, 92, 238, 248. 

Avenarius, 167 ff, 194. 



Bacon of Verulam, 18 f, 48. 

Bain, A., 56. 

Baldwin, Mark, 51, 57. 

Barth, P., 284, 289. 

Bastian, A., 34. 

Baumgarten, A. G., 200. 

Bayle, Pierre, 60. 

Beneke, F., 253. 

Bentham, Jeremy, 252, 258. 

Berger, A. v., 240. 

Bergson, Henri, 134, 148. 

Berkeley, G., 27, 61, 75, 81, 87, 

149. 
Berthold v. Regensburg, • 96. 
Boethius, 47. 
Bohme, J., 96. 
Bridgman, Laura, 33. 
Bruno, Giordano, 156 f, 164, 191. 
Biichner, 59, 141. 
Burckhard, Max, 240. 
Burke, 202 
Busch, Otto, 240. 
Bussc, L., 133. 



Carneri, B., 253. 

Carriere, M., 204. 

Cartesians, 249. 

Car us, J. v., 133. 

Charron, Pierre, 60. 

Cherbury, H., 192. 

Christ, Jesus, 247. 

Cicero, 47, 244. 

Cohen, 57, 133, 239, 288. 

Cohn, Jonas, 239. 

Collins, A., 192. 

Comte, A., 70, 259, 2Tj, 279. 

Condillac, 90. 

Copernicus, 131, 156, 168. 

Croce, Ben., 240. 

Cynics, 23, 245. 

Cyrenaics, 86. 

Darwin, 34, 61, 166, 189, 253. 
Democritus, 5S, 61, 140, 185, 244. 
Descartes, 59, 92, 140, 149, 157, 

158, 178, 249, 291. 
Dessoir, M., 56, 205, 240. 
Dewey, John, 51, 57, 134. 
Diels, H., 154, 164. 
Dilthey, W., 240. 
Diogenes, 245. 
Doring, Aug., 288, 289. 
Drobisch, M. W., 57. 
Dubos, 202, 213. 
Duns, Scotus, 192. 
Durkheim, 289. 

Ebbinghaus, H., 55. 
Eckhart, Master, 96. 
Eisler, Rud., 23, 134, 289. 
Eleatics, 61, 86, 89, 91, 154. 
Empedocles, 140, 185. 
Epicureans, 2T. 



316 



INDEX OF AUTHORS 



317 



Epicurus, 9, 245. 
Erdmann, B., 57. 
Eucken, R., 150. 
Eudemus, 47. 

Fechner, G., 28, 150, 194, 204 f, 

239, 291. 
Feuerbach, Ludw., 283. 
Fichte, 2 f, 15, 90, 141, 251, 258, 

259. 
Frohschammer, J., 150. 

Germain, Sophie, 217. 

Geulincx, A., 178. 

Gizycki, G., 288. 

Goethe, 159, 165, 189, 191, 216, 

233, 250, 267. 
Goldscheid Rud., 288. 
Gomperz, Theodore, 57, 89, 240. 
Grillparzer, 216, 227 i. 
Groos, Karl, 211, 239, 
Grotius, Hugo, 278. 
Gumplowicz, L., 280, 288. 

Hackel, E., 162. 
Hartenstein, 93, 107, 251, 295. 
Hartmann, Ed. v., 134, 194. 
Hegel, 13, IS, 49, 90, 94» 98, 141. 

159, 160 f, 164, 197 f, 203, 234, 

239, 250, 252, 283. 
Heinze, M., 23. 
Helmholtz, 75, 165 f, 181. 
Helvetius, 259. 
Heraclitus, 164. 

Herbart, 28, 201, 204, 239, 253. 
Herder, 15, 202, 250, 283. 
Hesiod, 154. 
Hettner, H., 240. 
Heurtin, Marie, 33. 
Heymans, G., 134, 194. 
Hippocrates, 27. 
Hobbes, T., 249, 278. 
Hoffding, 56, 288. 
Holbach, 59, 140. 
Home, H., 202. 
Homer, 89, 154, 232, 263. 
Horace, 201. 
Horwicz, A., 56. 



Hume, David, 27, 60 f, 76, 87, 125 f, 

168, 249. 
Husserl, E., 57. 
Hutcheson, Fr., 249. 

Jamblichus, 95 £. 

James, W., 56, i34. I39. 184, 256. 

Jevons, Stanley, 57. 

Jodl, Fr., 55, 181, 287. 

Joel, Karl, 97, 256, 288. 

Joule, J. P., 181. 

Kant, 15, 19, 22, 48, 51, 61, 67, 69, 
76, 78 f, 85, 87, 90, 93. 98, 103, 
104, 108, 121, 125, 141, 165, 168, 
192, 196, 200, 202, 211, 213, 223, 
250 f, 258, 259 f, 291 f, 295, 305* 

Kassowitz, M., 56. 

Katscher, L., 242. 

Keller, Helen, 33. 

Kirchhoflf, G. R., 90. 

Kleinpeter, H., 134. 

Kreibig, J. Kl., 134, 288. 

Kiilpe, O., 23, 36, s6, 205. 

Laas, E., 70, 133. 

Lamarck, 166, 189. 

Lamettrie, 59, 140. 

Lange, Fr. A., 139, 194. 

Lange, Konrad, 205 f, 240. 

Laplace, 165. 

Lasalle, Ferd., 164, 283. 

Lavoisier, 131. 

Lazarus, M., 34, 211. 

Leclair, A. v., 70, 81, 133. 

Leibnitz, 149, 178, 307. 

Leonardo da Vinci, 236. 

Lessing, 202. 

Leucippus, 58, 140, 185. 

Liebmann, O., 133. 

Lilienfeld, P. v., 289. 

Lipps, Th., 56, 205 f, 239 f, 288. 

Locke, J., 27, 61, 87, 90, 249. 

Lotze, H., 28, 56, 150, 194. 

Lucretius, 27. 

Mach, Ernst, 21, 51, 56, 75, 90, 
102, 134, 167 f, 180. 



3i8 



INDEX OF AUTHORS 



/lalebranche, Nic, 178, 249. 
Marx, Karl, 283. 
Mayer, Rob^ 181. 
Megarian School, 46. 
Menger, Anton, 289. 
Meumann, E., 290. 
Meyer, Th. A., 240. 
Meynert, Th., 75, 300. 
Michael Angelo, 236. 
Mill, James, zj. 
Mill, J. S., 2^, 50, 70, 129. 
Molescott, 141. 
Montaigne, M. de, 60. 
Morgan, Lewis H., 289. 
Miiller, Johannes, 74. 
Munsterburg, H., 56, 133. 

Natorp, P., 134, 234, 289. 
Neokantians, 70, 78. 
Neoplatonists, zj, 95 f, 149. 
Neopythagoreans, 95 f. 
Newton, 305. 
Nietzsche, Fr., 254, 268. 

Occasionalists, 178. 
Oppenheimer, Fr., 280., 289. 
Orphics, 95, 247, 
Ostwald, Wilh., 14, 181. 

Parmenides, 155. 

Paulsen, Fr., 23, 270 f, 288, 290. 
Payot, Jules, 289. 
Ramus, Peter, 48. 
Pfander, A., 56. 
Phidias, 236. 
Philo, 9. 

Pierce, Charles, 99. 
Plato, 3, 7, 9, 18, 27, 46, 58, 92, 
IIS, 121, 149, 155, 188, 197, 199, 

201, 234, 246, 274, 2^^. 

Plotinus, 18, zT, 97 f, 149, 197 f, 

201. 
Popper, Josef, 217, 240. 
Porphyry, 47. 
Prantl, C, 57- 
Proclus, 96. 
Protagoras, 9, 89. 
Pyrrho, 59. 



Quintilian, 47. 

Raphael, 232, 236. 
Raumer, K., 289. 
Ree, Paul, 288. 
Rehmke, 70. 
Rein, W., 289. 
Rey, A., 134. 
Ribot, 180. 
Riehl, A., 23, 133- 
Rokitansky, Karl, 300. 
Rousseau, 278. 
Royce, J., 150. 

Savigny, 61. 

Schaffle, A., 279, 288. 

Schelling, 90, 141, 159, 197 f, 203 f, 

250. 
Scherer, Wilh., 240. 
Schiller, F. C. S., 102, 134. 
Schiller, Friedrich, 5, 16, 132, 203, 

211, 216, 219, 235, 254. 
Schiller, H., 290. 
Schmidt, Leop., 287. 
Schopenhauer, 47 n, 'j^), 150, 197 f, 

204, zze, 253, 259 f. 
Schroeder, E., 57. 
Schroeder, L. v., 268. 
Schubert-Solden, 70. 
Schultz, Julius, 134. 
Schuppe, E., 70, 133. 
Shaftesbury, 202, 249, 260. 
Shakespeare, 232, 233, 237. 
Sidgwick, H., 288. 
Siebeck, H., ZT, 56. 
Sigwart, Chr., 56. 
Simmel, G., 288, 289. 
Smith, Adam, 27, 249, 259, 260. 
Socrates, 46, 244, 245 f, 260, 270, 

Z7Z. 
Sophocles, 224. 
Spencer, Herbert, 2, 35, 133, 166, 

189, 211, 253, 279 f, 282, 288. 
Spinoza, 98, 156, 167, 174, 191, 

250, 254. 
Spitzer, H., 205, 240. 
Stein, Heinrich v., 199, 239. 
Stein, Ludwig, 99, 289. 



INDEX OF AUTHORS 



319 



Steinthal, H., 34. 
Geoffroy-Saint-Hilaire, 166, 
Stohr, A., 57. 

Stoics, 9, 27, 86, 140, 164, 245. 
Sturt, 134. 

Tarde, G., 289. 
Tauler, Joh., 96. 
Thales, 6. 

Theophrastus, 47. 
Thomas, of Aquinas, 274. 
Thucydides, 231. 
Toland, 192. 

Uberweg, Fr., 23, 65. 
Unold, Joh., 288. 

Verworn, M., 195. 

Villa, G., 56. 

Vischer, Fr., 204, 239. 



Vogt, K, 59, 141. 
Volkelt, J., 133, 205, 239. 

Wagner, Rich, 221 f. 
Ward, Lester, F., 289. 
Westermarck, Ed., 242, 265, 287, 

298. 
Willmann, Otto., 289. 
Winckelmann, 202. 
Windelband, W., 24, 55. 
Wolff, Chr., 18 f, 200. 
Wundt, W., 23, 28, 34, 38, 45 f, 

50, 55. I33» 146, 149 fj 182, 194, 

240, 2.TJ, 287. 

Zeller, Ed., 240. 
Zeno, the Eleatic, 155. 
Ziegler, Theob., 287, 290. 
Ziehen, Th., 56, 290. 
Zimmermann, Rob., 204, 239. 



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